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Abstract
The first chapter of the thesis investigates the resilience of Chinese manufacturing im-
porters to supply chain disruptions by exploiting the 2003 SARS epidemic as a natural
experiment. I show both in theory and empirics that geographical diversification is crucial
in building a resilient supply chain. I also find that reduction in trade costs induces firms
to further diversify. Connectivity to the transportation network facilitates diversification
in input sourcing and reduces the negative impact of SARS. Infrastructure is therefore use-
ful not only in improving the efficiency of the economy, but also in increasing its resilience
to shocks.
The second chapter studies how changes in factor endowments, technologies, and trade
costs jointly determine structural adjustments, which are defined as changes in the dis-
tributions of production and exports. During 1999 to 2007, Chinese manufacturing pro-
duction became more capital-intensive while exports did not. A structurally estimated
Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin model with heterogeneous firms reconciles this seemingly
puzzling pattern. Counterfactual simulations show that capital deepening made Chinese
production more capital intensive, but technology changes that biased toward the labour-
intensive sectors and trade liberalizations provided a counterbalancing force.
The last chapter examines how firm heterogeneity shapes comparative advantage.
Drawing on matched customs and firm-level data from China, we find that export par-
ticipation, exported product scope and product mix, and firm mix within industries vary
systematically with firms’ labour intensity. This is rationalized by a model in which firms
from industries of comparative disadvantage face tougher competition in the export mar-
ket. The competitive effect induces reallocation within and across firms and generates
endogenous Ricardian comparative advantage, which dampens ex ante comparative ad-
vantage. Using sufficient statistics to measure and decompose comparative advantage, we
find that the dampening mechanism is quantitatively important in shaping comparative
advantage for a calibrated Chinese economy.
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Chapter 1
Germs, Roads and Trade: Theory
and Evidence on the Value of
Diversification in Global Sourcing
1.1 Introduction
Global sourcing has allowed firms to find the best input in a global market but also exposed
them to foreign shocks. For example, the 2011 To¯hoku earthquake in Japan caused severe
disruptions to affiliates of Japanese multinationals in the US (Boehm et al., forthcoming).
Despite the conventional wisdom suggesting firms to diversify and the fact that firms are
increasing the priority of supply chain management, there is little rigorous evidence on
how diversification in global sourcing shapes the impact of supply chain disruptions on
firms and the extent to which infrastructure affects the size of the impact.1
In this paper I study the value of diversification in global sourcing for Chinese manu-
facturing importers by exploiting the 2003 SARS epidemic as a natural experiment. I show
both theoretically and empirically that geographical diversification is crucial in building a
resilient supply chain.2 By doing this I make the following three contributions. First, I find
that high productivity firms are more geographically diversified in input sourcing than low
productivity firms. Second, I find that sourcing diversifications make firms more resilient
to adverse shocks on sourcing if sourcing decisions exhibit complementarities across trade
1More than 90% of the firms surveyed by the World Economic Forum (2012) indicated that supply chain
and transport risk management had become a greater priority for them. A Financial Times article (2014)
advocates that diversification is still at the heart of supply chain management. However, management and
operation scientists mostly rely on simulations to evaluate supply chain disruptions and have problems
estimating model parameters according to the review by Snyder et al. (2016).
2A firm is defined to be more resilient if pass-throughs of adverse shocks on trade routes to firm outcomes
(such as marginal costs or revenues) are smaller. Ponomarov and Holcomb (2009) survey other notions of
resilience.
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routes. Finally, I find that connectivity to transportation networks increases sourcing di-
versification by inducing firms to source via more trade routes, which helps dampen the
negative impact of adverse shocks.
The 2003 SARS epidemic provides the empirical setting to investigate supply chain
disruptions. Unlike the recent outbreaks of Ebola and Zika, Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS) was an unknown disease when it first struck southern China in late
2002. It rapidly hit several other countries/regions, and reached its peak in the second
quarter of 2003. The epidemic ended in July 2003, after affecting more than 8,000 and
taking away the lives of 774 people. The rapid spread, coupled with scant information
disclosed by the Chinese government, shocked the global community. Major trading part-
ners of mainland China such as Canada, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore, and trade
hubs in China such as Beijing and Guangdong were severely affected. Given its deadli-
ness and infectiousness, governments took stringent measures to combat SARS, including
travel bans,3 vessel controls at ports,4 and health check-points on roads, which inevitably
disrupted trade. For example, the number of visitors to the 2003 spring session of Canton
Fair, the largest trade fair in China, dropped by 81%, and the total business turnover
dropped by 74% year-on-year.5
To guide the empirical analysis, I built a model in which firms source inputs from
different origins via various trade routes to assemble final goods. When making sourc-
ing decisions, a firm first chooses the trade routes. Conditional on its established routes,
the firm then chooses imports across this set of routes. The model has the following key
testable predictions. First, given the assumption that adding new trade routes incurs fixed
costs, only high productivity firms can afford to source via more routes if sourcing deci-
sions are complementary across trade routes. I further show that they are more diversified
in sourcing than low productivity firms as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
which takes into account how intensively firms source inputs via each route. Second, more
diversified firms are more resilient to adverse shocks if sourcing decisions are complemen-
tary across trade routes. I find that the pass-through of an adverse shock on trade routes
to marginal cost is proportional to the input expenditure share of the route hit by the
shock, which tends to be smaller for more diversified firms. The rise in marginal costs
drives down input demands if sourcing decisions are complementary across trade routes.
3The World Health Organization (WHO) issued rare travel advice warning travellers against visiting
regions with local outbreaks (Heymann, Mackenzie and Peiris, 2013).
4The WHO also provided guidelines to port authorities if cruise vessels had suspected cases on board.
The number of vessels arriving in Hong Kong dropped by about 5% in the first half of 2003. A Malaysian
chemical cargo vessel heading to Guangzhou was held in quarantine for 10 days when the crew members
started developing SARS-like symptoms. More than two months elapsed before the sick crew members
were given the all-clear.
5Source: Historical statistics of the Canton Fair.
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Such a feedback effect from marginal cost to imports is again smaller for a more diversified
firm. Finally, the model predicts that reduction in trade costs induces firms to further
diversify by sourcing via more trade routes.
I test the model prediction on diversification and resilience by estimating the response
of Chinese manufacturing firm imports to SARS using matched customs and firm-level data
from 2000-2006. The data allow me to identify the date, the location of the importer, the
Chinese entry customs, and the origin of each transaction. To capture the spatial and time
variations of the epidemic, I construct a treatment variable which measures the exposure
of Chinese importers to SARS by trade route. A trade route is defined as treated if the
origin or the entry customs was on the WHO’s list of areas with local SARS outbreaks.
Since the model predicts that the pass-through of a trade cost shock into the route-specific
import depends on the pre-shock input expenditure share of the affected route, I include an
interaction term between the treatment variable and the average input expenditure share
by trade route before SARS to capture such heterogeneous treatment effect. The baseline
estimate implies that the average effect of the SARS shock on imports was about -7.9%.
Crucially, the impact increased with the pre-SARS input expenditure share which suggests
that sourcing decisions were complementary and diversification brought resilience. For a
firm that solely relied on a route hit by SARS, my estimation implies that its imports
would fall by as much as 52%.
More diversified firms saw smaller impacts on their route-specific imports, but the
overall impact might not be smaller if a larger number of trade routes were affected. To
see if that was the case, I use the model to account for the effect of SARS on other
firm level outcomes. Despite the fact that I only observe firms’ international sourcing
behaviours which prevents me from fully identifying and estimating the model, I show
that we can gauge the effect on firm marginal costs and outputs using a sufficient statistic
approach.6 The idea is to combine the “hat algebra” approach (Jones, 1965; Dekle, Eaton,
and Kortum, 2007) and the technique from Feenstra (1994).7 Using this new method, I find
that the marginal cost of firms whose imports were hit by SARS increased by about 0.7%
on average. The rise in marginal costs tended to be smaller for firms with more trade
routes. Conversely, if pass-throughs were homogeneous, firms with more trade routes
would be more heavily affected. Aggregating across firms, total Chinese manufacturing
6Sufficient statistic approach is increasingly popular in the trade literature, with most notable contri-
bution by Arkolakis et al. (2012). Recent contributions include Blaum et al. (2016), and Fajgelbaum and
Redding (2014).
7In a CES model, Feenstra (1994) found that we can estimate changes in the Sato-Vartia price index
even if there are new or disappearing varieties as long as there are varieties which are available both before
and after. Similarly, I estimate changes in firms’ marginal cost relying on overlapping trade routes prior
and post the shock.
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output decreased by about 0.7% at the peak of SARS.8
The model predicts that high productivity firms are more geographically diversified
which is confirmed by the data. Conditional on firm productivity, the model also predicts
that firms’ sourcing strategies expand weakly if trade costs decline. Therefore, improving
infrastructures reduces trade costs and induces firms to become more diversified. This
might make them more resilient to adverse shocks given the finding that diversification
brings resilience. To test these model implications, I utilize the expansion of Chinese
highway and railway networks from 2000-2006 and examine whether or not firms further
diversify their sourcing strategy after connecting to railways or highways. Indeed, I find
that firms located in regions connected to highways started to source via more trade
routes, but connectivity to railways only had significant effects on the intensive margin.
To deal with the potential endogeneity of highway or railway placements, I follow the
“inconsequential unit approach” to exclude regions located on nodes of the transportation
network and focus on the periphery regions (Chandra and Thompson, 2000). The effect of
connectivity to transportation networks on diversification remains robust and significant.
Finally, I provide evidence that connectivity to railways dampened the negative impact of
SARS on imports for firms in the periphery regions while the effect of highway connection
was insignificant.
I conduct various robustness checks on the baseline result. First, to deal with concerns
over omitting export demand shocks, I extend the benchmark model by allowing firms
to export, and derived a new structural equation incorporating export demand shocks.
Guided by the extended model, I construct controls for export demand shocks. The esti-
mated effect of export demand shocks turns out to be small and insignificant. Second, I
ensure that the SARS shock was as good as random to firms in order to estimate its effect
consistently. To test this assumption, I employ a Difference-In-Difference strategy to show
that the growth trends of the never-treated and eventually-treated imports were similar
before SARS. Third, to deal with concerns about the peculiar feature of processing trade
and its prominence in Chinese imports, I estimate the response of importers Processing
with Inputs (PI) and Pure Assembly (PA) importers, separately. PA firms do not decide
where to source or own the imported inputs but must have written contracts approved
by the customs authority in advance (Feenstra and Hanson, 2005). There is little scope
for them to adjust sourcing in the face of SARS. Indeed, I find no significant treatment
effect or differential treatment effect for PA firms, while the diversification channel still
works for PI firms. Finally, I examine the possibility of alternative mechanisms cushion-
8It is about two thirds of the GDP loss estimated by Lee and McKibbin (2004) using a CGE model. I
do not consider input-output linkages which could amplify the effect as in Carvalho et al. (2016).
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ing firms from negative shocks. I construct variables to measure firms’ inventories, access
to finance and liquidity, and include them with the diversification channel. The diver-
sification channel remains robust but these alternative mechanisms are insignificant. To
deal with multi-plant firms diversifying productions in multiple locations, I focus on firms
importing/exporting in a single location and find the diversification mechanism remains
significant for them.9
Related Literature
My paper is related to several strands of the literature. It first contributes to studies on
trade in intermediate inputs and global value chains. There is a large body of literature
studying the productivity and welfare gains from sourcing foreign intermediate inputs
(Hummels et al., 2001; Goldberg et al., 2010; Gopinath and Neiman, 2013; Halpern et
al., 2015; Yu, 2015; Blaum et al., 2016). This paper builds on the work by Antra`s, Fort,
and Tintelnot (2017, hereafter AFT) and highlights another benefit of global sourcing,
namely allowing firms to diversify their sourcing strategies and increase their resilience to
adverse shocks.10 While firm heterogeneity has been shown to affect their organizational
forms (Antra`s and Helpman, 2004) and the productivity gains of sourcing (Blaum et al.,
2016), I show that it also shapes firms’ output volatilities and resilience to supply chain
disruptions.11
My study is also related to the literature on diversification and trade. The mechanism
of my model is similar to the “technological diversification” channel in Koren and Tenreyro
(2013). They show that it can explain the differential country-level output volatilities in
a close-economy model with endogenous growth. I show how it can generate resilience
to supply chain disruptions and heterogeneous firm-level volatility in open economies.12
While only the extensive margin is active in their model, I look at diversification in both
the intensive and extensive margins. Allen and Atkin (2016) investigate how the expansion
of Indian highways has shaped farmers’ revenue volatility and crop allocations through the
lens of a model with risk-averse agents, but diversification is achieved by risk-neutral agents
in my model. Similarly, using models with risk-averse agents, Fillat and Garetto (2015)
9Neither the firm survey nor the customs data report the number of plants that a firm has. I use a
proxy which counts the distinct number of Chinese locations associated with each firm in the customs
data.
10Similar to AFT, Bernard et al. (forthcoming), Blaum et al. (2016), and Furusawa et al. (2015) also
study firms’ extensive margin choice in sourcing but with different focuses from mine.
11AFT investigates the heterogeneous response of US firms to a large long-term shock which increases
the potential of China in supplying intermediate inputs. Berman et al. (2012) and Amiti et al. (2014)
both study how firm heterogeneity matters for exporters’ response to exchange rate shocks. I focus on
importers’ heterogeneous response to a negative temporal real shock.
12Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2012), and Caselli et al. (2014) study country-level volatility in open
economies. Vannoorenberghe et al. (2016), Kurz and Senses (2016) also found firm-level volatilities are
related to exporting and importing. Kramarz et al. (2016) examine diversification and the volatility of
French exports, focusing on the role of micro and macro level shocks.
Chapter 1 19
and Esposito (2016) examine demand diversifications for multinationals and exporters,
respectively. I focus on diversification in sourcing and test its implication on the resilience
of supply chains using a natural experiment.
The paper also contributes to the lively literature evaluating the impact of natural
disasters or epidemics on economic activities (Young 2005; Hsiang and Gina 2014; Boehm
et al., forthcoming; Barrot and Sauvagnat 2016; Carvalho et al. 2016). Similar to Boehm
et al. (forthcoming), Barrot and Sauvagnat (2016), and Carvalho et al. (2016), I also study
how shocks affect the rest of the economy or other economies through the input channel.
The key difference is that I focus on firms’ heterogeneous response and how diversification
can serve as a mechanism to mitigate negative shocks. While the detrimental effect of
Ebola on trade has been noted (FAO, 2016; World Bank, 2016), there is little concrete
estimation of this effect. This paper is the first to evaluate the impact of an epidemic on
trade in intermediate inputs.
Finally, the paper is related to studies on infrastructure and trade. While most of
the literature focuses on how infrastructure reduces trade costs and brings productivity or
welfare gains,13 my study highlights an additional benefit of better infrastructure, that is,
allowing firms to diversify sourcing and increase their resilience to shocks. Similar effects
of infrastructure are also featured in Burgess and Donaldson (2010, 2012) who find that
the arrival of railways in India reduced the damage of weather shocks on local economies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the motivating
evidence. Section 3 sets up the model and develops its main predictions. Section 4 studies
the resilience of firms to SARS. Section 5 accounts for the effect on marginal costs and
revenues. Section 6 examines the effect of roads on diversification and resilience. Section
7 concludes.
1.2 Motivating Evidence
This section establishes three new stylized facts on global sourcing which motivates the
theoretical model in the next section. I use two datasets to generate these facts. The first is
the Chinese Annual Industry Survey (CAIS) for year 1999-2007. It covers all state owned
enterprises and other firms with sales above 5 million Chinese Yuan (around US$60,000).
It provides firms’ financial statements, name, address, phone number, post code, etc.. The
other data that I use are the Chinese Customs data for year 2000-2006 which cover all
Chinese import and export transactions. For each transaction, the data record the value,
quantity, origin, destination, the Chinese customs district for clearance, and information
13Recent contributions include Donaldson (2018), Allen and Arkolakis (2014), Fajgelbaum and Redding
(2014), Atkin and Donaldson (2014), Bernard et al. (forthcoming), and Baum-Snow et al. (2016).
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about the Chinese import/export entity. There is no common identifier between these two
datasets. I match them using firm name, post code, and phone number.14 Because my
focus is the production of goods, I limit the sample to manufacturing firms. Firms with
fewer than 8 employees are excluded since they operate under different legal requirements.
I also exclude firms with negative outputs or fixed assets. The matched sample represents
about 38% of all Chinese imports in 2000 and 46% of those in 2006.
1.2.1 Output Volatility and Sourcing Diversification
Since the customs data record the origin, destination, and customs district, I can track
the geographical trajectory of each transaction.15 For example, a firm from Beijing can
import from Japan via the Shanghai or the Tianjin customs district.16
The combination of a sourcing origin and a customs district forms a geographically
distinct route for sourcing. Using this information, I first identify the set of trade routes
used by each Chinese importer. I then measure sourcing diversification for each firm using
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) which sums over the squares of input expenditure
share of all routes, while the input expenditure share is measured by the share of route-
specific inputs in total inputs. Since domestic sourcing is not observed in my data, HHI
is assigned as one for non-importers. At the same time, CAIS allows me to compute
the volatility of outputs for firms. Following Koren and Tenreyro (2013), I define output
volatility as the variance of (real) sales growth rate during the period 1999 to 2007.17 Since
this is a relatively short time series, I also use the customs data to generate a relatively long
time series of firms’ quarterly exports and compute the volatility of exports for exporters
from 2000-2006.18 I then examine how sales and exports volatility are associated with
firms’ sourcing diversification and find:
Stylized fact 1: Importers which are more geographically diversified in sourcing are less
volatile.
This can first be seen from Figure 1.1. Panel (a) plots a local polynomial regression
of (log) firm level sales volatility on sourcing diversification measured by the average HHI
14This matching method has been used in various papers including Yu (2015), and Manova and Yu
(2016).
15In the Chinese customs regulations, importers are required to report the border customs district
through which goods are actually imported. For the goods transferred between customs districts, the
name of the customs district at the entry point is reported. For more details, please refer to section III of
the Chinese Standards on Completion of Customs Declaration Forms for Import/Export Goods.
16In total, China was divided into 41 provincial level customs districts during the sample period. The
majority of these customs districts overlap the provincial borders (see Figure A3 in the Appendix). A full
list of the customs districts is given in Appendix Table A18.
17The price index is from Brandt et al. (2012). I focus on the balanced panel and exclude entry and
exit to insure that I have relatively longer time series to compute volatility.
18There is no product level price index for exports. Instead, I use output price index to deflate exports.
The results are similar without deflating.
Chapter 1 21
−
1.
3
−
1.
25
−
1.
2
−
1.
15
−
1.
1
ln
(vo
lat
ilit
y o
f s
ale
s)
.2 .4 .6 .8 1
HHI
(a) Volatility of sales
−
.
8
−
.
6
−
.
4
−
.
2
ln
(vo
lat
ilit
y o
f e
xp
ort
)
.2 .4 .6 .8 1
HHI
(b) Volatility of exports
Figure 1.1: Sourcing diversification and firm-level volatility
between 2000 and 2006. Panel (b) looks at the volatility of exports and sourcing diver-
sification. As can be seen, there is a general upward sloping trend in both figures: firms
with more diversified sourcing strategies are associated with lower volatility. Of course,
there may be confounders that lead to such a relationship. To handle such concern, I con-
duct a regression analysis regressing firms’ output volatility on sourcing diversification,
controlling for age, size in terms of average employment, and productivity measured in
terms of average TFP during sample period for firms. I also control for diversification in
the product margin by including the average number of imported products (Harmonized
System 8 digit product), and geographically diversification on the demand side by adding
the number of exporting routes used by the exporters. The results are shown in Appendix
Table A7. The relationship remains stable: a higher HHI is associated with higher output
volatility. It continues to hold when restricting the sample to importers and controlling
for the number of products imported. The regressions on exports volatility lead to the
same conclusion as in Appendix Table A8.
1.2.2 Customs District Heterogeneity and Gravity
Importers source inputs through geographically distinct customs districts. These customs
districts show rich heterogeneity in terms of the number of firms they serve and the value
of goods they process. This is captured in Figure 1.2 (a). The figure plots the share of
Chinese imports through each customs district on the horizontal axis against the share of
importers that import via each customs district on the vertical axis.19 The vertical axis
captures the extensive margin while the horizontal axis captures both the intensive margin
and the extensive margin. As is obvious from the figure, there are large variations between
19The sum of the values on the vertical axis does not add up to 1 because firms could import through
multiple customs districts. The current result uses data from the year 2006 - results from other years are
similar.
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customs districts. The Shanghai customs district is the largest. Nearly 40% of Chinese
importers import through Shanghai. Although the share of importers through Shenzhen
is just about a third of Shanghai, the value of goods passing through is almost the same,
about 20% of the total. Such divergence in the extensive margin and the intensive margin
suggests that some customs districts may be easy to access but they are not as efficient in
terms of sourcing foreign imports.
Part of Shanghai’s advantage is probably its relatively central position on the Chinese
coastline. Figure 1.2 (b) plots the share of firms importing via Shanghai for each prefecture
city. Gravity clearly plays a role: there is a gradient originating from Shanghai. Closer
firms are more likely to import through Shanghai. These findings can be summarized as:
Stylized fact 2: Customs districts are heterogeneous in facilitating imports and firms
tend to source via closer customs.
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Figure 1.2: Customs district heterogeneity and gravity
1.2.3 Multi-customs-district Premium
Firms using different numbers of customs districts are also very different. Figure 1.3
(a) shows the distribution of customs use across importers. Importers using multiple
customs districts are a minority but they import much more goods than single-customs-
district importers. Only 30% of the importers import via more than one customs district.
But they contribute about 60% of total imports. This suggests that the importers using
multiple customs districts are probably larger. I next examine whether this is borne out
by regression analysis.
It is well known that importers are larger than non-importers (Bernard, Jensen, Red-
ding, and Schott, 2007; Kugler and Verhoogen 2009). AFT shows that the importer
premium tends to rise with the number of countries that firms import from. I confirm
this finding in the Chinese data and show that there is an additional premium: importers
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importing through more customs districts tend to be larger and more productive. This
is shown in Appendix Table A9 in which I use data from the year 2006 and regress firm
characteristics on the number of customs districts that firms use, controlling for the num-
ber of origins. My focus is the dummies indicating the number of customs districts that
importers use with single-customs-district firms as the benchmark group. Columns (1)
to (4) focus on sales. Column (1) controls only for industry, prefecture and ownership
fixed effects, and the premium of multi-customs-district firms is huge. Moreover, it in-
creases with the number of customs districts. When the number of importing countries
is included in column (2), which is the focus of AFT, the effect shrinks by around two
thirds. Firm size as measured by employment is included in column (3). To address the
concern that the premium could be due to multi-plant firms located in multiple customs
districts, a measure controlling for multi-plant firms is added in column (4). Either CAIS
or the customs data do not report the number of plants. Since the customs data report
the destination and origin for each transaction, I count the number of distinct domestic
destination/origin locations for each Chinese exporter/importer. If firms have separate
plants in each location, this place count measure can be used to control for multi-plant
firms. Adding this multi-plant measure, the premium decreases slightly but remains size-
able and significant. Similar results hold for imports in column (5), labour productivity
as measured by real value added per worker in column (6) and Total Factor Productivity
(TFP) in column (7).20 The premium is also visualized in Figure 1.3 (b), with the dash
lines indicating the 95% confidence intervals. The third stylized fact is summarized as:
Stylized fact 3: Multi-customs-district sourcing firms are larger and more productive.
In Appendix 1.C.1, I conduct various robustness checks on the premium, including
an alternative measure for a multi-plant firm, excluding processing importers who are
subject to place-based policy such as processing trade zone, and excluding importers from
Guangdong province which is divided into seven customs districts. For all these robustness
checks, the premium remains sizeable and highly significant. The premium is not particular
to the year 2006 and found in data from other years as well.
1.3 Theoretical Framework
This section presents a model of global sourcing which reconciles the three stylized facts
established in the previous section. More importantly, it provides theoretical predictions
on sourcing diversification and resilience to supply chain disruptions, which will guide
20I use the price indexes from Brandt et al. (2012) to construct real value added and real capital stock.
TFP is estimated using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method.
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Figure 1.3: Multi-customs-district premium
my empirical analysis. I introduce multiple domestic regions, domestic trade costs, and
customs services into the model by Antra`s, Fort and Tintelnot (2017). While countries
are singletons and goods arrive at factory doors directly in their model, the new features
are necessary to identify domestic regions and customs districts hit by SARS. They also
allow me to investigate the role of domestic infrastructure.
1.3.1 Demand
There are I regions at home. In each region, the representative consumer’s preference for
the manufacturing final goods is given by the following CES utility function
Ui = (
∫
$∈Ωi
q($)
σ−1
σ d$)
σ
σ−1 ,
where σ > 1 is the demand elasticity, and Ωi is the set of final-good varieties available at
region i. The demand for final goods at region i is determined by
qi($) = Dipi($)
−σ,
where Di ≡ 1σ ( σσ−1)1−σP σ−1i Ei is a region specific demand shifter; Ei and Pi are the local
expenditure and price index, respectively; pi($) is the price of variety $.
1.3.2 Production and Trade
The final-good producers compete in a monopolistically competitive market with free en-
try. They are endowed with a core productivity ϕ which is drawn from a distribution
Gi(ϕ), ϕ ∈ [ϕi,∞]. Following Melitz (2003), such productivity is learned only after pay-
ing the fixed entry cost of fei. To produce the non-tradable final goods, firms assemble
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intermediate inputs which are sourced from intermediate input producers located in dif-
ferent origins. The bundle of intermediate inputs has a continuum of measure one and is
assumed to have a symmetric elasticity of substitution ρ.21
While AFT assumes that the final-good producers trade directly with the intermediate
input producers and there are no domestic trade costs, I assume that it requires customs
services when sourcing the foreign inputs, and trade is also costly at home. The reason
for making these assumptions is twofold. First, importers use services provided by the
customs bureau at various stages of the transaction. Even services which are not directly
provided by the customs bureau, such as searching for the right suppliers, translating
documents, or making payments, are usually provided by intermediaries located in the
vicinity of the customs bureau. The cost and efficiency of the service vary across customs
districts, which can help explain the large customs district heterogeneity observed in the
second stylized fact.22 Second, domestic trade costs are particularly high in developing
countries. Atkin and Donaldson (2015) estimate that the distance elasticity for domestic
trade costs is four to five times larger in Ethiopia or Nigeria than in the US. In the case of
China, as pointed out by Young (2000), interregional competition leads to severe market
segregation. It is important to understand how domestic trade costs shape firms’ sourcing
behaviour and how improvement in infrastructure might help firms in sourcing.
To keep the model as tractable as possible and at the same time retaining these ad-
ditional features, I assume that firms’ input sourcing follows a two-stage process, as il-
lustrated in Figure 1.4. Intermediate inputs are first sourced by intermediaries located
in each customs district. Inputs are then shipped to the final-good producers.23 The
iceberg trade costs of shipping inputs from origin k to the customs district j, and from j
to the final destination i are denoted as τjk and τij , respectively. In order to source inputs
through trade route jk, the final-good producers from region i need to pay a fixed cost in
terms of fijk units of labour in region i. I use Ji(ϕ) to denote the set of customs districts,
and Kij(ϕ) the set of origins for which the firm with productivity ϕ located in region i
has paid the associated fixed cost of sourcing wifijk. I will refer Ji(ϕ) and Kij(ϕ) as the
sourcing strategy.
The intermediate input producers use constant return to scale technologies for produc-
tion with labour as the only input, and sell their outputs competitively. At each origin,
there is a continuum of intermediate input producers. The unit labour requirement is de-
21The assumption of non-tradable final goods is not crucial. It is relaxed later in one of the robustness
checks. The measure of intermediate inputs can also be endogenized without changing the main predictions.
Similar to AFT, ρ turns out to play little role in the model.
22Customs broker is a typical type of intermediary. Alibaba, the largest Chinese B2B platform, provides
an online platform for customs brokers. The prices and services listed vary across locations.
23This is similar to the “hub and spoke” structure used by Head, Jing and Ries (2017) for sourcing. It
also resembles the idea of international gateway in Cos¸ar and Demir (2016).
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Figure 1.4: Illustration of firms’ sourcing process
noted as ak(ϕ, v) for the input producer v ∈ [0, 1] locating in region k who supplies inputs
for a firm with productivity ϕ. Following AFT, I assume that the firm-specific ak(ϕ, v) is
drawn from the following Fre´chet distribution:
Pr(ak(ϕ, v) > a) = e
−Akaθ , Ak > 0,
where Ak is the average efficiencies of intermediate input producers from origin k. At
each customs district, there is a continuum of intermediaries which use constant return
to scale technologies providing the customs service. The unit labour requirement for
the intermediary ω ∈ [0, 1] locating in customs district j trading with the firm having
productivity ϕ is denoted as bj(ϕ, ω). Again, it is assumed that bj(ϕ, ω) is drawn from a
Fre´chet distribution:
Pr(bj(ϕ, ω) > b) = e
−Bjbθ , Bj > 0,
where Bj is the average efficiency of the intermediaries in customs district j. Under these
assumptions, the marginal cost of firms is given by
ci(ϕ) =
1
ϕ
(
∫ 1
0
[τijbj(ϕ, ω)wj(
∫ 1
0
(τjkak(ϕ, v)wk)
1−ρdv)
1
1−ρ ]1−ρdω)
1
1−ρ .
1.3.3 Optimal Sourcing
The final-good producers’ problem in sourcing has two layers: the sourcing strategy, i.e.,
the extensive margin problem in choosing which trade routes to be used in sourcing inputs,
and the intensive margin, i.e., how much inputs to source from each route. I first solve
the intensive margin problem for a given sourcing strategy, then characterize the optimal
sourcing strategy.
The cost of sourcing input v from origin k via intermediary ω at customs district j to
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destination i for firm ϕ is: τijτjkak(ϕ, v)bj(ϕ, ω)wkwj . If ak(ϕ, v) and bj(ϕ, ω) were learnt
simultaneously and the final-good producer sought to min
j,k
{τijτjkak(ϕ, v)bj(ϕ, ω)wkwj},
there is no explicit solution as in the Eaton-Kortum (2002) model. This is because the
product of two Fre´chet distributed random variables is not Fre´chet distributed. To make
progress, I impose the the following assumption on timing: the final-good producers do
not observe the realized unit labour requirement at the origins when making the sourcing
decision across customs districts; they can only predict these costs given the productivity
distribution of potential suppliers in different origin countries.24 Suppose the expected unit
cost of intermediate inputs shipped to customs district j for firm ϕ is cji (ϕ). The customs
district picked by final-good producer is determined by solving the following problem:
min
j∈Ji(ϕ)
{τijbj(ϕ, ω)cji (ϕ)wj}.
Since 1/bj(ϕ, ω) is Fre´chet distributed, according to Eaton and Kortum (2002), the prob-
ability of sourcing through customs district j is given by
χij(ϕ) =
Bj(τijwjc
j
i (ϕ))
−θ∑
l∈Ji(ϕ)Bl(τilwlc
l
i(ϕ))
−θ . (1.1)
The problem at customs district j in choosing intermediate input producers across origins
is:
min
k∈Kij(ϕ)
{τjkak(ϕ, v)wk}.
Again, given the Fre´chet distributed 1/ak(ϕ, v), the probability of sourcing from region k
at customs district j is given by
χk|j(ϕ) =
Ak(τjkwk)
−θ
Θj(ϕ)
,
where Θj(ϕ) ≡
∑
n∈Kij(ϕ)An(τjnwn)
−θ. The expected unit cost cji (ϕ) is given by c
j
i (ϕ) =
(γΘj(ϕ))
− 1
θ , where γ is a constant defined by the Gamma function. Similar to the Nested
Logit model in discrete choice theory, the probability of sourcing from origin k using
customs district j for final-good producer from region i with productivity ϕ, which I will
call sourcing intensity for the rest of the paper, is given by:
χijk(ϕ) = χij(ϕ)χk|j(ϕ) =
BjAk(τijτjkwjwk)
−θ
Ψi(ϕ)
, (1.2)
24Antra`s and de Gortari (2017) make a similar assumption in a model of global value chain with multi-
stage production. They show that this assumption of incomplete information with stage specific random-
ness is isomorphic to an alternative assumption of complete information but with randomness ascribed to
the overall costs of a given route.
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where Ψi(ϕ) ≡
∑
l∈Ji(ϕ)BlΘl(ϕ)(τilwl)
−θ =
∑
l∈Ji(ϕ),n∈Kij(ϕ) φiln is the sourcing capability
of the firm, and φiln = BlAn(τilτlnwlwn)
−θ is the sourcing potential of origin n through
customs district l. Then Equation (1.1) can also be rewritten as
χij(ϕ) =
BjΘj(ϕ)τ
−θ
ij wj
−θ
Ψi(ϕ)
.
Thus the customs districts which have lower costs trading with the destination are more
likely to be used. This is consistent with Stylized fact 2 on customs district gravity.
Following Eaton and Kortum (2002), the Fre´chet assumptions implies that
ci(ϕ) =
1
ϕ
(γ2Ψi(ϕ))
−1/θ. (1.3)
Up till now, the sourcing strategies given by Ji(ϕ) and Kij(ϕ) have been taken as
given. They are characterized by the following problem:
max
Iijk∈{0,1}J,Kj=1
k=1
pii(ϕ, {Iijk}J,Kj=1
k=1
) = Diϕ
σ−1(γ2
J,K∑
j=1
k=1
IijkBjAk(τijτjkwjwk)
−θ)
σ−1
θ − wi
J,K∑
j=1
k=1
Iijkfijk,
(1.4)
where Iijk is an indicating variable, J and K are the total number of customs districts and
origins that firms could potentially choose. Iijk takes value 1 if j ∈ Ji(ϕ) and k ∈ Kij(ϕ),
that is Ji(ϕ) ≡ {j : Iijk = 1} and Kij(ϕ) ≡ {k : Iink = 1, n = j}. As noted by AFT, there
is no explicit solution to Problem (1.4). A brute force approach requires an evaluation of
2JK combinations of customs district and origin for each firm. Nonetheless, the solution
has the following properties.
Proposition 1.1. The optimal sourcing strategy Iijk(ϕ) ∈ {0, 1}J,Kj=1,k=1 is such that
(a) a firm’s sourcing capability Ψi(ϕ) is non-decreasing in ϕ;
(b) if σ − 1 > θ, Ji(ϕL) ⊆ Ji(ϕH), Kij(ϕL) ⊆ Kij(ϕH) for ϕH ≥ ϕL;
(c) if σ − 1 > θ, Θj(ϕ) is non-decreasing in ϕ.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.1.
Conclusion (a) implies that firms with higher core productivities ϕ have even lower
marginal costs given their higher sourcing capabilities. In the case that σ−1 > θ, sourcing
decisions are complementary. According to conclusion (b), there is a pecking order in firms’
sourcing strategies.25 It implies that high productivity firms are more likely to source not
25For the case that σ−1 = θ, the sourcing decisions across different trade routes are independent. For the
case that σ−1 < θ, they are substitutable. In both cases, the sourcing strategies of firms do not necessarily
follow a pecking order according to AFT. In the rest of the paper, I focus on the more empirically relevant
case that sourcing decisions are complementary. Later, I provide an estimate for σ− 1− θ which turns out
to be positive.
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only from more origins but also via more customs districts. This is consistent with Stylized
fact 3 that multi-customs-district importers are more productive.
1.3.4 Industry and General equilibrium
Following AFT, I assume that consumers spend a fixed share of their income η on the
manufacturing final goods. The remainder is spent on an outside good which is homoge-
neous and freely tradable across regions. The outside good thus serves as numeraire and
pins down the wage for each region. Wages are thus taken as given in solving the sectoral
equilibrium for the manufacturing sector. Since entry is free:
∫ ∞
ϕi
pii(ϕ)dG(ϕ) = wifei,
the measure of final-good producers in each region can be pinned down as
Ni =
ηLi
σ(
∫∞
ϕi
∑
j∈Ji(ϕ),k∈Kij(ϕ) fijkdGi(ϕ) + fei)
.
1.3.5 The Gravity Equation
For a firm with productivity ϕ, if it sources inputs from origin k via customs district j,
the corresponding import is given by
Mijk(ϕ) = (σ − 1)Diϕσ−1(γ2Ψi(ϕ))
σ−1
θ χijk(ϕ). (1.5)
Then the total imports of all firms in region i from origin k via customs district j is given
by
Mijk(ϕ) = Ni
∫
ϕijk
Mijk(ϕ)dG(ϕ)
= (σ − 1)Diγ
2(σ−1)
θ BjAk(τijτjkwjwk)
−θΛijk,
where Λijk =
∫
ϕijk
Iijk(ϕ)ϕ
σ−1Ψi(ϕ)
σ−1−θ
θ dG(ϕ), and ϕijk is the productivity cut-off for
firms located in region i picking route jk.
1.3.6 Diversification, Resilience, and Volatility
The previous results are direct extensions of AFT, this subsection presents new results
on firms’ diversification in sourcing, resilience to shocks on supply chains, and output
volatility. Proposition 1.1 implies that high productivity firms tend to be more diversified
along the extensive margin since they source from more trade routes. However, it is not
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necessarily true that their inputs are less concentrated. For example, consider two firms
A and B, firm A is using two trade routes with each contributing 12 of total inputs, while
firm B is using three routes with one contributing 34 , and the other two each contributing
1
8 . The concentration of A’s sourcing strategy measured by the HHI is (
1
2)
2 + (12)
2 = 12 ,
and (34)
2 + 2(18)
2 = 1932 >
1
2 for B. So B looks more diversified by the extensive margin, but
less diversified after taking the intensive margin into account. The following proposition
rules out such a possibility.
Proposition 1.2. If sourcing decisions are complementary across trade routes, that is
σ − 1 > θ, the concentration of firms’ sourcing strategies as measured by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index HHIi(ϕ) ≡
∑
j,k χijk(ϕ)
2 is non-increasing in ϕ.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.2.
Therefore, high productivity firms are more diversified even after considering the in-
tensive margin. The intuition is that if a certain trade route is dominant for a firm, it
must be less or equally dominant for a more productive firm. This is because the high
productivity firms have greater sourcing capability and more alternatives. For the example
above, it cannot be that B ’s most dominant option takes a share greater than 12 when it
has one more option than A.
So far, I have characterized the properties of the optimal sourcing strategy for given
sourcing potentials and fixed costs. The following proposition considers a comparative
statics on how the optimal source strategies respond to exogenous changes in these pa-
rameters.
Proposition 1.3. If sourcing decisions are complementary across trade routes, that is
σ − 1 > θ, and market demands Di are fixed, firms’ sourcing strategies Ji(ϕ) and Kij(ϕ)
weakly expand whenever there is improvement in the sourcing potential ~φi or reduction in
the fixed costs of sourcing ~fi, where ~φi
′
= {φijk}J,Kj=1,k=1 and ~fi
′
= {fijk}J,Kj=1,k=1.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.3.
The proposition implies that increasing sourcing potentials or reduction in the fixed
costs of sourcing will induce firms to expand their sourcing strategies along the extensive
margin.26 The intuition behind the result is as follows. Since sourcing decisions are
complementary, an increase of sourcing potential of any trade route is likely to raise the
marginal benefit of including a route in the sourcing strategy. Reducing the cost of any
26In a different model setup, Bernard et al. (forthcoming) discovers a similar result with respect to
search costs and variable trade costs.
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sourcing route is likely to lower the marginal cost of including a route. These make it
more attractive for a firm to add a new route.
Now I examine the model prediction on firms’ resilience to shocks. Resilience is mea-
sured by the pass-through of adverse shocks to firm performance. A firm is said to be more
resilient if the pass-through is smaller. Since there is no explicit solution to the model,
we might expect that it is difficult to know without numerical simulations. It turns out
that we can gauge the effect without solving the whole model by using the “hat algebra”
technique thanks to Jones (1965) and revitalized by Deckle, Eaton, and Kortum (2007).
One complication is that my model has adjustments in the extensive margin. Firms can
add or drop trade routes. In the Eaton-Kortum-type models, firms import from every-
where and there is only adjustment in the intensive margin. To solve the problem, I use
a technique from Feenstra (1994) with which he estimates the welfare gains from new
varieties. Applying his idea along with the hat algebra approach, I find:
Proposition 1.4. For a small idiosyncratic trade cost shock which changes τijk to τ
′
ijk
(τijk ≡ τijτjk) such that the firm does not abandon route jk, we have:
(a) The pass-through to the marginal cost is given by
∂ ln(ĉi(ϕ))
∂ ln(τ̂ijk)
=
χijk(ϕ)
1−∑jk∈Ni(ϕ) χ′ijk(ϕ) ,
where X̂ ≡ X′X and Ni(ϕ) is the set of new routes chosen by the firm after the shock.
(b) With complementarity of sourcing decisions across trade routes (σ − 1 > θ) and
adverse shocks (τ ′ijk ≥ τijk),
∂ ln(ĉi(ϕ))
∂ ln(τ̂ijk)
= χijk(ϕ),
∂2 ln(ĉi(ϕ))
∂ ln(τ̂ijk)∂ϕ
≤ 0; ∂
2 ln(ĉi(ϕ))
∂ ln(τ̂ijk)∂φijk
> 0.
That is, high productivity firms are more resilient to adverse shocks, and firms are less
resilient to shocks on more appealing trade routes.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.4.
The pass-through has two components according to conclusion (a): the intensive mar-
gin captured by χijk(ϕ) and the extensive margin captured by
1
1−∑jk∈Ni(ϕ) χ′ijk(ϕ) . Both
depend on firm productivity ϕ.27 However, it is difficult to know how pass-throughs vary
with productivity ϕ for general shocks. Conclusion (b) instead focuses on adverse shocks
27The pass-through depends only on the intensive margin and is homogeneous across all importers
in Eaton-Kortum-type models with universal importing. Therefore, these models predict that firms are
equally resilient.
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which is more relevant to the discussion of resilience.28 In this case, the pass-through
depends only on the intensive margin. This is because no firms will add new trade routes
facing adverse shocks, according to Proposition 1.3. The only possible adjustment along
the extensive margin is to drop trade routes.29 Then the term on extensive margin ad-
justment becomes 1
1−∑jk∈Ni(ϕ) χ′ijk(ϕ) = 1 since
∑
jk∈Ni(ϕ) χ
′
ijk(ϕ) = 0. The impact of the
shock is determined by the intensive margin and increases with χijk(ϕ). If the firm is not
diversified at all, and solely replies on the trade route hit by the shock, the pass-through
is 100%. Conclusion (b) tells us that the pass-through decreases weakly with firm produc-
tivity. This is because high productivity firms are more diversified and source from more
places. Their load of inputs on any particular route is smaller, and so is the pass-through.
It also tells us that the pass-through is larger for routes with higher sourcing potential.
Due to the pecking order, firms agree on the ranking of trade routes. The more appealing
routes take larger shares for every firm. Shocks on these routes have higher pass-throughs
and are more detrimental to firms.
Marginal costs are usually not directly observable. To generate empirically testable
predictions, I study how the easily observed firm-level import flows given by Equation
(1.5), will respond to an adverse shock. The model delivers the following result.
Proposition 1.5. (a) For a small trade cost shock which increase τimn to τ
′
imn such that
firms do not abandon route mn, import flows respond according to
−∂ ln M̂ijk(ϕ)
∂ ln τ̂imn
=
 θ + (σ − 1− θ)χimn(ϕ), if m=j, n=k,(σ − 1− θ)χimn(ϕ), otherwise.
(b) If sourcing decisions are complementary across trade routes, the size of the pass-
through to imports decreases weakly with firm productivity.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.5.
Again, the pass-through endogenously depends on firm productivity ϕ. Other than
the usual Fre´chet shape parameter θ which captures the direct impact of the shock, there
is an additional term (σ−1−θ)χimn(ϕ) which is positive if sourcing decisions are comple-
mentary (σ− 1 > θ), and negative if inputs are substitutable (σ− 1 < θ). This additional
term highlights the interdependencies across trade routes and disappears in the knife-edge
case of no interdependencies (σ − 1 = θ). The cost shock reduces firms’ sourcing capa-
bility and increases their marginal cost according to Proposition 1.4. This drives down
28The bottleneck problem is that we cannot characterize how the set of new routes N (ϕ) varies with
ϕ. For a favourable shock, the pass-through is non-monotonic with respect to firm productivity which I
discuss in the proof.
29The situation here is to the opposite of Proposition 1.3. When the sourcing potential of a certain route
declines, firms’ sourcing strategies either shrink or remain the same.
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marginal demand curve for all inputs if the sourcing decisions are complementary. Such
a feedback effect through interdependencies amplifies the initial cost shock and reduce
imports further. In contrast, if the inputs are substitutable, the cost shock reduces firm
output and drives up the marginal demand curve. Such increase in the marginal demand
for the input dampens the initial negative shock. This difference will allow me to identify
whether sourcing decisions are complementary or substitutable.
The pass-through also varies the sourcing intensity χijk(ϕ). The feedback effect is
stronger if the firm has a heavier load on inputs from the route being shocked, which
tends to be the case for a less diversified firm. Finally, the interdependency is also reflected
by the result that imports also respond to shocks on other routes in the firm’s sourcing
strategy.
I have shown that more productive firms can be more resilient to adverse shocks in
Proposition 1.4. However, since high productivity firms are sourcing from more places,
they may also be more exposed to shocks. There is no guarantee that they are less volatile.
The following proposition provides conditions under which high productivity firms are also
less volatile.
Proposition 1.6. (a) If the shocks on trade routes are not perfectly correlated and have
the same variance ξ2, opening to trade lowers the volatility of firms’ sourcing capabilities.
(b) If sourcing decisions are complementary across trade routes and the adverse shocks
are i.i.d., the volatility of firm revenue is:
var(R̂i(ϕ)) ∝ ξ2HHIi(ϕ)
which weakly decreases with productivity ϕ.
(c) The volatility of importers is the same under universal importing.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.6.
While the literature has shown extensively that trade in intermediate brings produc-
tivity gains for firms (Goldberg et al., 2010; Halpern et al., 2015; Blaum et al., 2016; AFT,
2017), we know less about the effect on higher moments of firm performance and how they
vary with firm productivity. Result (a) indicates a potential additional benefit of opening
to trade for intermediate inputs: lower firm-level volatility. Caselli et al. (2015) illustrate
that opening to trade can lower countries’ aggregate volatility by allowing countries to
diversify and reducing the exposure to domestic shocks. A similar mechanism is present
in my model at the firm level except that I allow firms to add or drop trade routes while
countries import from everywhere in their model. They emphasize that the mechanism
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hinges on the size of variance and covariance across countries. This is still true in my
model. If the variance of domestic sourcing potential is negligible compared with the
variance of the foreign sourcing potentials, sourcing autarky actually would lead to lower
volatilities.30 Result (b) spells out a scenario that more geographically diversified firms are
less volatile. It provides a theoretical explanation for Stylized fact 1. The channel relies
on diversification since the variation of volatility is all loaded on the variation of HHI. In
a model with universal importing such as Eaton-Kortum, result (c) implies homogeneity
in the volatility of all importers, regardless of the underlying structure of shocks. This is
at odds with Stylized fact 1 and highlights the importance of adjustment in the extensive
margin in generating volatility heterogeneity across firms.
1.4 Diversification and Resilience to the SARS Epidemic
This section tests Proposition 1.5 on diversification and resilience by exploiting the 2003
SARS epidemic as a natural experiment. During my sample period, SARS was one of the
most significant events which disrupted the supply chains of China.31 As I will argue, it
was an unexpected exogenous shock to Chinese importers which made it more difficult for
them to source inputs.
1.4.1 The SARS Epidemic
SARS was the first easily transmissible epidemic to emerge in the new millennium. It broke
out in Southern China in November 2002 and ended in July 2003. It was an unknown
disease which has respiratory symptoms similar to an influenza and could not be cured by
existing antivirals and antibiotics at that time. Given its severity and infectiousness, gov-
ernments and intergovernmental organizations took unprecedented measures to prevent it
becoming a global pandemic (Heymann et al. 2013). Other than travel advice warning
people against travelling to areas with local outbreaks, the WHO also issued procedures
to hold cargo vessels in check at ports in case there were probable cases on board.32 The
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) set up the “Anti-SARS Airport Evalu-
ation Project” to impose checks on flights from SARS infected areas.33 These measures
necessarily created frictions in the flow of people and goods. For example, the number of
30This may explain why Kurz and Senses (2016) find that US importers are more volatile than non-
importers. As a matured economy, US is probably less volatile than other countries.
31While Japan is one of the key suppliers for China and there are many recent studies on the effect of
the 2011 earthquake (Boehm et al 2015; Todo, et al., 2015; Carvalho et al., 2016), my data do not cover
this period.
32For example, Travel advice - Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China, and Guangdong
Province, China was issued on 2 April 2003. Procedures for prevention and management of probable cases
of SARS on international cargo vessels was issued on 23 May 2003.
33ICAO Airport Evaluation for Anti-SARS Protective Measures.
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air passengers around the Asia-Pacific dropped almost by 50% in the second quarter of
2003 compared with 2002 (Hollingsworth et al., 2006), while the freight traffic in Asia and
North American stayed below the 2002 level for most of the year.34
Important suppliers of mainland China such as Canada, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore
and Vietnam were severely affected. These five regions topped the list of SARS cases, just
behind mainland China itself (see Appendix Table A17). Imports from these regions
alone made up about 20.5% of all Chinese imports in 2002. SARS struck these regions
on different dates and lasted for different periods, such spatial and time variations help
to identify the effect of the epidemic. To capture these variations, I use lists of Areas
with recent local transmission of SARS provided by the WHO which it identified as risky
to travel to. These lists are summarized in Appendix Table A12, in which I indicate the
period that each region was listed as risky. Using this list, I construct a dummy SARSjk,t
indicating whether a trade route was hit by SARS or not at period t. It takes the value one
as long as a Chinese customs district j or origin k remained on the list at time t.35 Since
the listing depended not only on the development of the epidemic but also the discretion
of WHO, it is very likely to be exogenous to Chinese importers and their foreign suppliers.
1.4.2 The Resilience of Firms to SARS
Proposition 1.5 predicts that the effect of an adverse shock on imports varies with the
pre-shock sourcing intensity. To capture such a differential treatment effect, I run the
following regression:
ln Importntijk = Di + Cj +Ok + F
nt +
∑
k
bkX
nt
k + α1χ
n,t−1
ijk
+α2SARSjk,t + βχ
n,t−1
ijk SARSjk,t + γCoSARS
nt
ijk + 
nt
ijk, (1.6)
in which I examine how firm n’s imports flowing from origin k through customs district j
at time t, Importntijk, would respond if trade route jk was hit by SARS. The customs data
are at monthly frequency which I aggregate to quarter-level to deal with the lumpiness of
monthly data. According to Proposition 1.5, the pass-through depends on the sourcing
intensity before shock χn,t−1ijk , which is measured by the average expenditure share of firm
n for inputs from route jk before the SARS epidemic. I add an interaction term between
the SARS shock SARSjk,t and the pre-SARS sourcing intensity χ
n,t−1
ijk to capture the
heterogeneous pass-through, while controlling for the main effects. The main coefficient
of interest is β. It has a structural interpretation of −(σ − 1 − θ) and is expected to be
34IATA International Traffic Statistics: December 2003.
35A customs district is defined as affected if its local province is on the list.
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negative if sourcing decisions are complementary. I also control for the interdependence of
trade flows across routes by adding a dummy CoSARSntijk indicating whether other trade
routes used by firm n were hit by SARS or not at period t. This is because Proposition
1.5 predicts that trade flows also respond to shocks hitting other routes. At the same
time, I control for Di the destination fixed effect, Cj the customs district fixed effect,
and Ok the origin fixed effect, respectively. Finally, and most importantly, I control for
firm characteristics Xntk and firm-time fixed effect F
nt to deal with idiosyncratic firm-level
time-varying shocks, including demand shocks and disruptions in production due to the
SARS epidemic.
The results are presented in Table 1.1, where I add the independent variables one by
one. Unsurprisingly, the pre-shock sourcing intensity is positive and highly significant
in all columns; trade flow is larger for routes with higher sourcing intensity. The main
effect of the SARS shock is negative and highly significant as indicated in column (2).
Firm imports fell by 7.9% on average if the route was hit by SARS. However, there are
significant variations across firms and routes. The pass-through is much smaller for more
diversified firms. When the interaction term between the sourcing intensity and SARS
shock is introduced in column (3), the main effect of the SARS shock is reduced to about
5.6%, and the coefficient of the interaction term is negative and highly significant at -0.465.
Then for a firm without any diversification before the epidemic such that χn,t−1ijk = 1, the
overall effect of the SARS shock was −0.0555 + (−0.465) ∗ 1 = −0.52. That is, its imports
fell as much as 52%. In contrast, if the firm was very diversified such that χn,t−1ijk ' 0,
the overall effect the SARS shock would just be the main effect at −5.6%. Moreover, the
fact that the estimated β is negative implies σ − 1 > θ, and the sourcing decisions are
complementary. In column (4), I further include the dummy indicating whether other
routes were hit by SARS or not to capture the interdependence across trade routes. The
effect turns out to be very small and not significantly different from zero while the other
coefficients remain robust.
1.4.3 Robustness Checks
Export Demand Shocks
So far, I have assumed that firms do not export, but in fact many importers are simulta-
neously exporters. If export demand shocks due to the SARS epidemic are correlated with
import cost shocks, the omitted variable problem will lead to a bias in the estimation. To
understand how export demand shocks translate into import demand, I extend the model
and allow firms to export final goods following the Melitz (2003) setup. This is shown in
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Table 1.1: Resilience of firms to the SARS epidemic
Dependent Variable: firm imports by route ln(impijk,t)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
pre SARS sourcing intensity 9.461∗∗∗ 9.461∗∗∗ 9.493∗∗∗ 9.493∗∗∗
(0.0970) (0.0970) (0.0953) (0.0953)
trade route hit by SARS=1 -0.0794∗∗∗ -0.0555∗∗ -0.0557∗∗
(0.0229) (0.0244) (0.0241)
trade route hit by SARS=1 x pre SARS sourcing intensity -0.465∗∗∗ -0.464∗∗∗
(0.133) (0.133)
other routes hit by SARS=1 0.00454
(0.0197)
firm-time FE Y Y Y Y
industry FE Y Y Y Y
ownership type FE Y Y Y Y
origin FE Y Y Y Y
destination FE Y Y Y Y
customs area FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.472 0.472 0.472 0.472
No. of observations 2019727 2019727 2019727 2019727
Notes: A trade route is a combination of an origin and a customs district. It is defined as hit by SARS
if the origin or the customs district is listed by the WHO as regions with local transmission of SARS. The
pre shock sourcing intensity is constructed as the route-specific input expenditure share averaged before
the SARS epidemic. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors clustered at region-industry level.
Significance levels are indicated by *, **, *** at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
Appendix 1.A.8. The key result is that the pass-through of a shock affecting both exports
and imports to import flow is given by
−∂ ln M̂ijk(ϕ)
∂ ln τ̂imn
=
 θ + (σ − 1− θ)χimn(ϕ) + (σ − 1)µimn(ϕ), if m=j, n=k,(σ − 1− θ)χimn(ϕ) + (σ − 1)µimn(ϕ), otherwise,
where µimn(ϕ) is the intensity of final goods exported through trade route mn, which
captures the diversification on the demand side. The pass-through is smaller for a more
diversified exporter who has a smaller share of goods exported though route mn. Moreover,
if cov(χimn(ϕ), µimn(ϕ)) > 0 and σ − 1 > θ, so that imports and exports are positively
correlated, the effect of diversification in sourcing is overestimated when diversification
on the demand side is omitted.36 To control for export demand shocks, I follow the
theory to add an interaction term between the epidemic shock and the pre-SARS export
intensity for each route. The export intensity is constructed as the average share of outputs
exported through each route before the epidemic. The results are presented in Appendix
Table A1. Column (1) is the benchmark which only includes the sourcing diversification
channel. Column (2) instead only includes the export diversification channel and omits
the sourcing diversification channel. The coefficient for the export intensity is positive.
So indeed firms tend to import more through the trade routes which have higher export
36σ − 1 > θ naturally implies σ − 1 > 0 because θ is greater than zero.
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intensity. Moreover, the interaction term between the SARS shock and export intensity
has a significant negative coefficient. Thus, without looking at sourcing diversification, it
looks as if imports are more resilient when the export intensity is lower. However, only
diversification on the import side matters when I put the two channels together in column
(3): the magnitude of the interaction term between the SARS shock and export intensity
drops dramatically and is not significantly different from zero. At the same time, the
baseline result of sourcing diversification remains robust and significant.
Alternatively, we expect that importers who do not export should not be exposed to
export demand shocks. In Appendix Table A14, I split the sample into exporters and
non-exporters. For importers who do not export, the differential treatment effect remains
robust and significant.37
No Pre-Trend Assumption
Although I have controlled for a rich set of fixed effects and even firm-time fixed effect
which should alleviate much concern on selection. It might still be of concern that the
routes hit by SARS were selected within a firm in such a way that made them more or less
resilient to the SARS shock. To show that this is not the case and the SARS shock was
as good as random, I employ a Difference-In-Difference strategy to estimate firm imports
by route, and include the interaction terms of the time dummies and the treated dummy,
controlling for firm characteristics including firm size, age, and firm, industry fixed effects,
ownership type, and origin-customs-destination fixed effects. A firm-route is defined as
treated if it was eventually affected by SARS during the sample period. The coefficients
for the interaction terms of the treated dummy and the time dummies are plotted in Figure
1.5. As we can see, there was no pre-existing trend before the epidemic.
Processing Trade
During the past three decades, China has adopted policies which encourage local firms
to form processing trade relationships with foreign firms. Processing trade accounted for
about half of total imports in the early 2000s (Yu, 2015). For Chinese processing traders,
there are two important regimes (Feenstra and Hanson, 2005; Manova and Yu, 2016):
processing with supplied inputs (PI) under which firms independently source and pay for
imported inputs, and pure assembly (PA) under which firms receive inputs at no cost from
foreign partners.38 As argued by Feenstra and Hanson (2005), PA firms play little part
37The effect is much larger than the full sample. But these non-exporters are less productive than the
exporters. They are less diversified and should have higher pass-throughs.
38As long as the finished outputs are re-exported, both types of processing trade are exempted from
import duties. If the processed goods are sold domestically, the exempted import tariffs must be returned.
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Figure 1.5: SARS on imports: difference-in-difference estimation
Notes: The figure plots the coefficients of the interaction terms of the time dummy and the
treated dummies in a difference-in-difference regression on firm imports by route. A firm-route
is treated if either the importing origin or the customs district was affected by SARS during the
sample period. Dash lines indicate 95% confidence intervals while standard errors are clustered at
firm level.
in sourcing and incur no costs using the imported inputs. Their sourcing decisions are
at the discretion of their foreign partners. Moreover, the terms of the transaction with
the foreign partner must be written in contracts and presented to the customs authority
in advance. Given these institutional constraints, there is little scope for them to adjust
their sourcing strategy in the face of unexpected shocks compared with normal firms. In
contrast, PI firms take ownership of the imported inputs. They actively search for the
right inputs and pay for the associated costs. Other than paying zero duties, the problem
that PI firms face can still be described by my model. Thus their response to the SARS
shock should still be in line with the model prediction.
To see whether this is the case, I examine the effect of SARS on pure PI processing
importers and pure PA processing importers separately. These are processing firms that
only engage in processing imports.39 The results are presented in Appendix Table A2.
Columns (1) and (2) include only the sample of PI importers while columns (3) and (4)
include only the sample of PA importers. As expected, the response of PI firms is in
line with the model. The coefficient of the interaction term is negative and significant,
although the average effect is not significant. In contrast, the coefficient of the interaction
term is positive but not significantly different from zero for PI firms. The main effect of the
SARS is also not significantly different from zero. These results implies that the PA firms
were not responsive in sourcing when affected by SARS, regardless of their diversification
in sourcing.
39I also examine importers who partially participate in processing imports. The results are qualitatively
the same as presented in Appendix Table A13. As noted by Yu (2015), there are hybrid firms which have
both PI imports and PA imports. To make the test as clean as possible, these hybrid firms are excluded.
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Alternative Cushioning Mechanisms
Finally, I examine whether the diversification channel under examination is robust to
alternative mechanisms that might make firms more resilient to the SARS shock. The
main alternative channels that I consider include liquidity, finance, and inventory. The
idea is that firms with more liquidity, better access to credit or more inventory may also
be more resilient to the SARS shock. These favourable conditions provide buffers for firms
to absorb and counteract adverse shocks. If these firms at the same time are also more
diversified, I would overestimate the effect of diversification. To rule out such a possibility,
I construct measures to capture these various channels. Following Manova and Yu (2016),
I measure the liquidity available to each firm as (current assets - current liabilities)/total
assets. For access to credit, I use the leverage ratio which is measured as liabilities/assets.
Finally, I use the ratio of the inventory in intermediate inputs relative to total intermediate
inputs to capture the inventory channel. These variables are added as additional controls
to the baseline regression. Since these measures are firm-year specific and will be fully
absorbed by the firm-time fixed effect, the firm-time fixed effect is replaced by a county-
time fixed effect. The results are presented in Appendix Table A3. Column (1) is the
baseline which includes only the import diversification channel. Columns (2) to (4) focus
on the alternative channels. Column (5) puts them together with the baseline channel. As
we can see, these alternative channels do not appear have significant effect in cushioning
the SARS shock on imports and the diversification channel remains significant.
There is concern that multi-plant firms, which produce in multiple locations and nat-
urally import via more routes, are more resilient because of diversification in production.
To deal with such concern, I focus on firms importing/exporting in a single location, which
make up about 80% of the importers in my sample, and are likely to be single-plant firms.
The results are presented in Appendix Table A15. The baseline result still holds for these
firms importing/exporting in a single place, while the effect is not significant for firms
with multiple importing/export locations.
1.5 Accounting for the Effect of the SARS Shock
SARS reduced imports, more strongly for less diversified firms. The question that remains
unanswered is how much the SARS shock on imports had raised firms’ marginal costs and
reduced aggregate output. The lack of domestic sourcing data prevents me from doing
a full-fledged structural estimation to uncover all underlying parameters. I have only
estimated firms’ response in the intensive margin. Despite these, as argued by Chetty
(2009), sufficient statistic approach can bridge the gap between reduced form and struc-
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tural estimation. The following proposition shows that answering the question requires
only estimating the demand elasticity, observing the pre-shock sourcing behaviour, and
the estimated effects on imports in the intensive margin.
Proposition 1.7. If sourcing decisions are complementary across trade routes, the change
in firms’ marginal cost in the face of adverse shocks to inputs can be inferred as:
ĉi(ϕ) = (
∑
j×k∈C(ϕ)
χijk(ϕ)M̂ijk(ϕ))
1
1−σ ,
where χijk(ϕ) is the pre-shock sourcing intensity, M̂ijk(ϕ) is the estimated change in trade
flow, σ is the demand elasticity, and C(ϕ) is the set of common routes used by the firm
both before and after shocks.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.7
Although marginal cost is not directly observable and cannot be easily estimated. This
result tells us that χijk(ϕ), M̂ijk(ϕ) and σ are sufficient statistics to estimate the effect
of adverse shocks on marginal cost. χijk(ϕ) is available from the data. M̂ijk(ϕ) can be
calculated given the estimates from the previous section. The only unknown is the demand
elasticity σ. As I have estimated, σ−1−θ = 0.464 from the interaction term of Column (4)
in Table 1.1 corresponds to the coefficient β in Equation (1.6). According to Proposition
1.5, β’s theoretical counterpart is −(σ − 1− θ). If θ is estimated, σ can also be inferred.
I next estimate θ by exploring firms’ sourcing decision with respect to tariff variations
across markets.
1.5.1 Estimating the Efficiency Dispersion Parameter θ
The key relationship that I use to estimate θ is χijk(ϕ) =
BjAk(τijτjkwjwk)
−θ
Ψi(ϕ)
, which is the
sourcing intensity from origin k through customs district j for a firm in region i with
productivity ϕ. Suppose χdi (ϕ) ≡ φ
d
i (ϕ)
Ψi(ϕ)
is the intensity of domestic sourcing where φdi (ϕ)
is the capability of domestic sourcing, a ratio-type estimator can be formulated:
lnχijk(ϕ)− lnχdi (ϕ) = ln
BjAk(τijτjkwkwj)
−θ
Ψi(ϕ)
− ln φ
d
i (ϕ)
Ψi(ϕ)
(1.7)
= lnBjwj
−θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
customs FE
+ lnAkwk
−θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
origin FE
− θ ln τij − θ ln τjk − lnφdi (ϕ).
AFT normalize φdi (ϕ) to be the value one which implies that all importers have the
same domestic sourcing capability. Hence lnφdi (ϕ) = 0 and disappears from the equation
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above. Since I observe the locations of firms and other firm variables, I allow it to vary
cross firms by controlling for firm characteristics and firm fixed effect.40
Compared with AFT, I also allow for domestic trade costs τij and intermediation
efficiencies at customs district Bjwj
−θ to affect firms’ sourcing behaviour. In the equation
above, I control for lnBjwj
−θ and lnAkwk−θ by customs fixed effect and origin fixed
effect, respectively. For domestic and international trade costs, I assume that ln τ θij =
α0 + α1 ln distij + α2comLangij + α3comCustomsij + ij , and ln τ
θ
jk = β0 + β1 ln distjk +
β2coCHNjk + β3tk + εjk. Domestic distances distij are measured in great circle distance
between the prefecture where the firm is located and the importing customs district. The
coordinates of the Chinese prefectures are measured in ArcGIS as the centroid of each
prefecture. The coordinates of the customs districts are measured as the centroid of
the major gateway city within the customs district.41 Distances between Chinese customs
districts and sourcing origins distjk are measured in terms of great circle distances between
the centroids of major gateways as well.42 comLangij is a dummy variable indicating
whether the domestic destination i shares the same language as the customs district j. This
variable is coded using the Language Atlas of China in Lavely (2000) which provides data
at county level. I further aggregate the data to prefecture city and customs district level.
comCustomsij is a dummy indicating whether destination i is within the customs district
j or not. It is meant to capture the trade costs imposed by the customs administrative
boundaries. Next, since Rauch and Trindade (2002) find that ethnic Chinese networks
facilitate trade between countries, I construct the variable coCHNjk which is the share of
ethnic Chinese in origin k multiplied by the share of overseas Chinese for customs district
j. Historically, some Chinese regions such as Guangdong had more emigrants bound for
other countries. These regions may have formed a better network with foreign suppliers
and enjoyed lower trade costs than other regions in China. The share of ethnic Chinese
for each origin is from Poston Jr et al. (1994).43 The share of overseas Chinese for
customs districts is constructed using the Chinese City Yearbook 1995. The Yearbook
reports the number of overseas Chinese for each prefecture.44 I aggregate it up to customs
40Firms with high domestic sourcing capability are very likely to have high global sourcing capability.
The global sourcing capability will be overestimated unless φdi (ϕ) is controlled. Yet firms in regions with
poor access to foreign markets may source more from the domestic market. In a different context, Baum-
Snow et al (2016) show that domestic and foreign market access have different implications for Chinese
urban growth.
41When there is more than one major gateway city, the minimum of the distances from the ports is used.
The list of major gateways for each customs district is in Appendix A18.
42For coastal countries, I identify the largest port. For inland countries, the capital city is used. I also
seek a robustness check with maritime distance. It is computed as using a map of maritime shipping from
Halpern et al. (2015) to extract the shortest path connecting the ports. I then calculate the length of the
path. The result is quantitatively similar.
43The sample used by Rauch and Trindade (2002) is limited to a smaller number of countries for which
the gravity variables are available. I use the full sample from Poston Jr et al. (1994).
44In the data they are called “Hua2qiao2” in Pinyin, which means ’overseas Chinese’.
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district level and divide it by the local population. The result is reported in the last
column of Appendix Table A18. Finally, I construct firm-market import tariffs using
data from TRAINS following Fitzgerald and Haller (2014). The tariff is constructed as
tnk =
∑
p
psnt +ps
n
t−1
2 ln(1 + tk,p) where ps
n
t is the product share in firm n’s import basket
at period t and tk,p is the import tariff imposed by China on product p from origin k. It
varies by market since product tariffs vary by market. Such variations shift the cost of
sourcing and allow me to identify the dispersion parameter θ.
In the end, the equation that I estimate is:
lnχnijk − lnχdi
n
= a+ Cj +Ok − α1 ln distij − α2comLangij − α3comCustomsij
−β1 ln distjk − β2coCHNjk − β3ln(tnk) +Xni δ + Fn + ξnijk,
where Cj and Ok are custom area and origin fixed effects respectively. Firm characteristics
Xni and firm fixed effect F
n capture the unobserved domestic sourcing capability lnφdi (ϕ)
in Equation (1.7). β3 is the coefficient of interest which corresponds to θ. The results
for the estimation using year 2006 data are reported in Appendix Table A4.45 The main
specification of interest is shown in Column (4) where we have θ̂ = 5.50. This is close to the
value in the literature as surveyed by Head and Mayer (2014). They find a median trade
elasticity of 5.03 for structural estimations using tariff variations.46 To address the concern
that current product share is endogenous to current tariff in Fitzgerald and Haller (2014),
I also use a tariff measure which only use the lagged product shares as weights. Instead
of controlling for gravity variables, I use origin-customs district-destination fixed effect
to fully absorb the iceberg trade costs. I also try other specifications and the elasticity
remains robust as in the Appendix Table A16. Given the estimate that θ̂ = 5.50, the
demand elasticity is σ̂ = 5.50 + 1 + 0.465 = 6.965.
The estimated origin fixed effect captures the efficiency of each origin lnAkw
−θ
k . I
plot it against total imports from each origin in Appendix Figure A2 (a). The estimated
customs district fixed effect captures the efficiency of each customs lnBjw
−θ
j . Panel (b)
plots it against total imports through each customs. Both show an upward sloping rela-
tionship. The estimated efficiency of Shenzhen is about 1.9 times higher than Shanghai.
This probably partly explains why imports through Shenzhen were almost the same as
Shanghai even though the number of importers imported via Shenzhen was just about 1/3
of Shanghai.
45There was not much variation in import tariffs across markets for China before 2006. Most Chinese
trade agreements took effect after 2005. Before that, China imposed homogeneous import tariffs across
markets except several least developed African countries.
46This is also their preferred value. AFT estimate θ using the variation in wages across sourcing origins
and get a much lower elasticity at 1.789.
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1.5.2 Effect of SARS on Firms’ Marginal Cost and Aggregate Output
With the estimated demand elasticity σ, we can now estimate the effect on firms’ marginal
cost using Proposition 1.7. Using the estimated effect of SARS on imports from the
previous section, I compute the point estimate of changes in imports by M̂ijk(ϕ) =
α˜2SARSjk,t + β˜χijkSARSjk,t + γ˜CoSARS
nt
ijk with α˜2 = −0.0555, β˜ = −0.464, and
γ˜ = 0.00454 according to column (4) of Table 1.1. Figure 1.6 (a) plots the estimated
changes in marginal cost against the number of trade routes for the affected firms.47 The
average effect on marginal cost is about 0.7%. Interestingly, there is a general downward
sloping trend: firms sourcing from more routes appear less affected. However, if the ho-
mogeneous pass-through specification is used to compute M̂ijk(ϕ) = α˜2SARSjk,t where
α˜2 = −0.0794 according to column (2) of Table 1.1, the result plotted in panel (b) shows
an opposite trend: the more diversified firms appear less resilient. This highlights the role
of heterogeneous pass-through in generating resilience for more diversified firms.
With the estimated effect on marginal cost, the effect on firm revenue is:
R̂i(ϕ) = ĉi(ϕ)
1−σ. (1.8)
Therefore, given that σ = 6.965, an 1% increase in marginal cost translates to a loss of
(1−σ)% = −5.965% in revenue.48 Before showing the aggregate effect, I examine whether
these firm-level revenue shocks are meaningful. I regress the actual firm revenue growth
rates in year 2003 on the accumulated revenue shocks over the quarters that the firm was
affected in 2003.49 The result is shown in Table 1.2. Columns (1) to (3) include both
importers and non-importers. Zeros are assigned for the accumulated shocks for non-
importers. Columns (4) and (5) only include importers. As we can see, in all regressions,
firms which had larger revenue shocks due to SARS had a lower growth rate in 2003. So
the constructed shocks are indeed correlated with the actual growth rates.
I then aggregate the loss in revenue across firms using
R̂ =
∑ Ri(ϕ)
R
ĉi(ϕ)
1−σ,
where Ri(ϕ)R is the observed output share of firm i from the data. This is computed for
each quarter that SARS was affecting the Chinese economy, and the result is plotted in
47The figure is generated using local polynomial regression, dropping the top 1% firms in terms of the
number of trade routes used.
48To the extent that σ might be different across firms, it has been investigated by Yeh (2016). He found
that larger firms face smaller price elasticities. This is an additional channel that they might respond less
to shocks.
49Quarterly level firm outputs are not observable since CAIS reports firm revenues at annual frequency.
I sum the inferred revenue shocks over the quarters that firms were affected. For example, if a firm had a
revenue shock of 1% in Spring and 2% in Summer, the overall shock is 3%.
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Figure 1.7. At the peak of the epidemic 2003Q2, SARS led to a loss of about 0.7% in
Chinese manufacturing output. It quickly subsided to just 0.2% when the epidemic ended
in 2003Q3.50
Table 1.2: Verifying the firm level revenue shock
Dependent Variable: All Firms Importers Only
firm revenue growth rate in year 2003 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
accumulated revenue loss due to -0.881∗∗∗ -0.705∗∗∗ -0.770∗∗∗ -0.569∗∗∗ -0.410∗∗∗
SARS shocks on imports (0.207) (0.204) (0.214) (0.119) (0.109)
ln firm age -0.319∗∗∗ -0.344∗∗∗ -0.535∗∗∗
(0.0445) (0.0472) (0.0787)
ln firm employment 0.100∗∗∗ 0.0415∗∗
(0.0305) (0.0197)
Prefecture FE Y Y Y Y Y
industry FE Y Y Y Y Y
Ownership FE Y Y Y Y Y
R2 0.00570 0.00614 0.00623 0.0573 0.0724
No. of observations 140081 140081 140081 11585 11585
Notes: The dependent variable is the the growth rate of firm revenue in 2003. Columns (1) to (3)
include both importers and non-importers. Columns (4) and (5) only include importers. The numbers in
parentheses are standard error clustered at industry-prefecture level. Significance levels are indicated by
*, **, *** at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
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Figure 1.6: Effect on marginal costs
1.6 Roads, Diversification, and Resilience
I have provided evidence showing that sourcing diversification made firms more resilient
to the SARS epidemic. But the questions remained are: (a) who are more diversified,
and (b) can we improve firms’ resilience by making them more diversified in sourcing? I
will address these two questions in this section. Answering these two questions not only
50Lee and McKibbin (2004) simulate a CGE model to estimate the economic impact of SARS. They find
a reduction of Chinese GDP by 0.37%. Since manufacturing is about 32.5% of Chinese GDP in 2003, my
estimation implies that GDP fell by 32.5%*0.7%=0.23% at the peak of SARS due to shocks on imports.
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Figure 1.7: Effect on aggregate output
provides further tests on the model, but also helps us to identify barriers that keep firms
from being resilient and find policies to improve their resilience.
1.6.1 Productivity and Diversification
Proposition 1.2 predicts that diversification depends on productivity: high productivity
firms are more diversified as measured by the HHI of their sourcing diversification. To
test this prediction, I run the following regression:
HHInt = a0 + a1lnFnt +
∑
k
βkX
n
k + nt,
where HHInt is the HHI of firm n at period t, Fnt is the firm productivity, and X
n
k
includes other firm characteristics. a1 is the main coefficient of interest. According to the
proposition, we should expect a1 < 0. As mentioned before, HHI is constructed as the
sum over the squares of input expenditure share in each trade route for each firm.51 It is
assigned as one for non-importers when I look at the full sample of firms since I do not
observe domestic sourcing.
The results are reported in Table 1.3. Columns (1) and (2) use the full sample, in-
cluding importers and non-importers. Columns (3) and (4) only look at importers. The
controls include year, ownership, industry, and region fixed effects in all columns, and firm
fixed effect in columns (2) and (4). Across all columns, we find that the estimated â1 is
negative and highly significant. So indeed, consistent with the model, high productivity
firms are more diversified in sourcing. This finding implies that it is important to control
51Following AFT, firms with imports more than its total inputs are excluded from the sample. Imports
on fuels and mineral products are not counted. Wage bills are included as total inputs to address the
concern on home sourcing.
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for firm productivity when examining sourcing diversification.
Table 1.3: Firm productivity and diversification of sourcing: all firms
Dependent Variable: All Firms Importers Only
sourcing diversification in HHI (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln TFP -0.00839∗∗∗ -0.000853∗∗∗ -0.0835∗∗∗ -0.0223∗∗∗
(0.000168) (0.000118) (0.00113) (0.00156)
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Ownership FE Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y
Region FE Y Y Y Y
Firm FE N Y N Y
R2 0.367 0.860 0.160 0.597
No. of observations 1328727 1224458 185957 165863
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are standard error clustered at firm level. The number of observations
varies across regressions as I use the reghdfe command in Stata which gets rid of singletons for fixed effects
nested with each other. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, *** at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
1.6.2 Roads and Diversification
I now examine the role of infrastructure, specifically railways and highways which have
been shown to reduce trade costs (e.g., Donaldson, 2018), in shaping firms’ sourcing diver-
sification. According to Proposition 1.3, firms’ sourcing strategies become more diversified
along the extensive margin if there is reduction in trade costs. To test this proposition,
I explore the expansion of the Chinese highway and railway network from 2000-2006. I
examine whether firms in regions connected to highways or railways expand their sourcing
strategies or not by running the following regression:
ln(1 +Nnit) = b0 + b1Highwayit + b2Railwayit + δi + δn + δt +
∑
k
βkX
nt
k + ζ
n
it,
Nnit counts the extensive margin of the sourcing strategy for firm n at period t. Highwayit
and Railwayit are dummies indicating region i’s connection to highways and railways,
respectively. δi, δn and δt capture region, firm, and time fixed effects, respectively. X
nt
k
is added to control for various firm characteristics, including firm productivity. ζnit is the
error term.
To implement this regression, I construct dummies indicating whether or not a region
was connected to highways or railways using China GIS data provided by the ACASIAN
Data Center at Griffith University. The data provide year 1999 county boundaries and
transportation data for the years 2000, 2004 and 2007. To construct the highway and
railway network for each year between 2000 and 2006, I manually collect the opening date
of Chinese highway and railway by section according to news reports, government reports,
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and other online sources that I collect.52 The complete networks for years 2000 and 2006
are illustrated in Figure A4 and A5. As we can see, the railway network was already quite
dense in 2000.53 The highway network was mostly confined to the coastal provinces in
2000, but expanded quickly to most of the country in 2006. The geographical unit of my
analysis is a county.54 I use the region code in CAIS to identify the county that each firm
is located.55
The results presented in Appendix Table A5 include counts of customs districts, origins,
and customs district-country pairs as outcome variables. Columns (1) to (3) use the full
sample of importers. A well-known issue in the literature on infrastructure evaluation is
the endogenous placement of roads. If roads were built to connect importers, the estimated
effect would be upward biased. To handle this issue, I follow the “inconsequential unit
approach” (Chandra and Thompson, 2000) to exclude firms located on the end nodes of
the network.56 The idea is that the unobserved characteristics of the units between the
nodes of the network should be inconsequential to the placement the roads. These units
got connected simply because they lie between the nodes. Thus I exclude importers located
in urban units within each city and provincial capital cities, since highways or railways
were built to connect these regions. The results are presented in columns (4) to (6). As is
obvious across all the columns, connection to the highway increases the number of customs
districts, sourcing origins, and customs district-origin pairs in importers’ sourcing strategy.
The effect is significant and robust across different samples and outcomes. However,
connection to railways does not appear to have a significant effect.
Although Proposition 1.3 only makes prediction about diversification along the ex-
tensive margin, firms are likely be more diversified as measured by HHI if they have a
wider sourcing strategy. I expect firms got connected by highways or railways to have a
lower HHI. This is formally tested by regressing HHI on dummies of highway and railway
connections. The results are presented in Appendix Table A6. Connections to railways
and highways are indeed associated with more diversification, as indicated in columns (1)
to (3). In column (4), I show that the same result holds after excluding the firms from the
urban units and provincial capitals. Although railways do not appear to have a significant
effect on the extensive margin, they help firms to diversify when the intensive margin is
taken into account.
52If there is a conflict with ACASIAN data on the opening date, I follow the sources that I have collected.
53The recent impressive development of high speed railways was mostly part of the stimulation package
after the 2008 financial crisis.
54The base map from ACASIAN combines the urban districts into a single urban unit for each prefecture.
I include these urban units in my baseline result and exclude them in the robustness checks.
55I use the region code (in Chinese) from the Ministry of Civil Affairs to link region codes over time.
56Redding and Turner (2015) synthesise the literature that addresses the endogenous placement of roads.
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1.6.3 Roads and Resilience
I have shown that diversification makes firms more resilient to the SARS epidemic and
roads help to increase diversification. The remaining question is: do roads increase firms’
resilience to the SARS epidemic? The idea is that if firms in regions with railway or
highway connection are more diversified, this should make them more resilient. To see if
this is the case, I run the following regression:
ln Importntijk = c0 + c1Highwayit + c2Railwayit + γ0SARSjk,t
+γ1HighwayitSARSjk,t + γ2RailwayitSARSjk,t +
∑
βkX
n
kt + nt,
where Highwayit and Railwayit are the connection dummies and SARSjk,t is the dummy
indicating whether route jk was affected by SARS or not at period t. The key coefficients of
interest are γ1 and γ2. If connectivity to roads indeed increases resilience, we expect them
to be positive. The results are presented in Table 1.4. One difference from the previous
section is that I cannot control for the firm-time fixed effect because the connectivity
dummies Highwayit and Railwayit are defined at region-time level. Firm-time fixed
effect and region-time fixed effect are fully multi-collinear with these dummies. Instead,
I control for province-time fixed effect to handle demand or productivity shocks due to
SARS.
Table 1.4: Roads and resilience
Dependent Variable: Full Excluding nodes
sample of the road network
firm imports by route ln(impijk) (1) (2) (3) (4)
trade route hit by SARS=1 -0.0924∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗
(0.0195) (0.0475) (0.0244) (0.0547)
highway connected=1 0.0332 0.000513
(0.0337) (0.0392)
trade route hit by SARS=1 x highway connected=1 0.0476 0.0382
(0.0388) (0.0434)
railway connected=1 0.0414 0.133∗∗
(0.0357) (0.0622)
trade route hit by SARS=1 x railway connected=1 0.0432 0.0637∗
(0.0307) (0.0350)
province-time, Destination, Origin, Customs, Ownership, Industry FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.111 0.111 0.123 0.123
No. of observations 2231882 2231882 1348241 1348241
Notes: A firm is defined as connected to highway if the county that the firm located is connected to
the highway in each year. Columns (1) to (2) include full sample while columns (3) and (4) exclude firms
located in urban units or provincial capitals. The numbers in parentheses are standard error clustered
at industry and prefecture level. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, *** at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01,
respectively.
The results are shown in Table 1.4. Column (1) shows the average effect of the SARS
shock. Columns (2) study the connectivity to highways and railways. Both highways and
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railways appear to dampen the effect of the SARS shock but the effect is not significant.
When I exclude firms located in urban units and provincial capitals in column (4). The
dampening effect of railways appears to be larger and marginally significant.57 Overall,
connection to railways reduced the negative impact of SARS on imports by about 6%.
However, the effect of highway connectivity remains insignificant.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper studies how diversification shapes firms’ resilience to supply chain disruptions.
The Chinese firms which are more geographically diversified in their input sourcing ap-
pear less volatile. However, diversification is not a free lunch. Gravity drags firms to
source through closer customs districts. Only the more productive firms manage to source
through more customs districts. I build a model to account for these facts based on the
work by Antra`s, Fort, and Tintelnot (2017). The model predicts that high productivity
firms are more diversified, hence more resilient to adverse shocks if sourcing decisions are
complementary across trade routes. It also predicts that trade liberalization or improve-
ment in infrastructure facilitates diversification. I explore the 2003 SARS epidemic as a
natural experiment to test the model predictions and find that, the damage on imports
is indeed smaller if the firm is more diversified hence need not rely so much on trade
routes hit by SARS. Moreover, connection to highways and railways appears to facilitate
diversification in sourcing and reduce the impact of the SARS shock. This is a benefit of
infrastructure that should not be overlooked by policy makers.
57To contain the spread of SARS, local Chinese governments set up check-points on highways to examine
the temperature of drivers and passengers. While such checks were also applied to passengers travelling by
railway before boarding, they were unlikely to disrupt trains, which follow fixed schedules, especially those
only carrying goods. In contrast, so many check-points were set up on roads that the Ministry of Public
Security had to issue an executive order called “Five Forbidden Practices”(in Chinese) in May 2003: no
interruptions of traffic were allowed in the name of fighting against SARS; no traffic controls at provincial
borders; no road blocks to stop traffic; no forced U-turns for vehicles in the normal course; and no traffic
jams in the name of quarantine. Such a difference probably explains the different effect of railways and
highways connection.
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Appendix
1.A Proofs
1.A.1 Proof of Proposition 1.1
Suppose there are two firms from region i with different productivities which are denoted
as ϕH and ϕL such that ϕH > ϕL. Their sourcing strategies are given by Ii(ϕH) =
{{j, k}, Iijk(ϕH) = 1} and Ii(ϕL) = {{j, k}, Iijk(ϕL) = 1} respectively. If Ii(ϕH) =
Ii(ϕL), conclusion (a) naturally holds as it implies Ψ(ϕH) = Ψ(ϕL). On the other hand,
if Ii(ϕH) 6= Ii(ϕL), it must be the case that:
Diϕ
σ−1
H (γ
2Ψ(ϕH))
σ−1
θ −
∑
{jk}∈Iijk(ϕH)
fijk > Diϕ
σ−1
H (γ
2Ψ(ϕL))
σ−1
θ −
∑
{jk}∈Iijk(ϕL)
fijk,
Diϕ
σ−1
L (γ
2Ψ(ϕL))
σ−1
θ −
∑
{jk}∈Iijk(ϕL)
fijk > Diϕ
σ−1
L (γ
2Ψ(ϕH))
σ−1
θ −
∑
{jk}∈Iijk(ϕH)
fijk.
Combining the two inequalities above, we have
Diγ
2(σ−1)
θ (ϕσ−1H − ϕσ−1L )(Ψ(ϕH)
σ−1
θ −Ψ(ϕL)
σ−1
θ ) > 0.
Since ϕH > ϕL and σ > 1, it must be the case that
Ψ(ϕH) > Ψ(ϕL).
So conclusion (a) is established.
For conclusion (b), we note that if σ − 1 > θ, the profit function specified in problem
(1.4) features increasing differences in (Iijk, Iimn), with j 6= m or k 6= n. It also features
increasing differences in (Iijk, ϕ) for any j and k. Using the Topkis’s monotonicity theorem,
we conclude that Iijk(ϕH) ≥ Iijk(ϕL) for any ϕH ≥ ϕL. It naturally implies Ji(ϕL) ⊆
Ji(ϕH) and Kij(ϕL) ⊆ Kij(ϕH).
Then from the definition of Θj(ϕ) ≡
∑
n∈Kij(ϕ)An(τjnwn)
−θ, given that Kij(ϕL) ⊆
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Kij(ϕH), naturally we have
Θj(ϕH) ≥ Θj(ϕL)
which is conclusion (c).
1.A.2 Proof of Proposition 1.2
Since the sourcing decisions are complementary, firms’ sourcing strategies follow a pecking
order. Suppose the sourcing potential of trade routes faced by firms in region i are ranked
as φi1 ≥ φi2 ≥, ...,≥ φiN . The least productive firm would only source from option 1
and its HHI1 = 1. For two firms with different sourcing strategies such that one is
sourcing from n options while the other is sourcing from n+ 1, their HHI for sourcing are
HHIn =
∑n
s=1 φ
2
is
(
∑n
s=1 φis)
2 and HHIn+1 =
∑n+1
s=1 φ
2
is
(
∑n+1
s=1 φis)
2
, respectively. Therefore, we have
HHIn+1 −HHIn =
(
n+1∑
s=1
φ2is)(
n∑
s=1
φis)
2 − (
n∑
s=1
φ2is)(
n+1∑
s=1
φis)
2
(
n∑
s=1
φis)2(
n+1∑
s=1
φis)2
=
φ2in+1(
n∑
s=1
φis)
2 − φ2in+1
n∑
s=1
φ2is − 2φin+1(
n∑
s=1
φis)(
n∑
s=1
φ2is)
(
n∑
s=1
φis)2(
n+1∑
s=1
φis)2
=
φin+1(
n∑
s=1
φis)[
n∑
s=1
φin+1φis −
n∑
s=1
φ2is]− φ2in+1
n∑
s=1
φ2is − φin+1(
n∑
s=1
φis)(
n∑
s=1
φ2is)
(
n∑
s=1
φis)2(
n+1∑
s=1
φis)2
.
Since φis ≥ φin+1, it must be the case that φ2is ≥ φin+1φis, ∀s ≤ n. Then we have∑n
s=1 φin+1φis ≤
∑n
s=1 φ
2
is. Thus the first term in the numerator of the third line in the
equation above is non-positive. Given that the other two terms are also negative, the
numerator of the third line must be negative. Thus we have
HHIn+1 < HHIn,
and the concentration of the sourcing strategy tends to lower for more productive firms.
1.A.3 Proof of Proposition 1.3
If sourcing decisions are complementary across trade routes (σ−1 > θ), the profit function
specified in problem (1.4) features increasing difference between (Iijk, φimn) between any
j 6= m, k 6= n. It also features increasing difference between (Iijk, -fimn) between any
j 6= m, k 6= n. Again, using the Topkis’s monotonicity theorem, we have Iijk(~φi′) ≥
Iijk(~φi) for ~φi
′
> ~φi. Naturally, it implies Ji(ϕ, ~φi) ⊆ J ′i(ϕ, ~φi
′
), Kij(ϕ, ~φi) ⊆ K ′ij(ϕ, ~φi
′
).
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Similarly, we have Iijk(~fi
′
) ≥ Iijk(~fi) for ~fi′ < ~fi which implies Ji(ϕ, ~fi) ⊆ J ′i(ϕ, ~fi
′
),
Kij(ϕ, ~fi) ⊆ K ′ij(ϕ, ~fi
′
).
1.A.4 Proof of Proposition 1.4
According to Equation (1.3), in case there is any shock to any supplier, the change in unit
cost for the firm is given by
ĉi ≡ c
′
i
ci
= Ψ̂i(ϕ)
− 1
θ .
Thus, we have:
∂lnĉi
∂lnΨ̂i(ϕ)
= −1
θ
. (E.1.1)
On the other hand, we have
Ψ̂i(ϕ) ≡
∑
j∈J ′(ϕ),k∈K′(ϕ) φ
′
ijk∑
j∈J(ϕ),k∈K(ϕ) φijk
.
Suppose Ω(ϕ) = J(ϕ) ⊗ K(ϕ) which is the set of routes picked by the firm before the
shock and Ω′(ϕ) = J ′(ϕ)⊗K ′(ϕ) is the one after the shock, and C(ϕ) = Ω∩Ω′ 6=  is the
set of routes continued to be used by the firm. The set of new routes used by the firm is
denoted as N (ϕ) ≡ Ω′ \ C. Then we have,
Ψ̂i(ϕ) =
∑
j,k∈C φ
′
ijk +
∑
j,k∈N φ
′
ijk
Ψi(ϕ)
=
∑
j,k∈C
φ′ijk
φijk
φijk
Ψi(ϕ)
+
∑
j,k∈N
φ′ijk
Ψ′i(ϕ)
Ψ′i(ϕ)
Ψi(ϕ)
(E.1.2)
=
∑
j,k∈C
φ̂ijkχijk + Ψ̂i(ϕ)
∑
j,k∈N
χ′ijk. (E.1.3)
Rearranging the equation above, we have
Ψ̂i(ϕ) =
∑
j,k∈C χijkφ̂ijk
1−∑j,k∈N χ′ijk .
So one unit change in φijk translates into
χijk
1−∑j,k∈N χ′ijk unit change in Ψ̂i(ϕ). Formally,
for a small change in x, we know ln(x) ≈ x − 1. Thus Ψ̂i(ϕ) ≈ 1 + ln(Ψ̂i(ϕ)) and φ̂ijk ≈
1 + ln(φ̂ijk). Then we have
ln Ψ̂i(ϕ) ≈
∑
j,k∈C χijk ln φ̂ijk
1−∑j,k∈N χ′ijk +
∑
j,k∈C(χijk − χ′ijk)
1−∑j,k∈N χ′ijk
which implies
∂ ln Ψ̂i(ϕ)
∂ ln φ̂ijk
≈ χijk
1−∑j,k∈N χ′ijk .
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Finally, since φijk = BjAk(τijkwjwk)
−θ, we have ∂ ln φ̂ijk∂ ln τ̂ijk = −θ. This implies that the
pass-through of cost shock τ̂ijk to marginal cost of the firm is given by:
∂lnĉi
∂ ln τ̂ijk
=
∂lnĉi
∂lnΨ̂i(ϕ)
∂ ln Ψ̂i(ϕ)
∂ ln φ̂ijk
∂ ln φ̂ijk
∂ ln τ̂ijk
≈ χijk(ϕ)
1−∑j,k∈N χ′ijk(ϕ) .
The proof of conclusion (b) has two steps. First, from proposition 1, we know that
sourcing capabilities Ψ(ϕ) is an increasing function of productivity ϕ. Thus the probability
of sourcing from route ijk χijk(ϕ) =
BjAk(τijkwjwk)
−θ
Ψ(ϕ) is decreasing with ϕ. Second, for the
denominator 1−∑j,k∈N χijk, according to Proposition 1.3, we have∑j,k∈N χijk = 0 in the
case of adverse shocks, and
∑
j,k∈N χijk ≥ 0 in the case of favourable shock. Alternatively,
this result can be derived by studying how the productivity cut-offs respond to the shocks
as follows.
In the case of an adverse shock such that τijk increases, it can be shown that no firms
would like to increase the number of trade routes. To show that, we know that there is
a pecking order in the case of complementarity and we could rank different trade routes
according to their sourcing potential. The most appealing option would be sourced by all
firms. This is option 1. The least appealing option would only be sourced by the most
productive firms. This is option N. Suppose the productivity cut-offs for these different
options are ϕ˜i1 ≤ ϕ˜i2 ≤, ...,≤ ϕ˜iN and suppose the route which is shocked currently ranked
at r. We can know that the cut-offs are determined by
ϕ˜σ−1i1 =
wifi1
γ(
2(σ−1)
θ Diφ
(σ−1)
θ
i1
ϕ˜σ−1in =
wifin
γ(
2(σ−1)
θ Di((
∑n
l=1 φil)
(σ−1)
θ − (∑n−1l=1 φil) (σ−1)θ ) , n > 1.
when the trade costs using route r increases, it will not affect cutoffs ϕ˜i1, ϕ˜i2, ..., ϕ˜ir−1.
Firms with productivity lower than ϕ˜ir−1 will keep their trade routes as they are. However,
as τir increases, the sourcing potential of route r: φir will decrease. This will decrease
the difference between sourcing capabilities through n routes v.s. n − 1 routes for n ≥ r
as σ−1θ ≥ 1. 58 Then for all n ≥ r, we have ϕ˜in increases. This is illustrated in Figure
A1 (a). Thus no firms would like to add trade routes. Instead, they would decrease the
58It can be shown that f(x) = f(x+ a)
σ−1
θ − xσ−1θ is an increasing function of x as σ−1
θ
≥ 1.
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number of sourcing routes. So we have 1−∑j,k∈N χijk = 1 for all firms and
∂lnĉi
∂ ln τ̂ijk
≈ χijk(ϕ).
which declines with ϕ. So we have
∂2 ln(ĉi(ϕ))
∂ ln(τ̂ijk)∂ϕ
=
∂χijk(ϕ)
∂ϕ
≤ 0.
∂2 ln(ĉi(ϕ))
∂ ln(τ̂ijk)∂φijk
=
∂χijk(ϕ)
∂φijk
=
1
Ψi(ϕ)
> 0.
(a) Adverse Shocks (b) Favourable Shocks
Figure A1: Pass-through of shocks
In the case that τijk decreases. Following the previous case, it is easy to see that
ϕ˜i1, ϕ˜i2, ..., ϕ˜ir−1 are not affected and firms with productivity ϕ ≤ ϕ˜ir−1 do not change
their sourcing strategies. Intuitively, they do not include r in their sourcing options and
are not affected by the cost shock. On the other hand, ϕ˜in will decrease to ϕ˜
′
in for all
n ≥ r. Then for firms with productivity within [ϕ˜′i,n+1, ϕ˜i,n+1], they would like to include
n+ 1 in their sourcing strategies. The pass-through of the shock would be
∂lnĉi
∂ ln τ̂ijk
≈ χir(ϕ)
1− χi,n+1(ϕ)′ .
Firms with productivity in [ϕ˜in, ϕ˜
′
i,n] fix their sourcing strategies and we still have
∂lnĉi
∂ ln τ̂ijk
≈ χijk(ϕ).
In this case, the pass-through is not universally declining with productivity as illustrated
by Figure A1 (b).
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1.A.5 Proof of Proposition 1.5
The gravity equation at firm level determining the trade flow is given by Equation (1.5).
Facing a supply shock, the change in trade flow is determined by
M̂ijk(ϕ) ≡
M ′ijk(ϕ)
Mijk(ϕ)
= Ψ̂i(ϕ)
(σ−1)
θ χ̂ijk(ϕ)
= Ψ̂i(ϕ)
σ−1
θ
−1φ̂ijk,
which implies ln M̂ijk(ϕ) = (
σ−1
θ −1) ln Ψ̂i(ϕ) + ln φ̂ijk. From the previous proof, we know
that for an adverse shock
∂ ln Ψ̂i(ϕ)
∂ ln φ̂ijk
≈ χijk.
And since ∂ ln φ̂i.mn∂ ln τ̂i.mn = −θ, we have
−∂ ln M̂ijk(ϕ)
∂ ln τ̂imn
=
 θ + (σ − 1− θ)χimn, if m=j, n=k(σ − 1− θ)χimn, otherwise.
This establishes conclusion (a). If sourcing decisions are complementary across trade
routes, as mentioned in the previous proof, the sourcing probability χijk(ϕ) of each trade
route is weakly decreasing in firm productivity ϕ. Then, the size of the pass-through should
follow the same pattern if sourcing decisions are complementary across trade routes. This
establishes conclusion (b).
1.A.6 Proof of Proposition 1.6
From the proof of Proposition 1.4, we know that the change in sourcing capability Ψ =∑
φr for a particular firm is given by
59
Ψ̂(ϕ) =
∑
r∈C(ϕ)
χr(ϕ)φ̂r
1− ∑
r∈N
χ′r(ϕ)
,
where C(ϕ) ⊂ Ω(ϕ) and N ⊂ Ω′(ϕ) are the sets of continued and new trade route for the
firm respectively while Ω(ϕ) and Ω
′
(ϕ) are the set of trade routes before and after the
shocks. They all depend firm level productivity ϕ. I further simplify the notations as
Ψ̂(ϕ) =
∑
r∈Ω(ϕ)
χr(ϕ)∆r,
59To simplify the notation, I omit the location subscript i.
Chapter 1 57
while ∆r = φ̂rδr(ϕ, φ̂) with δr(ϕ, φ̂) being an indicator function defined as
δr(ϕ, φ̂) =

1
1− ∑
r∈N
χ′r(ϕ)
, if r ∈ C(ϕ, φ̂);
0, otherwise,
which captures to extensive margin shock of sourcing capabilities. Under the assumption
that ∆r has the same variance ξ
2 across trade routes, we have
var(Ψ̂(ϕ)) = var(
∑
r∈Ω(ϕ)
χr(ϕ)∆r)
=
∑
r∈Ω(ϕ)
χr(ϕ)
2var(∆r) +
∑
m6=n,m,n∈Ω(ϕ)
χm(ϕ)χn(ϕ)cov(∆m,∆n)
= ξ2(
∑
r∈Ω(ϕ)
χr(ϕ)
2 +
∑
m6=n,m,n∈Ω(ϕ)
χm(ϕ)χn(ϕ)ρmn)
≤ ξ2.
The last inequality holds because (
∑
r∈Ω(ϕ)
χr(ϕ))
2 =
∑
r∈Ω(ϕ)
χr(ϕ)
2+
∑
m 6=n
m,n∈Ω(ϕ)
χm(ϕ)χn(ϕ) =
1. As long as the correlation of shocks ρij ≡ cov(∆m,∆n)ξ2 < 1 for any i and j, that is the
shocks are not perfectly correlated across trade routes, we have var(Ψ̂(ϕ)) < ξ2. On the
other hand, if firms are under sourcing autarky, firms are subject to local shocks with
volatility ξ2. This establishes conclusion (a).
If the shocks are i.i.d. such that ρmn = 0, we have:
var(Ψ̂(ϕ)) = var(
∑
r∈Ω(ϕ)
χr(ϕ)∆r)
= ξ2
∑
r∈Ω(ϕ)
χr(ϕ)
2
= ξ2HHI(ϕ).
From Proposition 1.2, we know that HHI decreases weakly with firm productivity. Then
the volatility of firms’ sourcing capabilities should decrease weakly with firm productivity
as well. Since firm revenue is given by Ri(ϕ) = Diϕ
σ−1γ
2(σ−1)
θ Ψi(ϕ)
σ−1
θ , we have60
R̂i(ϕ) = Ψ̂i(ϕ)
σ−1
θ .
60The demand Di does not show up because we focus on cost shock on inputs.
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Using the delta method, we have
var(R̂i(ϕ)) ≈ [∂R̂i(Ψ̂i(ϕ))
∂Ψ̂i(ϕ)
∣∣∣
Ψ̂i(ϕ)=E[Ψ̂i(ϕ)]
]2var(Ψ̂i(ϕ))
=
(σ − 1)2
θ2
E[Ψ̂i(ϕ)]
2(σ−1−θ)
θ var(Ψ̂i(ϕ)).
Since ∆r is i.i.d., E[Ψ̂i(ϕ)] = E[
∑
r∈Ω(ϕ)
χr(ϕ)∆r] =
∑
r∈Ω(ϕ)
χr(ϕ)E[∆r] = E[∆r] is a
constant. The last equality holds as
∑
r∈Ω(ϕ)
χr(ϕ) = 1. Given that var(Ψ̂(ϕ)) = ξ
2HHI(ϕ),
we have
var(R̂i(ϕ)) ∝ ξ2HHI(ϕ),
which declines weakly with firm productivity ϕ in the same way as HHI(ϕ). This estab-
lishes conclusion (b).
Under universal importing, the change to the sourcing capabilities of a firm is given
by
Ψ̂ =
∑
r∈Ω
χrφ̂r,
where Ω is set of available trade routes to all importers. Given the universal importing
assumption, Ω is the same for each firm, so is the sourcing intensity χr. Then the variance
of Ψ̂ should be the same for all importers. So is firm revenue. This establishes conclusion
(c).
1.A.7 Proof of Proposition 1.7
From Equation (1.3), the change in marginal costs in response to sourcing potentials is
given by
ĉi(ϕ) = Ψ̂i(ϕ)
− 1
θ (E.1.4)
which is inversely related to the change in the sourcing capability of the firm. On the other
hand, from the proof of Proposition 1.4, the change in sourcing capability to an adverse
shock is related to change sourcing potential and pre-shock sourcing probability as
Ψ̂i(ϕ) =
∑
j,k∈C
χijkφ̂ijk. (E.1.5)
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if sourcing decisions are complementary across trade routes. Although φ̂ijk is still not
observable, according to Equation (1.5), the change in the trade flow is given by
M̂ijk(ϕ) = Ψ̂i(ϕ)
σ−1
θ
φ̂ijk(φ)
Ψ̂i(ϕ)
= Ψ̂i(ϕ)
σ−1
θ
−1φ̂ijk(φ)
which implies
φ̂ijk(φ) =
M̂ijk(ϕ)
Ψ̂i(ϕ)
σ−1
θ
−1 .
Substitute the equation above into Equation (E.1.5), we have
Ψ̂i(ϕ) = (
∑
j×k∈C
χijk(ϕ)M̂ijk(ϕ))
θ
σ−1 ,
together with Equation (E.1.4), immediately we know
ĉi(ϕ) = (
∑
j×k∈C
χijk(ϕ)M̂ijk(ϕ))
1
1−σ .
1.A.8 Tradable Final Goods and Demand Shocks
Suppose final goods are tradable. Exporting to market k through customs district j incurs
a variable iceberg trade cost τXijk, and a fixed cost in terms of f
X
ijk unit of labour from region
i. Then firms’ profit function in Equation (1.4) now becomes:
max
Iijk, IXijk∈{0,1}
pi(ϕ, {Iijk}, {IXijk}) = ϕσ−1(γ2Ψi(ϕ))
σ−1
θ Di(ϕ)−wi
J,K∑
j=1,k=1
Iijkfijk−wi
J,K∑
j=1,k=1
IXijkf
X
ijk
where Iijk and I
X
ijk are indicator variables for import and export through route jk respec-
tively, and Di(ϕ) ≡
∑J,K
j=1,k=1 I
X
ijk(τ
X
ijk)
1−σ
Dk is the demand shifter. The model features
increasing difference in (IXijk, ϕ), so more productive firms tend to export to more places.
It also features increasing difference in (IXijk,Ψi(ϕ)), thus any reduction in trade costs
would lead firms to expand their export along the extensive margin, vice versa if trade
costs increase.
The gravity equation at firm level determining the import flow is still given by Equation
(1.5) except that the demand shifter Di is now firm specific. Suppose τ̂
X
ijk = τ̂ijk, thus the
cost shock affects imports and exports along the same route at the same time, then
M̂ijk(ϕ) = Ψ̂i(ϕ)
(σ−1)
θ
−1φ̂ijkD̂i(ϕ).
Compared with the proof in Appendix 1.A.5, there is an extra term D̂i(ϕ) which captures
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the demand shock given by:
D̂i(ϕ) =
∑
j,k∈CX (ϕ) d
′
ijk +
∑
j,k∈NX (ϕ) d
′
ijk
Di(ϕ)
=
∑
j,k∈CX (ϕ)
d′ijk
dijk
dijk
Di(ϕ)
+
∑
j,k∈NX (ϕ)
d′ijk
D′i(ϕ)
D′i(ϕ)
Di(ϕ)
=
∑
j,k∈CX (ϕ)
d̂ijkµijk + D̂i(ϕ)
∑
j,k∈NX (ϕ)
µ′ijk,
where CX (ϕ) is the set of destinations that the firm continues to serve after the shock,
and NX (ϕ) is the set of destinations that are newly included. Rearranging the equation
above, we have
D̂i(ϕ) =
∑
j,k∈CX µijkd̂ijk
1−∑j,k∈NX µ′ijk ,
where µijk(ϕ) ≡ dijkDi(ϕ) is the intensity of exporting through route jk, and dijk ≡ (τXijk)
1−σ
Dk
is the residual demand for route jk. For negative shocks on trade costs, as argued above,
firms would like to reduce exports along the extensive margin. Thus
∑
j,k∈NX (ϕ) µ
′
ijk = 0
and
D̂i(ϕ) =
∑
j,k∈CX (ϕ)
µijkd̂ijk.
Then we have
∂ ln D̂i
∂ ln τ̂ijk
=
∂ ln D̂i
∂ ln d̂ijk
∂ ln d̂ijk
∂ ln τ̂ijk
= (1− σ)µijk(ϕ),
combined with the fact that
∂ ln M̂ijk(ϕ)
∂ ln τ̂imn
= (σ−1θ − 1)∂ ln Ψ̂i(ϕ)∂ ln τ̂imn +
∂ ln φ̂ijk
∂ ln τ̂imn
+ ∂ ln D̂i(ϕ)∂ ln τ̂imn , we have
−∂ ln M̂ijk(ϕ)
∂ ln τ̂imn
=
 θ + (σ − 1− θ)χimn(ϕ) + (σ − 1)µimn(ϕ), if m=j, n=k,(σ − 1− θ)χimn(ϕ) + (σ − 1)µimn(ϕ), otherwise.
1.B Main Tables
C
h
a
p
ter
1
61
Table A1: Resilience to the SARS shock: export demand shock
Dependent Variable: import cost export demand both export demand
firm import by route ln(impijk,t) shocks only shocks only and import cost shocks
(1) (2) (3)
trade route hit by SARS=1 -0.0557∗∗ -0.0696∗∗∗ -0.0549∗∗
(0.0241) (0.0244) (0.0242)
pre SARS sourcing intensity 9.493∗∗∗ 9.470∗∗∗
(0.0953) (0.0982)
trade route hit by SARS=1 x pre SARS sourcing intensity -0.464∗∗∗ -0.463∗∗∗
(0.133) (0.132)
pre SARS export intensity 1.277∗∗∗ 0.0725∗∗
(0.0579) (0.0362)
trade route hit by SARS=1 x pre SARS export intensity -0.261∗∗∗ 0.0285
(0.0741) (0.0519)
other routes hit by SARS=1 0.00454 -0.0111 0.00467
(0.0197) (0.0224) (0.0197)
firm-time, industry, ownership, origin, destination, customs FE Y Y Y
R2 0.472 0.396 0.472
No. of observations 2019727 2019284 2019284
Notes: A trade route is a combination of an origin and a customs district. It is defined as hit by SARS if the origin or the customs district are
listed by the WHO as regions with local transmission of SARS. Pre shock export intensity is constructed as the average share of outputs exported
through each route before the SARS epidemic. It is zero for non-exporters. The pre shock sourcing intensity is constructed as the input expenditure
share averaged before the SARS epidemic. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors clustered at region-industry level. Significance levels
are indicated by *, **, *** at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
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Table A2: Resilience of processing importers
Dependent Variable: Processing with inputs Pure Assembly
firm import by route ln(impijk) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
pre SARS sourcing intensity 7.744∗∗∗ 7.819∗∗∗ 7.819∗∗∗ 6.368∗∗∗ 6.364∗∗∗ 6.364∗∗∗
(0.189) (0.192) (0.192) (0.383) (0.378) (0.377)
trade route hit by SARS=1 -0.0327 0.0238 0.0568 0.0438 0.0406 0.107
(0.0499) (0.0494) (0.0655) (0.148) (0.158) (0.162)
trade route hit by SARS=1 x pre SARS sourcing intensity -0.648∗∗∗ -0.643∗∗∗ 0.0423 0.0432
(0.195) (0.195) (0.744) (0.739)
other routes hit by SARS=1 0.0487 0.147
(0.0616) (0.144)
firm-time, industry, ownership, origin, destination, customs FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
R2 0.530 0.530 0.530 0.529 0.529 0.529
No. of observations 267005 267005 267005 17556 17556 17556
Notes: Pure processing importers are firms which have no ordinary imports subject to tariffs. Columns (1) and (3) include the sample of importers which
only engage in processing with supplied inputs (PI). Column (4) and (6) include the sample of importers only engaged in pure assembly(PA). PA firms do
not decide where to source or pay for the sourced inputs while PI firms do. The numbers in parentheses are standard error clustered at region-industry
level. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, *** at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
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Table A3: Robustness check: the liquidity, finance, and inventory channels
Dependant Variable: firm imports by route ln(impijk,t)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
pre SARS sourcing intensity 9.124∗∗∗ 9.124∗∗∗ 9.124∗∗∗ 9.138∗∗∗ 9.141∗∗∗
(0.0900) (0.0900) (0.0900) (0.0902) (0.0906)
trade route hit by SARS -0.0404∗∗ -0.0391∗ -0.0391∗ -0.0405∗∗ -0.0105
(0.0197) (0.0201) (0.0227) (0.0206) (0.0375)
trade route hit by SARS x pre shock sourcing intensity -0.321∗∗∗ -0.320∗∗∗ -0.321∗∗∗ -0.321∗∗∗ -0.312∗∗∗
(0.0955) (0.0954) (0.0953) (0.0956) (0.0954)
liquidity 0.00681 -0.0840∗∗
(0.0201) (0.0366)
trade route hit x liquidity -0.0101 -0.0568
(0.0277) (0.0586)
leaverage ratio -0.0131 -0.0435∗∗∗
(0.00860) (0.0153)
trade route hit x leverage ratio -0.00151 -0.0237
(0.0138) (0.0289)
inventory -0.324∗∗∗ -0.329∗∗∗
(0.0179) (0.0192)
trade route hit x inventory 0.000131 -0.0162
(0.0286) (0.0310)
firm, destination-time, ownership, industry, origin, customs FE Y Y Y Y Y
R2 0.403 0.403 0.403 0.403 0.403
No. of observations 2143515 2143515 2143515 2143515 2140168
Notes: Following Manova and Yu (2016), liquidity available to firms is measured by (current assets - current liabilities)/total
assets. Inventory is measured as the ratio of intermediate inputs relative to total inputs. In all regressions, we control for time,
destination region, origin, customs region and ownership fixed effects. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors clustered
at region-industry level. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, *** at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
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Table A4: Estimating the efficiency dispersion parameter θ
Dependent Variable:
foreign sourcing relative to home sourcing ln(χijk)− lnφ
d
Φ (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln geodist customs district-destination -0.166∗∗∗ -0.0977∗∗∗ -0.0521∗∗∗ -0.0522∗∗∗
(0.0125) (0.0156) (0.0159) (0.0159)
ln geodist origin-customs district -0.437∗∗∗ -0.435∗∗∗ -0.408∗∗∗ -0.411∗∗∗
(0.0141) (0.0140) (0.0153) (0.0153)
common customs district 0.473∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗
(0.0682) (0.0673) (0.0673)
common language customs district-destination 0.842∗∗∗ 0.845∗∗∗
(0.0880) (0.0880)
co-Chinese 10.55∗∗∗ 10.48∗∗∗
(2.630) (2.627)
FH firm-market import tariff -5.500∗∗∗
(0.797)
Firm, Industry, Ownership, Origin, Customs, Region FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.456 0.457 0.458 0.458
No. of observations 121742 121742 121742 121742
Notes: The dependent variable is the the log difference of probability in sourcing from a route relative to sourcing at
home. The sample only includes importers in year 2006 that are not entrants in year 2005. “co-Chinese” is the share of
ethnic Chinese in the origin multiplied by the share overseas Chinese in the Chinese customs district. “FH firm-market
import tariff” a firm market specific tariff constructed following Fitzgerald and Haller (2014). It is a weighted average
of product tariffs using the basket goods in current and lagged years. The numbers in parentheses are standard error
clustered at firm level. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, *** at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
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Table A5: Roads and sourcing diversification: the extensive margin
Full sample Excluding nodes of road network
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: ln(N + 1) in customs districts origins customs districts-origins customs districts origins customs districts-origins
highway connected 0.00531∗∗∗ 0.00514∗∗∗ 0.00499∗∗∗ 0.00414∗∗∗ 0.00444∗∗∗ 0.00414∗∗
(0.000938) (0.00142) (0.00150) (0.00102) (0.00157) (0.00165)
rail connected -0.00105 0.00146 0.000790 -0.00169 0.00179 0.00109
(0.00137) (0.00220) (0.00229) (0.00154) (0.00239) (0.00250)
ln TFP 0.00771∗∗∗ 0.0159∗∗∗ 0.0168∗∗∗ 0.00717∗∗∗ 0.0144∗∗∗ 0.0151∗∗∗
(0.000280) (0.000468) (0.000491) (0.000329) (0.000557) (0.000580)
ln age 0.00949∗∗∗ 0.0162∗∗∗ 0.0170∗∗∗ 0.00815∗∗∗ 0.0136∗∗∗ 0.0141∗∗∗
(0.000457) (0.000732) (0.000773) (0.000493) (0.000797) (0.000832)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Ownership FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
R2 0.811 0.873 0.871 0.806 0.873 0.872
No. of observations 1223731 1223731 1223731 832414 832414 832414
Notes: Columns (1) to (3) use the full sample while columns (4) to (6) exclude firms located in urban units and provincial capitals. The numbers in parentheses are standard error
generated from observed information matrix. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, *** at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
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Table A6: Roads and sourcing diversification: HHI
Dependent variable: HHI Full sample Excluding nodes of road network
(1) (2) (3) (4)
connected to highway -0.00310∗∗∗ -0.00305∗∗∗ -0.00258∗∗∗
(0.000315) (0.000315) (0.000354)
connected to railway -0.00168∗∗∗ -0.00139∗∗∗ -0.00249∗∗∗
(0.000490) (0.000490) (0.000516)
ln TFP -0.000831∗∗∗ -0.000826∗∗∗ -0.000827∗∗∗ -0.000417∗∗∗
(0.000118) (0.000118) (0.000118) (0.000145)
ln firm age -0.000716∗∗∗ -0.000717∗∗∗ -0.000720∗∗∗ -0.000768∗∗∗
(0.000144) (0.000144) (0.000144) (0.000163)
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Ownership FE Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y
Region FE Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.860 0.860 0.860 0.865
No. of observations 1223731 1223731 1223731 832414
Notes: The dependent variable is firms’ concentration of sourcing measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). Columns
(1) to (3) use the full sample while column (4) excludes importers located in urban units and provincial capitals which are the
nodes of the road network. The numbers in parentheses are standard error clustered at firm level. Significance levels are
indicated by *, **, *** at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
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1.C Complementary Tables and Figures
1.C.1 Complementary Tables
Output Volatility and sourcing diversification
This subsection provides robustness tests on the firms’ output volatility and input diver-
sification. The first exercise looks at the volatility of firms’ export which is generated out
of a relatively long time series of firms’ quarterly export. I then regress the volatility of
exports on the number of trade routes, controlling for firm age, firm size and output diver-
sification captured by the number of exporting routes. The results are shown in Table A8.
As can be seen from the table, firms with more diversified sourcing strategies continue to
have lower volatility in exports.
Table A7: Volatility of sales
Dependent variable: ln(sales volatility) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sourcing Diversification measured by HHI 0.288∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗
(0.0315) (0.0306) (0.0310) (0.0328) (0.0414)
ln age of firm -0.207∗∗∗ -0.176∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗ -0.228∗∗∗
(0.00750) (0.00763) (0.00789) (0.0154)
ln employment -0.0708∗∗∗ -0.0448∗∗∗ -0.0288∗∗∗
(0.00472) (0.00592) (0.00928)
ln TFP -0.0438∗∗∗ -0.0360∗∗∗
(0.00665) (0.0105)
ln number of exporting routes -0.00991∗∗ -0.0159∗∗
(0.00462) (0.00733)
ln number of imported products -0.0158∗∗
(0.00697)
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y
Prefecture FE Y Y Y Y Y
R2 0.0556 0.0806 0.0878 0.0895 0.0958
No. of observations 44454 44451 44451 44432 14356
Notes: Sales volatility is the variance of growth rate during 1999-2007. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
is constructed over the shares of inputs sourced from different trade routes and averaged across years. For
non-importers, it is assigned as 1. For exporting routes, it is assigned as 1 for non-exporters. Column (5)
only includes importers. The numbers in parentheses are standard error clustered at industry and prefecture
level. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, *** at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
Multi-customs-district importer premium
This section presents results on the various robustness checks on the multi customs district
premium. First, I show that this is not a phenomenon particular to year 2006. Table A10
presents results year 2000. The premium is quite similar. Additional checks are shown
in Table A11. First, an alternative measure of multi-plant firm is used. The measure is
a variable in the CAIS data called “Dan1wei4shu4liang4” in Pinyin which means number
of production unit. This is not the number of plants that a firm has but multiple-plant
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Table A8: Volatility of exports
Dependent variable: ln(exports volatility) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sourcing Diversification measured by HHI 0.732∗∗∗ 0.740∗∗∗ 0.663∗∗∗ 0.685∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗∗
(0.0669) (0.0665) (0.0681) (0.0670) (0.0844)
ln age of firm -0.0703∗ -0.000882 0.00268 -0.0119
(0.0385) (0.0386) (0.0386) (0.0410)
ln employment -0.0950∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗ -0.0881∗∗∗
(0.0153) (0.0209) (0.0218)
ln TFP 0.0462∗∗ 0.0650∗∗∗
(0.0215) (0.0229)
ln number of exporting routes -0.0514∗∗∗ -0.0552∗∗∗
(0.0166) (0.0169)
ln number imported products -0.0586∗∗∗
(0.0177)
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y
Prefecture FE Y Y Y Y Y
R2 0.0846 0.0853 0.0931 0.0957 0.0987
No. of observations 5887 5887 5887 5884 5716
Notes: Volatility of exports is the variance of quarterly exports growth rate between 2000 and 2006.
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is constructed over the shares of inputs sourced from different trade
routes and averaged across years. Only firms that are both importer and exporter are included in column
(5). The numbers in parentheses are standard error clustered at industry and prefecture level. Significance
levels are indicated by *, **, *** at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
firms should have more production units. The results is shown in column (1) and (2).
There is worry that some regions might have place-based policy such as processing trade
zone. It might induce firms importing from certain places. I exclude firms that purely
engage in processing imports.61 The result is shown in column (3) and (4). Finally, given
that Guangdong Province is divided into 7 custom areas, significantly more than other
provinces. To address the concern that the result is driven importers from Guangdong, I
exclude importers from Guangdong. The result is presented in column (5) and (6). The
multi-customs-district premium remains robust.
61Processing import is defined as pure assembly (14 in the 2-digit shipment id code) and processing with
imported materials (15 in the 2-digit shipment id code).
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Table A9: Multi-customs-district premium: 2006
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sales Sales Sales Sales Import labor productivity TFP
2 customs districts 0.593∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.599∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.0906∗∗∗
(0.0187) (0.0180) (0.0134) (0.0133) (0.0304) (0.0146) (0.0151)
3 customs districts 1.115∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.828∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗
(0.0378) (0.0353) (0.0250) (0.0247) (0.0496) (0.0285) (0.0297)
4 customs districts 1.662∗∗∗ 0.627∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗ 0.999∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗
(0.0763) (0.0704) (0.0489) (0.0491) (0.0825) (0.0593) (0.0613)
5+ customs districts 2.226∗∗∗ 0.989∗∗∗ 0.710∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗ 1.517∗∗∗ 0.589∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.105) (0.0768) (0.0755) (0.131) (0.101) (0.0961)
ln # of import countries 0.691∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 1.620∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗∗
(0.0117) (0.00857) (0.00861) (0.0198) (0.00843) (0.00926)
ln Employment 0.775∗∗∗ 0.769∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗
(0.00591) (0.00595) (0.0117)
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Prefecture FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Ownership FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Multi-plant FE N N N Y Y Y Y
R2 0.291 0.419 0.681 0.683 0.569 0.410 0.403
No. of observations 37589 37589 37589 37571 37572 36324 36211
Notes: The estimation method is OLS with high dimensional FE using the Stata command reghdfe written by Correia (2015). It
eliminates singletons nested within fixed effects. From column (3) on, we control for the multi-plant firms using the measure of firm unit
number in the data. Industry fixed effect is controlled for at the 4-digit CIC level. Ownership fixed effect is controlled for using the
registered firm type which distinguishes firms between state owned enterprises, private owned enterprises and foreign invested enterprises.
The numbers in parentheses are standard error clustered at industry and prefecture level. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, ***
at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
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Table A10: Multi-customs-district premium: 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sales Sales Sales Sales Import labor productivity TFP
2 customs districts 0.622∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.738∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗
(0.0267) (0.0253) (0.0190) (0.0190) (0.0442) (0.0234) (0.0241)
3 customs districts 1.058∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗ 1.023∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗
(0.0532) (0.0491) (0.0380) (0.0379) (0.0784) (0.0501) (0.0466)
4 customs districts 1.587∗∗∗ 0.660∗∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗∗ 1.268∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ 0.502∗∗∗
(0.132) (0.122) (0.0986) (0.0950) (0.137) (0.0980) (0.101)
5+ customs districts 2.179∗∗∗ 1.050∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗ 1.087∗∗∗ 0.619∗∗∗ 0.927∗∗∗
(0.236) (0.227) (0.158) (0.149) (0.310) (0.196) (0.207)
ln # of import countries 0.611∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 1.489∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗
(0.0129) (0.00992) (0.00987) (0.0274) (0.0113) (0.0118)
ln Employment 0.708∗∗∗ 0.707∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗
(0.00856) (0.00855) (0.0181)
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Prefecture FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Ownership FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Multi-plant FE N N N Y Y Y Y
R2 0.355 0.458 0.676 0.677 0.526 0.331 0.317
No. of observations 17984 17984 17984 17974 17980 17444 17407
Notes: The estimation method is OLS with high dimensional FE using the Stata command reghdfe written by Correia (2015). It
eliminates singletons nested within fixed effects. From column (3) on, we control for the multi-plant firms using the measure of firm unit
number in the data. Industry fixed effect is controlled for at the 4-digit CIC level. Ownership fixed effect is control using the registered
firm type which distinguishes firms between state owned enterprises, private owned enterprises and foreign invested enterprises. The
numbers in parentheses are standard error clustered at industry and prefecture level. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, *** at
0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
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Table A11: Robustness of the multi-customs-district premium: 2006
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sales TFP Sales TFP Sales TFP
2 customs districts 0.116∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.0870∗∗∗ 0.0646∗∗∗ 0.0401∗∗∗ 0.0397∗∗
(0.0134) (0.0150) (0.0149) (0.0174) (0.0155) (0.0182)
3 customs districts 0.256∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
(0.0249) (0.0299) (0.0261) (0.0326) (0.0279) (0.0345)
4 customs districts 0.453∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗
(0.0490) (0.0607) (0.0499) (0.0628) (0.0532) (0.0677)
5+ customs districts 0.694∗∗∗ 0.740∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗
(0.0772) (0.0996) (0.0766) (0.0980) (0.0781) (0.101)
ln # of import countries 0.280∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗
(0.00858) (0.00924) (0.00967) (0.0103) (0.00958) (0.0104)
ln Employment 0.771∗∗∗ 0.776∗∗∗ 0.764∗∗∗
(0.00598) (0.00661) (0.00716)
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Prefecture FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Ownership FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Multi-plant FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
R2 0.681 0.401 0.702 0.417 0.706 0.406
No. of observations 37571 36213 26265 25168 23896 22940
Notes: Column (1) and (2) use alternative measure of mulit-plant firm. Column (3) and (4) exclude pure processing
importers. Column (5) and (6) exclude importers from Guangdong province. The numbers in parentheses are
standard error clustered at industry and prefecture level. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, *** at 0.1, 0.05
and 0.01, respectively.
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Table A12: Areas with local transmission of SARS
Country Area From To
China Beijing 02-Mar-03 18-Jun-03
China Guangdong 16-Nov-02 07-Jun-03
China Hebei 19-Apr-03 10-Jun-03
China Hubei 17-Apr-03 26-May-03
China Inner Mongolia 04-Mar-03 03-Jun-03
China Jilin 01-Apr-03 29-May-03
China Jiangsu 19-Apr-03 21-May-03
China Shanxi 08-Mar-03 13-Jun-03
China Shaanxi 12-Apr-03 29-May-03
China Tianjin 16-Apr-03 28-May-03
China Hong Kong 15-Feb-03 22-Jun-03
China Taiwan 25-Feb-03 05-Jul-03
Canada Greater Toronto Area 23-Feb-03 02-Jul-03
Canada New Westminster 28-Mar-03 05-May-03
Mongolia Ulaanbaatar 05-Apr-03 09-May-03
Philippines Manila 06-Apr-03 19-May-03
Singapore Singapore 25-Feb-03 31-May-03
Vietnam Hanoi 23-Feb-03 27-Apr-03
Notes: This table lists the areas identified by the WHO as regions with
local transmission of SARS.
Table A13: Resilience of processing importers: partial processing traders
Dependent Variable: Processing with inputs Pure Assembly
firm import by route ln(impijk) (1) (2) (3) (4)
pre shock sourcing intensity 9.456∗∗∗ 9.510∗∗∗ 7.542∗∗∗ 7.532∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.114) (0.222) (0.220)
trade route hit by SARS=1 -0.0650∗∗ -0.0248 -0.0596 -0.0673
(0.0281) (0.0296) (0.0757) (0.0816)
trade route hit by SARS=1 x pre shock sourcing intensity -0.662∗∗∗ 0.150
(0.138) (0.452)
other routes hit by SARS=1 -0.0103 0.0204
(0.0249) (0.0705)
firm-time FE Y Y Y Y
industry FE Y Y Y Y
ownership type FE Y Y Y Y
origin FE Y Y Y Y
destination FE Y Y Y Y
customs area FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.470 0.470 0.487 0.487
No. of observations 1385724 1385724 78896 78896
Notes: Partial processing traders are importers which partially participate in processing trade. Column (1)
and (2) use the sample of importers that engage both in Processing with Inputs (PI) and ordinary imports
but not Pure Assembly (PA). Column (3) and (4) use the sample of importers that engage both in PA and
ordinary imports but not PI. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors clustered at region-industry level.
Significance levels are indicated by *, **, *** at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
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Table A14: Resilience of importers: exporters and non-exporters
Dependent Variable: Importers but Importers and
not exporters also exporters
firm imports by route ln(impijk) (1) (2) (3) (4)
pre shock sourcing intensity 7.863∗∗∗ 7.985∗∗∗ 9.547∗∗∗ 9.574∗∗∗
(0.248) (0.244) (0.0987) (0.0976)
trade route hit by SARS=1 0.00956 0.0733 -0.0819∗∗∗ -0.0626∗∗
(0.0623) (0.0646) (0.0238) (0.0249)
trade route hit by SARS=1 x pre shock sourcing intensity -1.665∗∗∗ -0.375∗∗∗
(0.361) (0.128)
other routes hit by SARS=1 -0.0407 0.00474
(0.0589) (0.0205)
firm-time FE Y Y Y Y
industry FE Y Y Y Y
ownership type FE Y Y Y Y
origin FE Y Y Y Y
destination FE Y Y Y Y
customs area FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.549 0.550 0.467 0.467
No. of observations 153627 153627 1866083 1866083
Notes: This table examines the resilience of importers which export and those that do not. Column
(1) and (2) include importers that do not export. Column (3) and (4) include importers that are
also exporters. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors clustered at region-industry level.
Significance levels are indicated by *, **, *** at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
Table A15: Resilience of importers: single-location and multi-location importers
Dependent Variable: Single-location Multi-location
firm import by route ln(impijk) (1) (2) (3) (4)
pre SARS sourcing intensity 9.105∗∗∗ 9.135∗∗∗ 11.38∗∗∗ 11.38∗∗∗
(0.0960) (0.0943) (0.166) (0.166)
trade route hit by SARS=1 -0.0908∗∗∗ -0.0683∗∗ -0.0389 -0.0604
(0.0262) (0.0288) (0.0478) (0.0468)
trade route hit by SARS=1 x pre SARS sourcing intensity -0.396∗∗∗ 0.0727
(0.134) (0.378)
other routes hit by SARS=1 -0.00554 0.0540
(0.0222) (0.0438)
firm, destination-time, ownership, industry, origin, customs FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.483 0.483 0.439 0.439
No. of observations 1572882 1572882 446827 446827
Notes: This table examines the resilience of importers which has only single import/export location
(roughly county level unit) in the customs data v.s. those have multiple. Column (1) and (2) include
importers that only reports one single location. Column (3) and (4) include importers that reports multiple.
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors clustered at region-industry level. Significance levels are
indicated by *, **, *** at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
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Table A16: Robustness of the trade elasticity
Dependent Variable: foreign sourcing relative
to home sourcing ln(χijk)− lnφ
d
Φ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Weighted tariff, no log approximation -5.180∗∗∗
(0.748)
lagged share weighted ln(tariff) -5.087∗∗∗
(0.759)
current share weighted ln(tariff) -5.121∗∗∗
(0.770)
FH firm-market import tariff -4.989∗∗∗ -5.676∗∗∗
(0.800) (0.830)
ln maritime distance -0.331∗∗∗
(0.0145)
ln geodist customs-destination -0.0522∗∗∗ -0.0521∗∗∗ -0.0522∗∗∗ -0.253∗∗∗
(0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0561)
ln geodist origin-customs -0.411∗∗∗ -0.411∗∗∗ -0.411∗∗∗
(0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0153)
common customs 0.446∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 0.411∗∗∗
(0.0673) (0.0673) (0.0673) (0.0799)
common language: customs-destination 0.845∗∗∗ 0.844∗∗∗ 0.844∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗
(0.0880) (0.0880) (0.0881) (0.119)
co-Chinese 10.48∗∗∗ 10.48∗∗∗ 10.48∗∗∗ 8.047∗∗∗
(2.627) (2.627) (2.627) (2.741)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y
Ownership type FE Y Y Y Y Y
Origin FE Y Y Y Y N
Customs district FE Y Y Y Y N
Destination FE Y Y Y Y N
Origin-Customs district-Destination FE N N N N Y
R2 0.458 0.458 0.458 0.460 0.504
N 121742 121742 121742 114732 115964
Notes: This table examines the robustness of θ with alternative measures and specifications. Column (1)
uses the simple weighted average of tariff without log approximation as in Fitzgerald and Haller (2014).
Column (2) uses only lagged shares in constructing the firm-market specific import tariff. Column (3)
uses only current shares in constructing the tariff measure. Column (4) uses maritime distances between
major ports instead of great circle distance to measure distances between customs districts and origins.
Column (5) absorbs the gravity variables by a origin-custom district-destination fixed effect. The numbers
in parentheses are standard errors clustered at firm level. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, ***
at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
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Table A17: SARS cases by regions
Areas Female Male Total Number of deaths fatality ratio (%) Date onset first probable case Date onset last probable case
China 2674 2607 5327 349 7 16-Nov-02 03-Jun-03
China, Hong Kong 977 778 1755 299 17 15-Feb-03 31-May-03
China, Taiwan 218 128 346 37 11 25-Feb-03 15-Jun-03
Canada 151 100 251 43 17 23-Feb-03 12-Jun-03
Singapore 161 77 238 33 14 25-Feb-03 05-May-03
Vietnam 39 24 63 5 8 23-Feb-03 14-Apr-03
United States 14 15 29 0 0 24-Feb-03 13-Jul-03
Philippines 8 6 14 2 14 25-Feb-03 05-May-03
Germany 4 5 9 0 0 09-Mar-03 06-May-03
Mongolia 8 1 9 0 0 31-Mar-03 06-May-03
Thailand 5 4 9 2 22 11-Mar-03 27-May-03
France 1 6 7 1 14 21-Mar-03 03-May-03
Australia 4 2 6 0 0 26-Feb-03 01-Apr-03
Malaysia 1 4 5 2 40 14-Mar-03 22-Apr-03
Sweden 3 2 5 0 0 28-Mar-03 23-Apr-03
Italy 1 3 4 0 0 12-Mar-03 20-Apr-03
United Kingdom 2 2 4 0 0 01-Mar-03 01-Apr-03
India 0 3 3 0 0 25-Apr-03 06-May-03
Republic of Korea 0 3 3 0 0 25-Apr-03 10-May-03
Indonesia 0 2 2 0 0 06-Apr-03 17-Apr-03
China, Macao 0 1 1 0 0 05-May-03 05-May-03
Kuwait 1 0 1 0 0 09-Apr-03 09-Apr-03
New Zealand 1 0 1 0 0 20-Apr-03 20-Apr-03
Republic of Ireland 0 1 1 0 0 27-Feb-03 27-Feb-03
Romania 0 1 1 0 0 19-Mar-03 19-Mar-03
Russian Federation 0 1 1 0 0 05-May-03 05-May-03
South Africa 0 1 1 1 100 03-Apr-03 03-Apr-03
Spain 0 1 1 0 0 26-Mar-03 26-Mar-03
Switzerland 0 1 1 0 0 09-Mar-03 09-Mar-03
Total 4273 3779 8098 774 9.6
Notes: Data source: WHO.
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Table A18: List of Chinese customs districts
ID Name Province largest 2nd largest 3rd largest share of
gateway gateway gateway overseas Chinese
100 Beijing Beijing Beijing 0.49%
200 Tianjin Tianjin Tianjin 0.01%
400 Shijiazhuang Hebei Tangshan Qinhuangdao 0.00%
500 Taiyuan Shanxi Taiyuan 0.00%
600 Manchuri Inner Mongolia Manchuri 0.00%
700 Mongolia Inner Mongolia Baotou 0.00%
800 Shenyang Liaoning Shenyang 0.00%
900 Dalian Liaoning Dalian Yinkou Dandong 0.04%
1500 Changchun Jilin Changchun 0.00%
1900 Harbin Heilongjiang Harbin 0.00%
2200 Shanghai Shanghai Shanghai 0.18%
2300 Nanjing Jiangsu Suzhou Nanjing Lianyungang 0.04%
2900 Hangzhou Zhejiang Jiaxing 0.08%
3100 Ningbo Zhejiang Ningbo-Zhoushan 0.07%
3300 Hefei Anhui Wuhu 0.01%
3500 Fuzhou Fujian Fuzhou 0.20%
3700 Xiamen Fujian Xiamen Quanzhou 1.14%
4000 Nanchang Jiangxi Nanchang 0.01%
4200 Qingdao Shandong Qingdao Rizhao Yantai 0.01%
4600 Zhengzhou Henan Zhengzhou 0.01%
4700 Wuhan Hubei Wuhan 0.01%
4900 Changsha Hunan Changsha 0.02%
5100 Guangzhou Guangdong Huangpu 2.75%
5200 Huangpu Guangdong Humen 0.01%
5300 Shenzhen Guangdong Shenzhen 2.07%
5700 Gongbei Guangdong Zhuhai 1.19%
6000 Shantou Guangdong Shantou 0.93%
6400 Haikou Hainan Haikou 0.27%
6700 Zhanjiang Guangdong Zhanjiang 0.01%
6800 Jiangmen Guangdong Jiangmen 1.02%
7200 Nanning Guangxi Fanchenggang 0.15%
7900 Chengdu Sichuan Chengdu 0.01%
8000 Chongqing Chongqing Chongqing 0.02%
8300 Guiyang Guizhou Guiyang 0.04%
8600 Kunming Yunnan Kunming 0.01%
8800 Lasa Tibet Lasa 0.00%
9000 Xi’an Shannxi Xi’an 0.29%
9400 Wulumuqi Xinjiang Wulumuqi 0.01%
9500 Lanzhou Gansu Lanzhou 0.00%
9600 Yinchuan Ningxia Yinchuan 0.01%
9700 Xining Qinghai Xining 0.00%
Notes: The table lists the customs district as shown in Figure A3. It also lists the gateway city (cities) for
each customs district. The column on overseas Chinese is constructed from Chinese City Yearbook 1995
and defined as the number of overseas Chinese divided by local population.
Chapter 1 77
1.C.2 Complementary Figures
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Figure A2: Countries and customs districts: efficiencies vs. imports
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Figure A3: Map of Chinese customs districts
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(a) Year 2000 (b) Year 2006
Notes: The base map is from the ACASIAN Data Center with finishing date cross-validated using news
reports, government reports and other online sources.
Figure A4: Chinese railways 2000-2006
(a) Year 2000 (b) Year 2006
Notes: The base map is from the ACASIAN Data Center with finishing date cross-validated using news
reports, government reports and other online sources.
Figure A5: Chinese highways 2000-2006
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Chapter 2
Structural Adjustments and
International Trade: Theory and
Evidence from China
2.1 Introduction
We define structural adjustments as changes in the distribution of production and exports.
In a world of multiple industries, economic structure evolves constantly. One familiar eco-
nomic development pattern is that a country first produce labour-intensive goods. Those
industries then decline and are gradually replaced by more capital-intensive industries.
According to the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) theory, as a country becomes more capital abun-
dant, production and exports become more capital-intensive. Yet we know relatively less
about the effect of trade liberalization and changes in Ricardian comparative advantage on
structural adjustments. Moreover, existing analysis in the literature on structural adjust-
ments focuses on reallocation across industries (e.g., Harrigan, 1995, 1997; Redding, 2002;
Romalis, 2004), but largely ignores reallocation within industries across heterogeneous
firms (Melitz, 2003). In this paper, we provide empirical, theoretical, and quantitative ev-
idence on how changes in factor endowments, technology, and trade costs jointly determine
structural adjustments both across and within industries.
We motivate our model by three new stylized facts on structural adjustments in China
from 1999 to 2007. As one of the fastest-growing economies, China provides a good
case for studying structural adjustments. Using firm-level data, we find the following.
1) Manufacturing production became more capital-intensive in 2007 as compared with
1999. 2) Exports did not become more capital-intensive. Instead, the export intensity
and percentage of firms that export increased in labour-intensive industries and decreased
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in capital-intensive industries. 3) Productivity growth of labour-intensive firms was faster
than capital-intensive firms during the period 1999-2007. China was clearly more capital
abundant in 2007 than in 1999. According to the HO theory, China should be producing
and exporting more capital-intensive goods. Thus, the observed adjustment in production
in fact 1 is consistent with the HO theory. However, fact 2 seems to suggest that China
had gained more comparative advantage in labour intensive sectors. Taken together, the
first two facts are therefore at odds with the HO theory (not to say that the HO theory
does not explain within-industry reallocations), while the third fact suggests that we need
to consider productivity differences.
We develop a theoretical model to reconcile the stylized facts and study structural
adjustments. We introduce firm heterogeneity (Melitz, 2003) into the two-country con-
tinuous HO and Ricardian framework (Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson 1977, 1980,
hereafter DFS) in the same manner as Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007). There is
a continuum of industries with different levels of capital intensity. Differences in factor
endowments and technology between the two countries are the source of comparative ad-
vantage. The resulting pattern of production and trade is similar to Romalis (2004). If
factor endowments are sufficient different between the two countries, the labour (capital)
abundant country specializes in labour (capital) intensive industries, while both countries
produce in industries with intermediate labour intensity. Trade is one-way for industries
in which either country specializes and two-way in industries in which both countries pro-
duce.1 However, while all firms export in Romalis (2004), export propensity, measured by
the conditional probability of exporting, is higher in industries of stronger comparative
advantage in our model.
We numerically solve the model to conduct comparative statics and find the following
three properties. Firstly, we confirm the “quasi-Rybczynski” theorem by Romalis (2004),
which states that production and exports become more capital-intensive when a country
becomes more capital abundant. On top of that, within-industry reallocations vary across
industries. Export propensity and export intensity increase in capital-intensive indus-
tries and decline in labour-intensive industries. The magnitude of changes is more pro-
nounced in more capital-intensive industries. Secondly, sector-biased technology change
which strengthens the Ricardian comparative advantage of labour-intensive industries in-
crease their export propensity and export intensity, and shift production toward these
industries. The first two properties can be thought of as a “single crossing property” for
1Unlike Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008), and Lu (2010) in which firm entry is exogenous, we
endogenize firm entry and allow for specialization. Zeros in trade flow can be generated in our model even
though productivity distribution is unbounded. There is no specialization if factor endowments are within
the “diversification cone” as in the two-sector model of Bernard et al. (2007), or if Ricardian comparative
advantage is sufficiently weak.
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sectoral distribution of production and exports. Finally, trade liberalization magnifies the
existing comparative advantage. The labour-abundant country produce and export more
in labour-intensive industries when trade costs are reduced.
To quantify the driving force behind structural adjustments in China, we estimate the
model’s underlining parameters by fitting the model moments to the data moments. The
estimated model allows us to gauge the contribution of each driving force by conducting
counterfactual experiments. Our estimation results indicate that during the period 1999-
2007 the capital-to-labour ratio of China more than doubled, technology improved signif-
icantly and favoured labour-intensive industries, and trade liberalization reduced variable
trade costs by more than a quarter. By running counterfactual simulations which replace
the model parameters of 1999 by the parameters of 2007, we find that factor endowments
were the major force shifting Chinese production toward capital-intensive industries. At
the same time, sector-biased technology change was the main driving force behind the
adjustment in exports. Over time, China gained more Ricardian comparative advantage
in labour-intensive industries due to faster productivity growth in these industries. The
technology change induced more firms to select into exporting and endogenously amplified
the Ricardian comparative advantage in labour industries, outweighing changes in factor
endowments, and leading to more exports in labour-intensive industries. The quantitative
analysis therefore helps to account for the empirical facts on the structural adjustments
in China.
Our estimated model also allows us to separate the endogenous Ricardian comparative
advantage from the ex ante Ricardian comparative advantage (Bernard et al., 2007), and
to evaluate the contribution of export selection to productivity growth (Melitz, 2003). We
find that Ricardian comparative advantage was dampened by export selection in 1999, but
then got strengthened by export selection in 2007. Export selection contributed to about
2.1% of manufacturing productivity growth in China from 1999 to 2007. We also use the
model to evaluate welfare gains and find that both China and the rest of the world (RoW)
benefited from China’s structural adjustments, but China benefited more. The rise of the
Chinese economy was mostly driven by technology changes, less by factor endowments,
and least by trade liberalization. This is consistent with the survey by Zhu (2012) in which
he concludes that productivity growth is the main source of China’s growth.2
Our paper makes contributions to several strands of literature. As far as we know,
this is the first quantitative study on production and trade patterns which incorporates
2Our result is also consistent with Tombe and Zhu (2015) in which they find trade liberalization con-
tributes modestly to the growth of China. That being said, we only capture the aggregate reallocation
effects but not the within-firm changes. De Loecker and Goldberg (2014) provide an in-depth review of
the various channels that trade liberalization affects productivity through within-firm changes.
Chapter 2 82
firm heterogeneity. Existing empirical studies on production and trade patterns mostly
rely on industrial or product level data, and can generally be divided into two lines. The
first is the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek literature which emphasizes cross-country differences in
factor endowments.3 The other line of the literature focuses on the Ricardian model which
emphasizes the role of productivity differences as the source of comparative advantage.4
We merge these two lines of analysis and introduce reallocation within industries by having
heterogeneous firms. With the help of firm level data and a structurally estimated model,
we not only quantify the importance of changes in factor endowments and technologies,
but also show that within-industry reallocations shape comparative advantage and affect
aggregate production and trade patterns considerably.
We also contribute to the literature studying the interaction of firm heterogeneity
and comparative advantage. Our model is most closely related to Bernard et al. (2007).
Recent contributions to this literature include Okubo (2009), Lu (2010), Fan et al. (2011),
Gaubert and Itskhoki (2016), and Burstein and Vogel (2011, 2017). With the exception of
Burstein and Vogel (2011, 2017), these papers include either HO or Ricardian comparative
advantage alone. Whereas the focus of Burstein and Vogel (2011, 2017) is the effect of trade
liberalization on skill premium, we focus on structural adjustments. Most importantly,
our paper is the first to quantify the endogenous component of Ricardian comparative
advantage due to firm heterogeneity, a mechanism first found in Bernard et al. (2007).
Our paper is also related to the literature on the evolution of comparative advantage.
Redding (2002) studies the role of technology and factor endowments in the evolution
of specialization patterns. Similar to his study, we also analyse how the distribution of
economic activity across sectors changes over time. Romalis (2004) uses long-run data
and finds evidence supporting the Rybczynski effect. Costinot et al. (2016), Levchenko
and Zhang (2016) examine the welfare implication of evolving comparative advantage.
We focus on how evolving comparative advantage shapes the structure of production and
exports, taking into account firm heterogeneity and changes in trade costs.
Finally, we also contribute to the literature studying China’s trade growth and its im-
plications for the RoW. Rodrik (2006), Schott (2008), and Wang and Wei (2010) discover
that Chinese exports were getting more sophisticated. Despite that, Amiti and Freund
(2010) find that the labour intensity of Chinese exports remained unchanged when pro-
cessing trade is accounted for. China therefore continued to specialize in labour-intensive
3This is a large literature which dates back to Leontief (1953). Recent contributions include Trefler
(1993, 1995), Harrigan (1995, 1997), Davis and Weinstein (2001), Romalis (2004), Schott (2004), Arezki
et al. (2017), and among others.
4This line of literature has generated considerable amount of work since the seminal contribution by
Eaton and Kortum (2002). Important contributions include Costinot et al. (2012) and Donaldson (2018).
There are also papers which consider different sources of comparative advantage jointly, such as Chor
(2010) and Morrow (2010).
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industries, which is consistent with our finding. We show that this is possible in a more
and more capital-abundant country since trade liberalization and sector-bias technology
favour exports from labour-intensive industries. Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) find
negative effects of Chinese import competition on US local employment, which has ignited
vibrant research evaluating welfare gains from trading with China. Hsieh and Ossa (2016),
and Di Giovanni, Levchenko, and Zhang (2014) both study the welfare effect of produc-
tivity growth in China. We quantify the welfare effect of changes in factor endowments,
technology, and trade liberalization individually.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data patterns
we observed from Chinese firm-level data. Section 3 develops the model. Our equilibrium
analysis is presented in section 4. Section 5 provides numerical solutions for the model
and conducts several numerical comparative statics. Section 6 structurally estimates the
model and presents the quantitative results, including the counterfactual experiments and
welfare analysis. Section 7 concludes.
2.2 Motivating Evidence
Structural adjustments take place in all economies gradually but surely as sector distribu-
tion evolves. In this section, we document stylized facts about adjustments in production
and trade structure over time. We focus on China because of its fast economic develop-
ment and the availability of good firm-level data. We use data from the Chinese Annual
Industrial Survey for the period 1999-2007 that covers all State Owned Enterprise (SOE)
and non-SOEs with annual sales higher than 5 million RMB Yuan.5 The dataset provides
information on balance sheet, profit and loss, cash flow statements, firm identification,
ownership, exports, employment, etc. We focus on manufacturing firms and exclude util-
ity and mining firms. To clean the data, we follow Brandt et al. (2012), dropping firms
with missing, zero, or negative capital stock, exports or value added, and only include
firms with more than eight employees. Summary statistics of the basic variables after
cleaning are shown in Appendix Table B1.
Guided by HO theory, we focus on sectors that have different capital intensities. We
define capital intensity as 1 − labour costsvalue added .6 Since the focus of this paper is on changes in
sectoral distribution over time, we mostly compare the data from 1999 to that from 2007.
5We do not look at years after 2007 due to the lack of data. The aftermath of the financial crisis is also
of great concern.
6We drop firms with capital intensity larger than one or less than zero. Labour costs include payable
wages, labour and employment insurance fees, and the total of employee benefits payable. The 2007 data
also reports housing fund and housing subsidy, endowment insurance and medical insurance, and employee
educational expenses provided by the employers. Adding these three variables increase the average labour
share slightly. To make it consistent, we do not include them.
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Table 2.1 presents the basic empirical features of Chinese manufacturing firms in terms
of factor allocation and export propensity. The average capital share of manufacturing
firms increased by four percentage points.7 So overall manufacture production is more
capital-intensive in 2007 than in 1999. At the same time, the average capital share of
exporters stays almost unchanged. The fraction of exporting firms remained at around
25%. The share of goods exported increased by about three percentage points, from 18%
to 21%.
Table 2.1: Capital share and exports
Variables mean in 1999 mean in 2007
capital share of all manufacturers 0.667 0.707
capital share of exporters 0.623 0.619
percent of firms that export 0.253 0.249
exports/gross sales 0.181 0.208
2.2.1 Definition of Industry
To study structural adjustments, we need to measure the industrial distribution of pro-
duction and exports. However, conventional sector classification potentially fails to ap-
propriately group products. As Schott (2003, page 687) argues, “testing the key insight
of Heckscher-Olin theory ... requires grouping together products that are both close substi-
tutes and manufactured with identical techniques. Traditional aggregates can fail on both
counts.” Table B2 in the Appendix shows that there are large variations of capital share
within the two-digit Chinese Industry Classification (CIC) of industries in 2007. The
standard deviation of capital intensity across firms within each industry is around 0.22.
Moreover, the capital intensity between exporters and non-exporters differs significantly.
Except for Manufacture of Tobacco (industry 16), the capital share of exporters is signifi-
cantly lower than non-exporters. These differences persist even when we use the four-digit
CIC industry classification, which includes more than 400 industries.8
Given the large variation of capital intensity within each industry and the systematic
differences between exporters and non-exporters, we follow Schott’s idea to define industry
7Hsieh and Klenow (2009) point out that labour share generated out of the firm level survey is sig-
nificantly less than the numbers reported in the Chinese input-output tables and the national accounts
(roughly 50%). They argue that it can be explained by non-wage compensation. But even in the aggregate
numbers, capital share is increasing over time, as documented by Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) and
Chang, Chen, Waggoner and Zha (2015).
8For brevity, the results are not reported but available upon request. Alvarez and Lo´pez (2005), and
Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2007) found that exporters are more capital intensive than non-
exporters for Chilean and American firms, respectively. Bernard et al. (2007) speculated that exporters in
developing countries should be more labour intensive than non-exporters given their comparative advantage
in labour intensive goods. For the same data, Ma et al. (2014) use capital to labour ratio (capital divided
by wage payments) as the indicator of factor intensity. They also find Chinese exporters are less capital
intensive than non-exporters.
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as “Heckscher-Ohlin aggregates” and regroup firms according to their capital intensity.
For example, firms with capital share from 0 to 0.01 are lumped together and defined as
industry 1, for a total of 100 industries.9
2.2.2 Production
We first examine how Chinese production structure changes over time. Panel (a) in Figure
C1 plots the distribution of production across “industries”. Each dot on the left panel
represents the share of firms operating in each industry defined according to capital inten-
sity. The share of firms producing in capital-intensive industries increases over time as the
whole distribution shifts to the right in 2007. Thus, there is significant reallocation of re-
sources to capital-intensive industries. Panel (b) plots the distribution of outputs in terms
of the real value added at industry level. Firms in capital-intensive industries accounted
for larger fractions in 2007 than in 1999.10 Table 2.2 summarizes the information in Figure
1, comparing capital-intensive industries in which firms’ capital intensities are higher than
0.5 with other industries. As the first column indicates, the share of capital-intensive firms
increased by 5.3 percentage points, from 76.5% in 1999 to 81.8% in 2007. Those firms’ em-
ployment and output shares also increased by 9.0 and 6.0 percentage points, respectively,
as shown in the last two columns.
Stylized fact 1: The Chinese manufacturing production became more capital intensive
over time.
Table 2.2: Structural adjustment of production
Year
share of firms
in capital
intensive industries
share of employment
in capital
intensive industries
share of value
added by capital
intensive industries
1999 0.765 0.672 0.879
2007 0.818 0.762 0.938
Difference 0.053 0.090 0.059
Notes: Capital intensive industries are industries with capital intensity larger than 0.5. The row “Differ-
ence” is the difference between year 1999 and 2007.
2.2.3 Trade Patterns
Next, we examine China’s structure of exports. Figure C2 plots the distribution of exports
across industries. The left panel plots the distribution of exporters (defined by the ratio
of number of exporters in the industry to total number of exporters) in 1999 and 2007,
9Such an industry definition has also been used by Ju, Lin and Wang (2015) to study industry dynamics.
10Real value added is calculated using the input and output pricing index constructed by Brandt et al.
(2012).
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of outputs
and shows that the distribution stays almost unchanged.11 The right panel plots the
distribution of export sales (defined by the ratio of the export sales in the industry to
total export sales), and we can see that distribution patterns for the two years are almost
indistinguishable. So, there is no noticeable change in aggregate exports. This result is at
odds with the Rybczynski theorem that predicts that a country’s production and exports
will become more capital-intensive when the country becomes more capital abundant. At
the same time we find that export propensity for different industries changes over time.
Figure C3 plots export propensity within each industry. The left panel plots the share of
exporters for each industry (defined by the ratio of number of exporters to total number
of firms in the industry), and we can see that over time it increases in labour-intensive
industries and drops in capital-intensive industries. The right panel plots export intensity,
which is the value of exports divided by total sales for each industry. It increases for
most industries, especially labour-intensive industries. However, it drops for the more
capital-intensive industries.
These adjustments are also shown in Table 2.3. As the first column indicates, the
fraction of capital-intensive exporters dropped by 0.5% during the period 1999-2007. These
exporters contributed to 81.4% of total exports in 1999. The fraction of export sales by
capital-intensive industries dropped by 0.3%, to 81.1% in 2007, as shown in the second
column. Finally, according to the third column, in capital intensive industries, 23.4% of
firms were exporters in 1999, while that fraction dropped to 21.4% in 2007.
Stylized fact 2: The average capital intensity of Chinese exports stayed almost unchanged
over time. Export propensity increased in labour-intensive industries and decreased in
capital-intensive industries.
11If anything, it shifts towards the labour intensive industries.
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Table 2.3: Structural adjustment of exports
Year
fraction of exporters
from capital
intensive industries
fraction of export
sales by capital
intensive industries
share of exporting
exporting firms in capital
intensive industries
1999 0.708 0.814 0.234
2007 0.703 0.811 0.214
Difference -0.005 -0.003 -0.020
Notes: Capital intensive industries are industries with capital intensity larger than 0.5. The row “Differ-
ence” is the difference between year 1999 and 2007.
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of exports
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Figure 2.3: Export propensity and intensity by industry
Putting Stylized facts 1 and 2 together, we have a seemingly puzzling observation.
Production clearly became more capital-intensive in 2007 than in 1999, while exports
did not.12 According to the standard HO theory, one should expect exports to become
more capital-intensive when production becomes more capital-intensive. However, the HO
theory assumes away the role of productivity. This leads us to the next stylized fact.
12This does not contradict earlier work on the rising sophistication of Chinese exports (Rodrik 2006,
Schott 2008, Wang and Wei 2010). China might have exported more sophisticated products but only
engaged in the labour intensive assembling. As found by Amiti and Freund (2010), the labour intensity of
Chinese exports remained almost unchanged from 1992 to 2005 once processing trade is accounted for.
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2.2.4 Productivity
We now look at productivity growth from 1999 to 2007 across industries, as in Trefler
(1993, 1995), Harrigan (1995, 1997), Davis and Weinstein (2001), which point at the
importance of examining technology. First, we gather firm-level data over nine years to
estimate the firm level total factor productivity (TFP) using the Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) method.13 Then we compute the average TFP for each industry weighted by
firm outputs, trimming the top and bottom one percent to remove outliers. Figure 2.4
shows the estimated average TFP for each industry. There are two basic observations.
First, TFP rises from 1999 to 2007 for all industries. Second, TFP grows faster in labour-
intensive industries. In other words, productivity growth is biased toward labour-intensive
industries.
Stylized fact 3: Productivity grew faster in labour intensive industries.
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value in log, weighted average of firm TFP estimated by LP
Average TFP by Industry
Figure 2.4: Industry productivity measured by weighted-average of firm TFP
2.2.5 Robustness of the Stylized Facts
We explore the robustness of the stylized facts in this subsection. To show that the stylized
facts are robust using data from periods other than the years of 1999 and 2007, we use all
the data and look at the annual differences. The following specification studies how annual
13The panel is constructed using the method by Brandt et al. (2012). Their price indexes and program
to construct the panel are available at http://feb.kuleuven.be/public/N07057/China/. Real output is
measured by real value added. Real output and input are all constructed using the input and output price
indexes provided by them. Capital stock is constructed using the perpetual inventory method. labour
is measured as employment. We estimate the TFP by 2-digit CIC industries. For brevity, the estimate
results are not reported here but available upon request. Our results are robust to the Olley and Pakes
(1996) method or labour productivity measured as real value added per worker. This is shown in the
Appendix 2.B.1.
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changes of outcome are systematically related to the capital intensity of each industry:
∆Yit = αZi + βXit + it,
where ∆Yit is the change of industry outcome Y from period t-1 to t: ∆Yit = Yit − Yit−1,
t=2000, 2001, ..., 2007. The outcomes include the share of firm number, output, sales,
exporter number, export volume, export intensity and average TFP. Zi is the capital
intensity of sector i and Xit includes other controls. Table 2.4 presents the results. From
column (1) to (3), we find that production becomes capital-intensive over time as the
share of firms, value added, and sales all increase with capital intensity. However, the
distribution of exports across industries does not really move; the share of exporters and
export volume basically are not correlated with capital intensity at all, as shown in columns
(4) and (5). Instead, changes in export propensity and export intensity tend to be smaller
for capital-intensive industries, which we can see in columns (6) and (7). Finally, TFP
growth tends to be lower in more capital-intensive industries as shown in column (8).
Table 2.4: Structural adjustments in China: 1999-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Firm Value Sales Exporter Export Export Export TFP
# added # Volume Propensity Intensity
capital intensity 0.0006a 0.001a 0.001a -0.00006 0.0002 -0.03a -0.04a -0.05a
(0.00009) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.00004) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.008)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R2 0.073 0.013 0.014 0.00035 0.00020 0.27 0.034 0.36
No. of observations 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800
Notes: The dependent variables of columns (1) to (5) are first-difference in the share of firm number,
value added, sales, exporter number and export volume for each industry, respectively. The dependent
variable of column (6) is the first-difference of export propensity (defined as the number of exporters
divided by firm number within each industry). The dependent variable of column (7) is the first-difference
of export intensity (defined as the value of exports divided by total sales within each industry). The
dependent variable of column (8) is the growth rate of average sectoral TFP weighted by value added. The
estimation method is OLS. Robust standard errors clustered at industry level are reported in parentheses.
The constants are absorbed by the year fixed effect. Significance levels are indicated by a, b, c at 0.1, 0.05
and 0.01 respectively.
Another concern is whether the findings are driven purely by “HO aggregates”. In
Appendix 2.B.1, we show that this is not the case. We use the four-digit CIC industry
classification to regenerate all facts. As is evident from the figures, our findings that a)
Chinese production became more capital-intensive but exports did not, b) export propen-
sity increased in labour-intensive sectors but declined in capital-intensive sectors, and
c) productivity growth is faster in labour-intensive sectors, all hold under CIC industry
classification.
Finally, to check whether our results are driven by any peculiar Chinese institution, we
regenerate the facts using various sub-samples. To address the concern of the expiration
of the Multi Fiber Agreement in 2005 and rising exports in the labour-intensive textile
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industries, we exclude the corresponding two-digit CIC industry categories 17 and 18 as
per Khandelwal, Schott, and Wei (2013). To address the effect of reform of Chinese SOEs
in the late 1990s, which might favour certain industries over others, we exclude all SOEs
from our sample. Finally, to address the effects of processing trade and export subsidies,
we exclude all pure exporters that are predominantly processing exporters and thus benefit
from export subsidies.14 In these various sub-samples, our basic findings are qualitatively
preserved, as shown in Appendix 2.B.1.
2.3 Model Setup
To account for the empirical features of the data, we now build a model that incorporates
Ricardian comparative advantage, HO comparative advantage, and firm heterogeneity.
The model embeds heterogeneous firms (Melitz 2003) into a Ricardian and HO theory
within a continuum of industries (Dornbusch, Fisher, and Samuelson 1977, 1980). There
are two countries: home and foreign, which differ only in technology and factor endow-
ments. Without loss of generality, we assume that the home country is labour abundant,
that is: L/K > L∗/K∗, and has Ricardian comparative advantage in labour-intensive
industries.15 There is a continuum of industries z on the interval of [0, 1]. z denotes the
industry capital intensity, so that higher z stands for higher capital intensity. Each indus-
try is inhabited by heterogeneous firms which produce different varieties of goods and sell
in a market with monopolistic competition.
2.3.1 Demand
There is a continuum of identical and infinitely lived households that can be aggregated
into a representative household. The representative household’s preference over different
goods is given by the following utility function:
U =
1∫
0
b(z) lnQ(z)dz,
where b(z) is the expenditure share on each industry and satisfies
1∫
0
b(z)dz = 1, and Q(z)
is the lower-tier utility function over the consumption of individual varieties qz(ω) given
14Pure exporters are defined as exporters with export intensity greater than 70% following Defever and
Rian˜o (2017).
15Variables with “*” are for the foreign. We will discuss what happens if HO and Ricardian comparative
advantage favour different industries.
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by the following CES aggregator:16
Q(z) = (
∫
ω∈Ωz
qz(ω)
ρdω)1/ρ,
where Ωz is the varieties available for industry z. We assume 0 < ρ ≤ 1 so that the
elasticity of substitution σ = 11−ρ > 1. The demand function for individual varieties is
given by:
qz(ω) = Q(z)(
pz(ω)
P (z)
)−σ, (2.1)
where P (z) = (
∫
ω∈Ωz
pz(ω)
1−σdω)
1
1−σ is the dual price index defined over price of different
varieties pz(ω).
2.3.2 Production
Following Melitz (2003), we assume that production incurs a fixed cost during each period
which is the same for all firms in the same industry, and that variable cost varies with firm
productivity. Firm productivity A(z)ϕ has two components: A(z) is a common component
for all firms from the same industry z; ϕ is an idiosyncratic component drawn from a
common continuous and increasing distribution G(ϕ), with probability density function
g(ϕ). Following Romalis (2004) and Bernard et al. (2007), we assume that fixed costs are
paid using capital and labour with a factor intensity that matches that of production in
that industry. Specifically, we assume that the total cost function is:
Γ(z, ϕ) =
(
fz +
q(z, ϕ)
A(z)ϕ
)
rzw1−z, (2.2)
where r and w are rents for capital and labour respectively. The relative industry-specific
productivity for home and foreign ε(z) is assumed to be:
ε(z) ≡ A(z)
A∗(z)
= λAz, λ > 0, A > 0. (2.3)
Under this assumption, λ captures the absolute advantage and A captures the compar-
ative advantage. Higher λ leads the home country to be relatively more productive in all
industries. If A > 1, the home country is relatively more productive in capital-intensive
industries and has Ricardian comparative advantages in those industries. If A = 1, ε(z)
does not vary with z, and there is no role for Ricardian comparative advantage. Un-
der the assumption that home has Ricardian comparative advantage in labour-intensive
16Such a preference structure is also used in the survey paper to quantify gains from trade by Costinot
and Rodriguez-Clare (2014). In Appendix 2.A.7, we generalize our main theoretical results to a nested-CES
preferences structure.
Chapter 2 92
industries, we have 0 < A < 1.
Trade is costly. Firms that export need to pay a per-period fixed cost fzxr
zw1−z which
requires both labour and capital. In addition, there are variable iceberg trade costs. Firms
need to ship τ units of goods for 1 unit of goods to arrive in the foreign market. Profit
maximization implies that the equilibrium price is a constant mark-up over the marginal
cost. Hence, the exports and domestic prices satisfy:
pzx(ϕ) = τpzd(ϕ) = τ
rzw1−z
ρA(z)ϕ
, (2.4)
where pzx(ϕ) and pzd(ϕ) are the export and domestic price, respectively. Given the
pricing rule, firms’ revenues from domestic and foreign market rzd(ϕ) and rzx(ϕ) are:
rzd(ϕ) = b(z)R
(
ρA(z)ϕP (z)
rzw1−z
)σ−1
, (2.5)
rzx(ϕ) = τ
1−σ
(
P (z)∗
P (z)
)σ−1 R∗
R
rzd(ϕ), (2.6)
where R and R∗ are aggregate revenues for home and foreign, respectively. Then the total
revenue of a firm is:
rz(ϕ) =
 rzd if it sells only domestically;rzx + rzd if it exports.
Therefore, the firm’s profit can be divided into the two portions, profit earned from do-
mestic markets and profit earned from foreign markets:
pizd(ϕ) =
rzd
σ
− fzrzw1−z,
pizx(ϕ) =
rzx
σ
− fzxrzw1−z. (2.7)
Thus, the total profit piz(ϕ) is given by:
piz(ϕ) = pizd(ϕ) + max{0, pizx(ϕ)}. (2.8)
A firm with productivity ϕ produces if its revenue at least covers the fixed cost. That
is pizd(ϕ) ≥ 0. Similarly, it exports if pizx(ϕ) ≥ 0. These define the productivity cut-off
for zero-profit ϕz and the productivity cut-off for exporting profit to be zero ϕzx, which
satisfy:
rzd(ϕz) = σfzr
zw1−z, (2.9)
rzx(ϕzx) = σfzxr
zw1−z. (2.10)
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Using the two equations above, we can derive the relationship between the two productivity
cut-offs:
ϕzx = Λzϕz, where Λz =
τP (z)
P (z)∗
[
fzxR
fzR∗
] 1
σ−1
. (2.11)
Λz > 1 implies selection into the export market: only the most productive firms export.
The empirical literature strongly supports selection into exporting. Therefore, we focus
on parameters where exporters are always more productive, following Melitz (2003) and
Bernard et al. (2007).17 Firms’ production and export decisions are shown in Figure
2.5. Each period, G(ϕz) fraction of firms exit upon entry because they do not earn
positive profit. And 1 − G(ϕzx) fraction of firms export because they have sufficiently
high productivity and earn positive profit from both domestic and foreign sales. Firms
whose productivity is between ϕzxand ϕz sell only in the domestic market. So the ex ante
probability of exporting conditional on successful entry χz is
χz =
1−G(ϕzx)
1−G(ϕz)
. (2.12)
Figure 2.5: Productivity cut-offs and firm decisions
2.3.3 Free Entry
If a firm does produce, it faces a constant probability δ of bad shock every period in which
it is forced to exit. The steady-state equilibrium is characterized by a constant mass of
firms entering an industry Mez and a constant mass of firms producing Mz. The mass of
firms entering equals the mass of firms exiting:
(1−G(ϕz))Mez = δMz. (2.13)
The entry cost is given by fezr
zw1−z. The expected profit of entry Vz comes from two
parts: the ex ante probability of successful entry times the expected profit from domestic
market until death and the ex ante probability of export times the expected profit from
the export market until death. Free entry implies
Vz =
1−G(ϕz)
δ
(pizd(ϕ̂z) + χzpizx(ϕ̂zx)) = fezr
zw1−z, (2.14)
17Lu(2010) explores the possibility that Λz < 1 and documents that in the labour intensive sectors
of China, exporters are less productive. Dai et al. (2011) argue for the importance of accounting for
processing exporters. And using TFP as the productivity measure instead of value added per worker, even
including processing exporters still support that exporters are more productive.
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where pizd(ϕ̂z) and χzpizd(ϕ̂zx) are the expected profit from serving the domestic and
foreign markets, respectively. ϕ̂z is the average productivity of all producing firms and
ϕ̂zx is the average productivity of all exporting firms. They are defined as:
ϕ̂z = (
1
1−G(ϕz)
∞∫
ϕz
ϕσ−1g(ϕ)dϕ)
1
σ−1 ,
ϕ̂zx = (
1
1−G(ϕzx)
∞∫
ϕzx
ϕσ−1g(ϕ)dϕ)
1
σ−1 . (2.15)
Combining the free entry condition (2.14) with the zero profit conditions (2.9), (2.10), the
productivity cut-offs ϕz and ϕzx satisfy:
fz
δ
∞∫
ϕz
[
(
ϕ
ϕz
)σ−1 − 1
]
g(ϕ)dϕ+
fzx
δ
∞∫
ϕzx
[
(
ϕ
ϕzx
)σ−1 − 1
]
g(ϕ)dϕ = fez. (2.16)
2.3.4 Market Clearing
In equilibrium, the sum of domestic and foreign spending on domestic varieties equals the
value of total industry revenue:
Rz = b(z)RMz
(
pzd(ϕ̂z)
P (z)
)1−σ
+ χzb(z)R
∗Mz
(
pzx(ϕ̂zx)
P (z)∗
)1−σ
, (2.17)
where the price index P (z) is given by the equation below. R and R∗ are home and foreign
aggregate revenues. R∗z and P (z)∗ are defined in a symmetric way.
P (z) =
[
Mzpzd(ϕ̂z)
1−σ + χ∗zM
∗
z p
∗
zx(ϕ̂
∗
zx)
1−σ] 11−σ . (2.18)
The factor market clearing conditions are:
L =
1∫
0
l(z)dz, L∗ =
1∫
0
l∗(z), (2.19)
K =
1∫
0
k(z)dz, K∗ =
1∫
0
k∗(z)dz.
2.3.5 Equilibrium
The equilibrium consists of the vector of {ϕz, ϕzx, P (z), pz(ϕ), pzx(ϕ), r, w, R, ϕ∗z,
ϕ∗zx, P (z)∗, pz(ϕ)∗, pzx(ϕ)∗, r∗, w∗, R∗} for z ∈ [0, 1]. It is determined by the following
conditions:
(a) Firms’ pricing rule (2.4) for each industry and each country;
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(b) Free entry condition (2.14) and the relationship between two zero profit produc-
tivity cut-offs (2.11) for each industry and both countries;
(c) Factor market clearing condition (2.19);
(d) The pricing index (2.18) implied by consumer and producer optimizations;
(e) The world goods market clearing condition(2.17).
Proposition 2.1. There exists a unique equilibrium given by {ϕz,ϕzx, P (z), pz(ϕ), pzx(ϕ), r, w,R, ϕ∗z,
ϕ∗zx, P (z)∗, pz(ϕ)∗, pzx(ϕ)∗, r∗, w∗, R∗}.
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.1.
2.4 Equilibrium Analysis
The presence of trade cost, multiple factors, heterogeneous firms, asymmetric countries,
and infinite industry make it difficult to find a closed-form solution to the model. There-
fore, we make two assumptions to simplify the algebra. First, we assume that the idiosyn-
cratic productivity is Pareto distributed with the following density function:
g(ϕ) = aθaϕ−(a+1), a+ 1 > σ,
where θ is the lower bound of productivity: ϕ ≥ θ. 18 Second, we assume that the coeffi-
cients of fixed costs are the same for all industries:
fz = fz′ , fzx = fz′x, fez = fez′ , ∀z 6= z′.
Proposition 2.2. (a) As long as the home country and the foreign country are sufficiently
different in factor endowments or technology, then there exist two factor-intensity cut-offs
0 ≤ z < z ≤ 1 such that the home country specializes in production within [0, z] whereas the
foreign country specializes in production within [z, 1], while both countries produce within
(z, z). (b) If there is no variable trade cost (τ = 1) and fixed cost of export equals fixed cost
of production for each industry (fzx = fz, ∀z), then we have z = z so that two countries
completely specialize.
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.2.
Given our assumptions that LK >
L∗
K∗ and A < 1, the home country has comparative
advantage in labour-intensive industries. Proposition 2 and Figure 2.6 illustrate the pro-
duction and trade patterns under this scenario. Countries engage in inter-industry trade
18Some of our results do not depend on the assumption of Pareto distribution. We will point it out if
this is the case.
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for industries within [0, z] and [z, 1], due to specialization.19 This is where the compara-
tive advantage in factor abundance or technology (classical trade theory) dominates trade
costs and the power of increasing return and imperfect competition (new trade theory).
Countries engage in intra-industry trade in industries within (z, z), where the power of
increasing return to scale and imperfect competition dominate the power of comparative
advantage (Romalis, 2004). Thus, if the two countries are very similar in terms of tech-
nology and factor endowments, the strength of comparative advantage would be relatively
weak, and there would be no specialization and only intra-industry trade between the two
countries. That is to say, z = 0 and z = 1. However, if trade is totally free, the classical
trade force dominates and full specialization arises as z = z, following the specialization
pattern in the classical DFS model. Finally, if A ≥ 1, it is possible that the Ricardian
comparative advantage is strong enough to overturn the HO comparative advantage. In
that case, the pattern of production and trade will be reversed. The home country will
specialize in [z, 1] and foreign country will specialize in [0, z].
Figure 2.6: Production and trade patterns
In the classical DFS model with zero transportation costs, factor price equalization
(FPE) prevails, and geographic patterns of production and trade are not determined when
the two countries are similar. With costly trade and departure from FPE, we can deter-
mine the pattern of production. Our model thus inherits all the properties in Romalis
(2004). However, his assumption of homogeneous firms leads to the stark feature that all
firms export. With the assumption of firm heterogeneity, export propensity varies across
industries in our model as shown in the following two propositions.
Proposition 2.3. (a) Under a general productivity distribution g(ϕ) > 0, the zero-profit
productivity cut-off decreases with the capital intensity, while the export cut-off increases
with the capital intensity within (z, z) in the home country. The converse holds in the
foreign country.
(b) The cut-offs remain constant in product intervals which either country specializes.
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.3.
19For the industries that countries specialize, half of the potential trade flows are zeros. Helpman, Melitz
and Rubinstein (2008) generate zeros in trade flow assuming bounded productivity distribution. Due to
specialization, zeros in trade flows arise even with unbounded productivity distribution in our model.
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The proposition does not rely on the assumption of Pareto distribution and is an exten-
sion of Bernard et al. (2007). Their discussion is limited to the cases that both countries
produce within the diversification cone and no specialization occurs. Our conclusion (b)
extends the property to the cases of specialization. Figure 2.7 illustrates these results for
both home and foreign countries.
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Figure 2.7: Productivity cut-offs
Proposition 2.4. (a) Under the general productivity distribution g(ϕ) > 0, the probability
of exporting χz is constant for industries in which either country specializes and decreases
with capital intensity in home country within (z,z), and vice versa for the foreign country.
If the productivity distribution is Pareto, we have
χz =
 R
∗
fR z ∈ [0, z]
τ˜−af−εah(z)
εafh(z)−τ˜a z ∈ (z, z)
,
where h(z) ≡
(
w
w∗ (
r/w
r∗/w∗ )
z
) aσ
1−σ
, τ˜ ≡ τ(f) 1σ−1 and for z ∈ (z, z)
∂χz
∂z
= B(z)
[
ln(A)− σ
σ − 1 ln
(
r/w
r∗/w∗
)]
, B(z) > 0.
(b) The export intensity is: γz =
fχz
1+fχz
which follows the same pattern as χz.
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.4.
Proposition 4 is a straightforward implication of Proposition 3. It says that the stronger
the comparative advantage is, the larger the share of firms that participate in international
trade. For industries that countries specialize, goods are supplied by only one country and
export propensity is a constant. This is illustrated in Figure 2.8. The left panel shows
that export propensity decreases with capital intensity in the home country. The right
panel shows an opposite pattern for the foreign country.
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Figure 2.8: Export propensity
Now we add the assumption that the idiosyncratic shock is drawn from a Pareto distri-
bution. The assumption of Pareto distribution leads to explicit expressions and allows us
to examine the sign of ∂χz∂z within (z, z): it depends on the Ricardian comparative advan-
tage ln(A) and the Heckscher-Ohlin Comparative Advantage ln
(
r/w
r∗/w∗
)
. The magnitude
of the HO comparative advantage depends on σ, the elasticity of substitution between
varieties: the smaller σ is, the more that industries differ in their export propensity. Since
A < 1 and KL <
K∗
L∗ , home country has both Ricardian comparative advantage and HO
comparative advantage in labour-intensive industries. Thus we expect ∂χz∂z < 0, and the
probability of export decreases with capital intensities in the home country. However, if
A > 1 and the home country has Ricardian comparative advantage in capital-intensive
industries, then the sign of ∂χz∂z depends on which comparative advantage is stronger. If
Ricardian comparative advantage is strong enough to overturn the HO advantage, then
the home country will export more in capital-intensive industries.
The key insight from the Melitz model is that selection into exports leads to within-
sector resource reallocation and brings productivity gains. Bernard et al. (2007) find that
the strength of reallocation is stronger in the industry that the country has compara-
tive advantage. Such differential reallocation effects will generate productivity differences
across sectors and countries. They refer to such a mechanism as “the endogenous Ricar-
dian comparative advantage”. In the following proposition, we show how to quantify such
a mechanism.
Proposition 2.5. (a) The average idiosyncratic firm productivity in each industry is
ϕ̂z = C(1 + fχz)
1/a,
where C is a constant. Within (z,z), it increases with the strength of comparative advantage
as reflected by χz. Within the specialization zone [0, z], it is a constant.
(b) For sectors within (z,z), that both countries produce, so that the Ricardian com-
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parative advantage can be decomposed into two components as:
Â(z)
Â∗(z)
= λAz︸︷︷︸
exogenous
(
1 + fχz
1 + fχ∗z
)1/a︸ ︷︷ ︸
endogenous
.
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.5.
According to conclusion (a), opening to trade brings productivity gains, because χz
would increase from zero to some positive number. The productivity gains will be larger
if the share of exporters is higher. In conclusion (b), the relative industry productivity
between home and foreign country is decomposed into an exogenous component and an
endogenous component that varies with the relative extent of export selection. The home
country can be relatively more productive either because industry-wide productivity is
higher or because relatively more firms are selected to export.
Moreover, the endogenous Ricardian comparative advantage can amplify or dampen
the exogenous component, depending on how the relative share of exporters varies across
industries. If the HO comparative advantage is so strong that the share of exporters is rel-
atively lower in industries with strong exogenous Ricardian comparative advantage, then
the exogenous Ricardian comparative advantage would be dampened. For example, sup-
pose A > 1 and λAz increases with z. Hence, the home country has exogenous Ricardian
comparative advantage in capital-intensive industries. However, if LK /
L∗
K∗ is so high that
home country has strong HO comparative advantage in the labour-intensive industries
and ln(A) < σσ−1 ln(
r
w/
r∗
w∗ ). Then, according to Proposition 4,
∂χz
∂z is negative and χz is
lower in the capital-intensive industries. Conversely, χ∗z is higher in the capital intensive
industries. Then (1+fχz1+fχ∗z
)1/a declines with z and the endogenous Ricardian comparative
advantage is weaker in capital-intensive industries.
2.5 Numerical Solution
In this subsection, we parametrize the model and solve it numerically. The purpose of this
section is twofold. The first is to visualize the equilibrium. The second is to study how
the equilibrium responds to changes in factor endowments, technology, and trade costs.
The parametrization of the model is shown in Table 2.5, following Bernard et al. (2007).
We set the initial factor endowments such that the home country has HO advantage in
labour-intensive industries. Initial technology parameters are chosen such that there is
no Ricardian comparative advantage. We normalize the expenditure function b(z) to
be 1 for all industries so that the variation of outputs and firm mass is driven only by
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comparative advantage. Figure 2.9 plots the conditional probability of exporting and firm
mass distribution across industries. Given our symmetric parameters, the two countries
produce and export symmetrically; countries produce and export more in industries in
which they have stronger comparative advantage.
Table 2.5: Numerical solution: parametrization
Variables Definition Value
K home capital stock 100
L home labour stock 300
K∗ foreign capital stock 300
L∗ foreign labour stock 100
fzx/fz relative fixed cost of export 1.5
fez/fz relative fixed cost of entry 30
τ iceberg trade cost 1.8
a shape parameter of Pareto Distribution 3.8
θ lower bound of Pareto Distribution 0.2
δ exogenous death probability of firms 0.025
σ elasticity of substitution 3.4
A strength of comparative advantage 1
λ strength of absolute advantage 1
b(z) expenditure share 1
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Notes: The figures are generated using the parameters specified in Table 2.5.
Figure 2.9: Benchmark solution
2.5.1 Comparative Statics
It is hard to get general results for comparative statics in this model. Instead, to better
understand the mechanics of the model, we conduct a few numerical comparative statics by
changing one parameter at a time. We consider effects of increasing K (capital deepening in
home country), decreasing A (strengthening Ricardian comparative advantage in labour-
intensive industries), and reducing trade costs (trade liberalization). We are interested in
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the effects on production, exports, and productivity.
The first exercise is to increase K from 100 to 200. The results shown in Figure 2.10
indicate that: 1) z increases and z decreases. That is, as two countries become similar
in factor endowments, the measure of industries in which both counties produce [z, z]
increases. 2) For firm mass M(z), we have ∂(M
′(z)−M(z))
∂z > 0. Furthermore, as Figure
2.10 (a) indicates, there exists a sector cut-off z1 such that M(z) increases for z ≥ z1
while decreases for z < z1. These results are consistent with the well-known Rybczynski
theorem that production shifts to capital-intensive industries as the home country becomes
more capital abundant. 3) As z increases, sectoral export probability increases. That is,
∂(χ′z−χz)
∂z > 0. Furthermore, as panel (b) indicates, there exists a sector cut-off z2 such
that χz increases for z ≥ z2 while decreases for z < z2. Similar results hold for the
sectoral export intensity. 4) The selection effect changes the sectoral productivity. Using
result (a) of Proposition 5, we immediately see that changes in export probability induce
changes in sectoral productivity. Thus, as z increases, sectoral productivity increases,
and sectoral productivity increases for z ≥ z2 whereas sectoral productivity decreases for
z < z2. To summarize, these results indicate that distributions of firms’ mass, export
probability/intensity, and productivity across industries all follow the “single crossing
property” when the relative factor endowment changes.
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Notes: The solid lines are for the benchmark case with K = 100. The dashed lines are for the case with K = 200.
Figure 2.10: Capital deepening
The second exercise reduces A, the parameter capturing Ricardian comparative ad-
vantage, from 1 to 0.5, which we call sector-bias technology change. Such a sector-bias
technology change favours labour-intensive industries at home by making them relatively
more productive to the RoW. The results are presented in Figure 2.11, which indicate
that 1) z decreases and z increases, so that the home country specialize more in labour-
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intensive industries; 2) ∂(M
′(z)−M(z))
∂z < 0; 3)
∂(χ′z−χz)
∂z < 0; and 4) Because the productivity
in labour-intensive industries increases more, the selection effect reinforces the compara-
tive advantage in labour-intensive industries. Note that results 2), 3) and 4) also follow
a “single crossing property”, however, in the opposite direction to the case of capital
deepening.
The third exercise reduces the iceberg trade cost τ from 1.8 to 1.5. From Proposition 2
we know that free trade will lead to complete specialization. Thus, a reduction in τ tends
to result in more specialization. That is, z would (weakly) increase and z decreases. That
is indeed the case in Figure 2.12. As expected, trade liberalization increases export prob-
ability and export intensity. Moreover, production shifts to the comparative advantage
industries.
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Notes: The solid lines are for the benchmark case with A = 1. The dashed lines are for the case with A = 0.5.
Figure 2.11: Sector-bias technology change
So far, we have only shown the numerical comparative statics for two specific param-
eters in each experiment. We now present the aggregate moments from the model over
a wider range of parameters. These moments include the share of capital-intensive firms
(capital intensity z ≥ 0.5), the average export propensity for labour-intensive industries
(z ≤ 0.5) and capital-intensive industries. The results are shown in Figure 2.13. In panel
(a), we simulate capital deepening by increasing K from 40 to 300. The share of capital-
intensive firms increases as home country becomes more capital abundant. The average
export propensity for labour-intensive industries drops and vice versa for capital-intensive
industries. Panel (b) simulates sectoral bias technology change by increasing A from 0.3
to 1.5. As the home country gains Ricardian comparative advantage in capital-intensive
industries, the share of capital-intensive firms and their export propensity both increase.
Panel (c) simulates trade liberalization with τ varying from 1.1 to 2.2. Still, trade liber-
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Notes: The solid lines are for the benchmark case with τ = 1.8. The dashed lines are for the case with τ = 1.5.
Figure 2.12: Trade liberalization
alization favours the comparative advantage industries and boosts their production and
exports. Our numerical results are summarized together in Table 2.6. The key lessons we
have learned are:
K
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Notes: Panel (a) simulates capital deepening by increasing K from 40 to 300. Panel (b) simulates sectoral technology
bias by varying A from 0.3 to 1.5. Panel (c) simulates trade liberalization with τ decreasing from 2.2 to 1.1.
Figure 2.13: Numerical comparative statics on aggregate moments
Property 1: As the capital endowment increases in the labour abundant home coun-
try, distributions of firms’ mass, export probability/intensity, and productivity across
industries all follow the “single crossing property”. That is, there exist cut-off capital
intensities for industries such that firms’ mass, export probability/intensity, and produc-
tivity increase for more capital-intensive industries, but decrease for more labour-intensive
industries.
Property 2: For the sector-bias technology change that strengthens Ricardian com-
parative advantage in labour intensive industries, distributions of firms’ mass, export
probability/intensity, and productivity across industries also follow the “single crossing
property”, but in the opposite direction to the case of capital deepening.
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Property 3: Trade liberalization strengthens existing comparative advantage by
widening the range of industries in which each country specializes. Countries become
more specialized as output and export both shift to comparative advantage industries.
Table 2.6: Numerical comparative statics
share of capital average χz for average χz for cut-off industry cut-off industry
intensive firms labour intensive capital intensive for home for foreign
(z ≥ z1) industries (z 6 z2) industries (z ≥ z2) specialization z specialization z
capital deepening (K ↑) + − + − +
sector-bias technology change (A ↓) − + − + −
trade liberalization (τ ↓) − + −
Notes: The variables are for the labour abundant home country. For the capital deepening experiment, we keep
all the benchmark parameters except K. Similarly, only A varies for the experiment of sector-bias technology change
and τ varies for the experiment of trade liberalization. z1 is is the cut-off industry which the share of firm mass does
not change in the comparative statics. z2 is the cut-off industry which the export probability does not change in the
comparative statics.
2.5.2 Discussion
If we believe capital had been deepening in China during the period 1999-2007, panel
(a) of Figure 2.10 is consistent with the Stylized fact 1 that Chinese production became
more capital-intensive. However, panel (b) is to the opposite of the Stylized fact 2 that
the share of exporters increased in labour-intensive industries and dropped in capital-
intensive industries. If trade liberalization was the main story and China had comparative
advantage in labour-intensive industries, the Stylized fact 1 is at odds with panel (a)
of Figure 2.12. According to Figure 2.11, if sector-bias technology change was the sole
driving force, production and exports should have both become more labour-intensive or
capital-intensive, depending on which industries the bias was favouring. However, this
cannot be reconciled with stylized facts 1 and 2. In sum, none of these forces alone can
explain all the stylized facts. We need to estimate and gauge the movement of each force
over time to disentangle their individual effect. This is what we do in the next section.
2.6 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we conduct a quantitative analysis of the model economy. We treat China as
the home country and the RoW as the foreign country. We first calibrate and structurally
estimate the model parameters by fitting the model to the Chinese data. To disentangle
the driving forces behind the pattern of structural adjustments that we observe in Section
2, we run counterfactual experiments by turning on different channels in the estimated
model. The estimated model also allows us to decompose the Ricardian comparative
advantage and productivity growth. Finally, we analyze the source of welfare gains and
check the robustness of the estimation results.
Chapter 2 105
2.6.1 Parametrization and Estimation
A subset of the parameters is based on data statistics or estimates from the literature.
As first proved by Chaney (2008) and also in Arkolakis et al. (2012), trade elasticity in
the Melitz model with Pareto distribution assumption is governed by the Pareto shape
parameter. Thus we set the Pareto shape parameter a = 3.43, the median trade elasticity
estimated by Broda et al. (2006) for China. We will later test the robustness of our
estimates by varying the trade elasticity from the lower end to the higher end of the
estimates in the literature. Next, to infer the elasticity of substitution σ, we regress the
logarithm of an individual firm’s rank in sales on the logarithm of firm sales.20 The
estimated coefficient is 0.774, with a standard error of 0.001. According to Helpman,
Melitz and Yeaple (2004), this coefficient would be a − (σ − 1). Thus, the elasticity of
substitution is σ = 3.43 + 1− 0.774 = 3.66.
We normalize the labour supply for China to be 1. The relative labour endowment
L∗
L is calculated for both 1999 and 2007 using data from the World Bank as the ratio of
industrial employment.21 Next, from Proposition 2.A.4, export intensity and probability
of export for each industry are related to each other as γz =
fχz
1+fχz
. Thus we can infer the
relative fixed cost of exports as f = γzχz(1−γz) for each industry. Our estimation for f is the
average across all industries. The estimated results are 1.00 and 1.77 for 1999 and 2007,
respectively.22 Finally, the expenditure share function is estimated as the consumption
share for each industry where consumption is accounted as output plus net imports. We
observe only output and exports from the firm survey. To infer imports, we match the firm
survey data with the customs data from 2000 to 2006.23 For each of the 100 industries, we
compute the ratio of aggregate imports to aggregate exports of the matched firms. Then
the imports of each industry are estimated as the aggregate exports of all firms multiplied
by the ratio. We then compute expenditure as the output plus next exports for each
industry, and then compute the expenditure function b(z) as the average of expenditure
share during the period 2000-2006. The estimated b(z) is shown in Appendix 2.B.2. These
are all the parameters calibrated before the main estimation, which is also summarized in
20The coefficient is estimated by pooling the data from two years together using OLS, controlling for
year-industry fixed effect.
21Industrial employment is computed by multiplying the total labour force with the share industrial
employment and employment rate. World Bank Database doesn’t provide industrial employment share for
the whole world in year 1999 and 2007. We take data from the closest available year: year 2000 and 2005
respectively.
22This does not mean the fixed cost of export was increasing from 1999 to 2007. It can be the case both
the fixed costs of sales at home and export were declining but the fixed cost of export was falling slower.
Appendix 2.B.2 plots the estimated f by industry.
23The customs data uses different firm identifier from the firm survey. We match them by firm name,
address, post code and phone number. About 30%-40% of the exporters in the firm data are matched.
The distribution of export across industries is almost identical for the matched exporters and all exporters
from the firm data. Thus the matched firms are unlikely to be selected.
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Table 2.7.
Table 2.7: Calibrated parameters
Parameters Value Source
Pareto shape a 3.43 Broda et al. (2006)
Elasticity of substitution σ 3.66 Estimated according to Helpman et al. (2004)
relative labour size L∗/L year1999 : 2.49
year2007 : 2.22
Ratio of industrial labour force (World Bank).
Relative fixed cost of export f
year1999 : 1.00
year2007 : 1.77
Inferred from γz =
fχz
1+fχz
Expenditure share b(z) Consumption share while C(z)=Y(z)-EXP(z)+IMP(z)
with imports inferred from matched firm and customs data
Notes: The estimated f is the average across industries for each year. b(z) is averaged over 2000 and
2006. They are plotted in Appendix 2.B.2.
Turning to the remaining parameters {K∗K , K/L, A, λ, τ}, we estimate them using
method of moments. The first target moment is the relative size of China and the RoW,
measured by the aggregation revenue ratio R∗/R. It is calculated using the ratio of
manufacturing output between the RoW and China using World Bank data.24 Secondly,
we target the empirical feature on industry-level exporter share and capital intensity.
The average share of exporters for the capital-intensive industries (z ≥ 0.5) and labour-
intensive industries (z ≤ 0.5) are chosen as the estimation target moments. Finally,
average capital intensity and capital intensity for exporters are also included. Thus, we
use five moments to estimate five parameters.25
We estimate the model parameters separately for the years 1999 and 2007. Table 2.8
reports the estimated parameters. First, China became more capital abundant in 2007.
The relative capital stock of the RoW to China dropped from 3.50 to 2.54, and the capital
to labour ratio of China more than doubled its level in 1999 from 0.907 to 2.03. Second,
China became more productive compared with the RoW, especially in labour-intensive
industries. As we can see, the parameter capturing the absolute advantage λ increased
from 0.125 to 0.355. Thus the gap in sectoral TFP between China and the RoW shrank
in every industry.26 More importantly, the parameter capturing exogenous Ricardian
comparative advantage A switched from > 1 to < 1. This implies that the productivity
growth in China must have been relatively faster in the labour-intensive industries during
24Manufacturing output is estimated as nominal GDP multiplied by the share of manufacturing in
aggregate GDP.
25Appendix 2.A.8 provides more details about the estimation method. Appendix 2.A.9 shows that the
lower bound θ of the Pareto distribution, the exogenous death probability of firms δ, the fixed entry cost
fez and fixed cost production fz are irrelevant for the these moments.
26Our estimate of the relative productivity between China and the RoW is close to the estimate by di
Giovanni et al. (2014). They estimate that average productivity of China relative to the RoW is about
0.34 in the 2000s. According to our estimate, the weighted average of relative productivity of China to the
RoW is 0.16 in 1999 and 0.30 in 2007.
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this period.27 Although we cannot observe the TFP for the RoW in each industry or
directly measure the Ricardian comparative advantage, we do observe that TFP growth
is relatively faster in the labour-intensive industries in China, as is shown in Figure 2.4 in
the Stylized fact 3. Finally, the variable iceberg trade cost τ decreased by about 25%, from
2.38 to 1.76. This is not surprising given the trade liberalization that China experienced
after joining the WTO in 2001.
Table 2.8: Estimation results
Parameters K
∗
K K/L A λ τ
Year 1999 3.50 0.907 1.31 0.125 2.38
(0.004) (0.02) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.001)
Year 2007 2.54 2.03 0.739 0.355 1.76
(0.02) (0.015) (0.009) (0.0002) (0.001)
Notes: This table presents the estimation results. K
∗
K
is the relative capital endowment of home and
the RoW. K/L is the capital to labour ratio at home. A captures the Ricardian comparative advantage.
λ captures the absolute comparative advantage. τ measures the iceberg trade cost. The numbers in
parentheses are bootstrapped standard errors. In each boostrap, we use a sample with replacement from
the data to generate the target moments and redo the estimation. We perform 25 boostraps for each year.
We then examine the fitting of our model. Table 2.9 shows the fitting of the targeted
moments. As can be seen in the table, we match the target moments reasonably well.
Table 2.10 shows the fitting of non-targeted aggregate moments. The model matches the
aggregate exporter share and aggregate export intensity relatively well. The aggregate
export intensity in the model has a slightly higher level and shows a bigger increase
compared with the data. The model also predicts a significant wage growth in China
relative to the RoW. In 1999, average wage for the RoW was about 6.5 times that of
China, declining to around 3 times in 2007. Such relative wage growth is close to what we
observe.28 As we will show in the counterfactual, such wage growth is mostly driven by
technology change favouring labour-intensive industries, less by the increasing scarcity of
labour to capital, least by the trade liberalization. The model also generates distribution
of firm and exporter shares across industries. The fitting is illustrated in Figure 2.14. The
estimated model closely matches not only the static patterns but also the changes over
time. In sum, our model estimation can quantitatively account for both the changes in
the aggregate economy as well as the structural adjustment in Chinese production and
27For supportive evidence, we look at reported R&D done by firms which are available in the data for
the period 2005-2007. We find that the R&D intensity, measured by R&D costs divided by sales, tends
to be higher for labour intensive Chinese firms. Levchenko and Zhang (2016) also find that productivity
tends to grow faster in industries with greater initial comparative disadvantage.
28According to ILO (2013, 2014), the world real wage growth between 1999 and 2007 is 20.4%. The world
CPI grew by 33.5% during 1999-2007 according to World Bank data. Thus the nominal wage grew by 60.7%
((1+20.4%)(1+33.5%)-1). For the same period, the nominal wage of China grew by 168%. So the relative
wage growth of the World to China is
wW2007/w
C
2007
wW1999/w
C
1999
=
wW2007
wW1999
/
wC2007
wC1999
= (1 + 60.7%)/(1 + 168%) = 60.0%. If
we are willing to accept that the wage of the RoW is very close to the whole world, the same calculation
using our estimate is
w∗2007/w2007
w∗1999/w
C
1999
= 2.89
6.43
= 44.9%. Thus our estimate of the relative wage growth of China
to the RoW from our model accounts a significant proportions of wage growth in China.
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exports from 1999 to 2007.
Table 2.9: Model fit: target moments
Data Model
Year 1999 2007 1999 2007
Revenue of RoW/China: R∗/R 16.74 7.47 16.74 7.47
exporter share: z ≤ 0.5 0.312 0.42 0.315 0.423
exporter share: z ≥ 0.5 0.241 0.234 0.238 0.228
capital intensity for all firms 0.667 0.707 0.659 0.688
capital intensity for all exporters 0.623 0.619 0.630 0.633
Notes: The current table demonstrates the fitting of the moments that are included in the estimation.
Table 2.10: Model fit: non-target moments
Data Model
Year 1999 2007 1999 2007
aggregate exporter share 0.253 0.249 0.241 0.230
aggregate export intensity 0.181 0.208 0.189 0.284
relative wage: w*/w 6.43 2.89
Notes: The current table computes moments that are not included in the estimation using estimation
results from Table 2.8 and compares them against data.
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Figure 2.14: Model fit: non-targeted production and exports
2.6.2 Counterfactuals
In this subsection, we conduct counterfactual experiments to investigate the driving forces
behind the structural adjustments of Chinese production and exports discussed in Section
2.2. In each experiment, we replace the estimated parameters of 1999 with those of
2007, one subset of parameters at a time. The first experiment replaces the technology
parameters {A,λ}. The second one replaces the trade cost parameters {τ , f}. The last one
replaces the endowment parameters {L∗L ,K
∗
K , K/L}. The results are presented in Table
2.11 and Figure 2.15.
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Table 2.11: Counterfactual simulations
Baseline Model Counterfactual simulation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
year 1999 2007 A and λ τ and f factor endowments
Revenue of RoW/China: R∗/R 16.74 7.47 10.31 16.22 12.31
exporter share: z ≤ 0.5 0.315 0.423 0.559 0.435 0.196
exporter share: z ≥ 0.5 0.238 0.228 0.193 0.352 0.196
capital intensity for all firms 0.659 0.688 0.659 0.655 0.694
capital intensity for all exporters 0.630 0.633 0.538 0.634 0.694
aggregate exporter share 0.241 0.230 0.221 0.357 0.196
aggregate export intensity 0.189 0.284 0.161 0.381 0.164
relative wage: w*/w 6.43 2.89 3.44 6.04 5.81
Notes: Column (1) and (2) are model results using the parameters estimated in Table 2.8. Column (3)
replaces the estimated technology parameters {A, λ} of 1999 by the estimates of 2007 and keeps other
parameters unchanged. Column (4) replaces {τ, f} of 1999 by the estimates of 2007 and keeps other
parameters unchanged. Column (5) replaces {L∗
L
, K
∗
K
, K
L
} of 1999 by the estimates of 2007 and keeps other
parameters unchanged.
Our first finding is that the rise of China is mostly driven by productivity growth,
less by changes in factor endowments, and least by trade liberalization. The relative size
of the RoW to China R
∗
R drops from 16.74 to 10.29 when we change {A,λ} in column
(3) of Table 2.11. This change in the relative size of the RoW to China is about 70% of
actual change from 16.74 to 7.47. The magnitude is significantly smaller in column (4)
and (5) when we run the other two counterfactuals. This is consistent with the findings by
Zhu (2012) and Tombe and Zhu (2015), who also find that the growth of China is mostly
driven by productivity growth.29 Similar to us, Tombe and Zhu (2015) also find that trade
liberalization with the RoW only contributes a small fraction to the growth of China. A
similar conclusion holds for relative wage w
∗
w . It drops by about a half when we replace
{A,λ}.
Our second finding is that, changes in factor endowments are the primary driver of
more capital-intensive production. The capital intensity of all firms barely changes when
we replace {A,λ} or {τ , f} but increases from 0.659 to 0.694 when we replace the endow-
ment parameters. As China became more capital abundant in 2007, China’s comparative
disadvantage in the capital-intensive industries was weakened. Hence, expected profit rose
in capital-intensive industries. Furthermore, as capital became relative cheaper, fixed en-
try costs in capital-intensive industries also decreased. In the end, more firms entered
capital-intensive industries. However, according to our estimates China gained Ricardian
comparative advantage in labour-intensive industries in 2007. Given the changes in {A,λ},
expected profit of operating in the labour-intensive industries increased. Wages also in-
creased, however, this drove up the fixed entry costs for labour-intensive industries. Rising
29Zhu (2012) uses a growth accounting approach. Tombe and Zhu(2015) calibrate a general equilibrium
model of trade and migration.
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expected profit and rising fixed entry costs balanced out, leaving firm mass distribution
almost unchanged.
Because trade liberalization benefited comparative advantage industries more, we would
expect an expansion of the labour-intensive industries. But the effect turned out to be
quite small. These results are also demonstrated in the left panel of Figure 2.15. Only in
the counterfactual experiment with factor endowments that we see the firm mass distri-
bution shifting toward capital-intensive industries.
Finally, technological changes drove the phenomena whereby exporters did not become
more capital-intensive, and export propensity increased in labour-intensive industries but
dropped in capital-intensive ones. As is evident from Table 2.11, only when {A,λ} is
replaced does the average capital intensity of exporters fall. This is due to a significant
rise of exporters in labour-intensive industries and a decline in the capital-intensive ones.
Export propensity increases universally when we replace {τ , f}. When replacing the
factor endowment parameters, exporter share declines everywhere, more so in the labour-
intensive industries, making exporters more labour-intensive on average.
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Figure 2.15: Counterfactuals
2.6.3 Decomposition of Ricardian Comparative Advantage and Produc-
tivity Growth
With the estimated parameters, we can decompose Ricardian comparative advantage into
exogenous and endogenous components using results from Proposition 5. This channel is
first discovered in Bernard et al. (2007) which prove the theoretical possibility of such
a channel. Proposition 5 allows us to evaluate its quantitative relevance. According to
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Proposition 5, the Ricardian comparative advantage can be decomposed as:
Â(z)
Â∗(z)
= λAz︸︷︷︸
exogeneous
(
1 + fχz
1 + fχ∗z
)1/a︸ ︷︷ ︸
endogenous
.
The exogenous component can be readily estimated using λ and A from Table 2.8. We
measure the endogenous component directly using the share of exporter for each industry
χz and χ
∗
z. Although χ
∗
z is not observable, we can show that χ
∗
z = χ
−1
z
(
τf
1
σ−1
)−2a
. So
χ∗z can be calculated given the observed χz, and σ, a, τ , and f .30 Figure 2.16 illustrates
the decomposition for both 1999 and 2007. The red triangle lines capture the exogenous
component λAz and the blue dotted lines captures both the exogenous and endogenous
components. The difference between the two lines is due to the endogenous component.
The estimated exogenous Ricardian comparative advantage favoured the labour-intensive
industries in 2007. Since the exporter share is relatively higher in labour-intensive in-
dustries, the endogenous Ricardian comparative advantage also favours labour-intensive
industries. Thus, the exogenous Ricardian comparative advantage is amplified by the en-
dogenous component. Therefore, the blue dotted line for 2007 is steeper than the red
triangle line. The situation is exactly reversed in 1999. The estimated exogenous Ricar-
dian comparative advantage favoured the capital-intensive industries and was dampened
by the endogenous component.
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Figure 2.16: Decomposition of Ricardian comparative advantage
We can apply such decomposition not only for cross sectional productivity differences
but also productivity growth over time. Let x and x′ denote variable x for current period
30The estimated χ∗z is plotted in Figure B5 in the Appendix. The share of exporters to China in the
RoW is significantly lower than the share of exporters in China to the RoW, driven by the fact that the
RoW is much larger than China. It increases with capital intensity, consistent with the RoW’s comparative
advantage in the capital-intensive industries. It also increases over time, especially for the capital-intensive
industries, due to the trade liberalization and the growing size of China. This identification result is similar
to the Head-Ries index (Head and Ries, 2001) where they trade costs for given ratios of export to domestic
absorption while we infer export propensity for given trade costs.
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and next period, respectively. Sectoral productivity growth is decomposed as: 31
E(A(z)′ϕ|ϕ ≥ ϕ′z)
E(A(z)ϕ|ϕ ≥ ϕz)
=
A(z)′
A(z)
ϕ̂′z
ϕ̂z
=
A(z)′
A(z)
(
1 + f ′χ′z
1 + fχz
)
1
a ,
where A(z)
′
A(z) absorbs the industry-wide productivity growth and (
1+f ′χ′z
1+fχz
)
1
a captures pro-
ductivity growth due to change in export selection. Figure 2.17 (a) plots the estimated
productivity growth by industry.32 As noted earlier, the productivity growth is higher in
the labour-intensive industries. The right panel plots (1+f
′χ′z
1+fχz
)
1
a . Since χz increased in
the labour-intensive industries, selection to export will lead to a disproportionally higher
productivity growth in these industries. Although exporter share declined for the capital-
intensive industries, the relative higher fixed costs of export f in 2007 still implies tougher
export selection. Overall, export selection leads to productivity growth almost in every
industry. We find that the average productivity growth rate weighted by value added
across all industries is about 144%. However, the weighted average of productivity growth
rate driven by the export selection is about 3.1%. Hence, export selection contributes
about 2.1% of the overall productivity growth.33
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Figure 2.17: Export selection and productivity growth
31The results is immediately from conclusion (a) of proposition 5 by assuming that the constant C is
the same over time. C depends on δ the exogenous death shock for firms, θ the lower bound of the support
of Pareto Distribution, and f˜ the relative fixed entry cost. Any changes in these 3 parameters will be
absorbed by the industry-wise productivity change in our accounting setting. If we could identify these 3
parameters, we can further decompose the productivity growth.
32We do not observe growth in industry-wide productivity A(z)
′
A(z)
directly. So we need to measure the left-
hand side of the equality in order to evaluate the contribution of endogenous selection given by (
1+f ′χ′z
1+fχz
)
1
a .
We estimate E(A(z)ϕ|ϕ≥ϕz)
′
E(A(z)ϕ|ϕ≥ϕz) as the growth of average sectoral productivity from 1999 to 2007. The sectoral
productivity is computed as the weighted average of firm level TFP as estimated by the Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003) method.
33The small contribution of export selection to overall productivity growth is not unique to this study.
For example, Baldwin and Gu (2003) find that Canadian plants entering the export market contribute
very little overall growth.
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2.6.4 Welfare Analysis
An estimated model also allows us to provide welfare analysis for China and the RoW.
Given the logarithm utility we use, we measure welfare using equivalent real consumption
given by W ≡ exp(U). The exact welfare formula is specified in Appendix 2.A.6. Armed
with estimated parameters and the welfare formula, we first compare the welfare level of
China with the RoW, and find
W1999
W ∗1999
= 8.2%,
W2007
W ∗2007
= 20%.
Though the welfare of China is much lower than the RoW, it is catching up quickly. To
gauge the speed of welfare growth in China and the RoW, we estimate the changes in
real consumption over time.34 The result is presented in column (1) of Table 2.12. We
have W2007W1999 = 5.84 and
W ∗2007
W ∗1999
= 2.43, implying that in 1999 real consumption grows 24.7%
for China and 11.7% for the RoW 35 To understand the source of these welfare gains, we
compute the corresponding welfare number in the counterfactual experiment discussed in
the previous subsection. The results are reported from column (2) to (4) in Table 2.12. 36
As can be seen, the welfare gain of China mostly comes from changes in factor endowments
and productivity growth, not from the trade liberalization. For the RoW, the welfare gain
mostly comes from changes in factor endowments, less from productivity growth, and least
from the trade liberalization.
Table 2.12: Counterfactual welfare
Baseline Counterfactual
welfare (1) (2) (3) (4)
change A(z) and A(z)∗ τ and f factor endowments
W2007
W1999
5.84 2.32 1.02 2.38
W ∗2007
W ∗1999
2.43 1.31 1.01 1.84
Notes: Column (1) corresponds to the welfare growth rate computed using the estimated parameters from
Table 2.8, assuming the death shock δ, lower bound of productivity θ and the relative fixed cost of entry f˜
do not change between 1999 and 2007. Column (2) computes the hypothetical welfare growth if only A(z)
and A(z)∗ have changed between 1999 and 2007. Similarly, columns (3) and (4) only change the trade costs
and factor endowments, respectively.
34As explained in Appendix 2.A.6, we assume the relative fixed entry cost f˜ , death probability δ and
the lower bound of the Pareto distribution θ are constant over time.
35To put these numbers into perspective, the real GDP per capita grows at 12.5% for China and 4.9% for
the RoW. But since we only capture the manufacturing sector, these numbers are not directly comparable.
36In column (2), instead of replacing A, λ, we replace the estimated year 1999 sectoral productivity
for China A(z) and the RoW A(z)∗ by those estimated for 2007. If we only replace A, λ, only changes
the relative productivity between China and the RoW would be captured. And we would miss out the
productivity growth over time in China and the RoW.
Chapter 2 114
Table 2.13: Robustness checks on trade elasticity
Given Parameters Estimated Parameters
a σ year K*/K K/L A λ τ
2.5 2.73 1999 3.88 0.91 1.56 0.10 3.28
2007 2.88 2.03 0.82 0.33 2.10
5 5.23 1999 4.09 0.91 1.59 0.14 1.81
2007 2.76 2.03 0.89 0.36 1.49
7.5 7.73 1999 4.21 0.91 1.63 0.15 1.49
2007 2.34 2.03 0.77 0.36 1.31
Notes: Our baseline estimation result in Table 2.8 is obtained by setting the Pareto shape a = 3.43. This
table provides estimation results with a varying from 2.5 to 7.5.
2.6.5 Robustness
In this subsection, we conduct the robustness check of our estimation result. In our
baseline, we set the trade elasticity a = 3.43 based on the literature. We would like to
know whether our estimate is robust to alternative values. In Table 2.13, we vary the
trade elasticity from 2.5 which is at the lower end of the estimate in the literature to 7.5,
which is at the higher end. By the nature of our calibration, the elasticity of substitution
σ also varies accordingly. It turns out that the point estimate of each parameter varies
with trade elasticity. However, the direction of the changes in the estimated parameters
are the same as our baseline estimation: across all cases, K
∗
K , A and τ decrease from 1999
to 2007, vice versa for KL and λ.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we first document the seemingly puzzling patterns of structural adjustments
in production and export based on comprehensive Chinese firm-level data: overall man-
ufacturing production became more capital-intensive whereas exports did not during the
period 1999-2007; export propensity increased in labour-intensive industries but dropped
in capital-intensive ones, which counters our understanding from the Rybczynski Theo-
rem of HO theory. To explain these findings, we embed a Melitz-type heterogeneous firm
model into the Ricardian and HO trade theory with continuous industries.
We structurally estimate the model and find that China became relatively more cap-
ital abundant over time, technology improved significantly and favoured labour-intensive
industries between 1999 and 2007. Trade liberalization reduced the variable trade costs by
about a quarter. By running counterfactual simulations, we find that the adjustment in
production pattern is mainly driven by changes in factor endowments whereas changes in
export propensity are mostly driven by changes in technology. Using the estimated model,
we find that export selection shapes the Ricardian comparative advantage extensively but
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contributes only about 2.1% of productivity growth over time. Finally, growth of output
and welfare in China is driven mostly by technology change, less by factor endowments
and trade liberalization.
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Appendix
2.A Proofs and Additional Theoretical Results
2.A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 3 in Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007).
The complication is that we allow for specialization while they focus on cases within the
diversification cone.37 The idea of the proof is as follows. We first write factor demands
as functions of the factor prices {w,w∗, r, r∗}. Then the factor market clearing conditions
determine the equilibrium factor prices. Once the factor prices are known, all the other
equilibrium variables are also determined.
For given factor prices, the total revenue for home country and foreign country are
R = wL + rK and R∗ = w∗L∗ + r∗K∗, respectively. For industries that home country
specializes, the factor demands are l(z) = (1− z)b(z)(R+R∗)/w, k(z) = zb(z)(R+R∗)/r.
Factor demands in foreign country are symmetric. For industries that both countries
produce, the industry revenue function is given by Equation (2.17), thus we need to
know the firm mass Mz and M
∗
z , the pricing index P (z) and P (z)
∗, and industry average
productivity ϕ̂z and ϕ̂
∗
z in order to settle their factor demands. We will use the model
conditions to substitute for these terms. Starting from Equation (2.17), we find that:
r(ϕ̂z)
r(ϕ̂∗z)
= p˜1−σz
( P (z)P (z)∗ )
σ−1 + R
∗
R τ
1−σχ
a+1−σ
a
z
R∗
R + χ
∗a+1−σ
a
z τ1−σ( P (z)P (z)∗ )
σ−1
, (E.2.1)
where r(ϕ̂z) =
Rz
Mz
is the average firm revenue, and p˜z ≡ pzd(ϕ̂z)pzd(ϕ̂∗z) =
ϕ̂∗zw
ε(z)ϕ̂zw∗ (
r/w
r∗/w∗ )
z is the
relative average domestic price between the two countries, with ε(z) ≡ A(z)A∗(z) .
At the same time, using the zero profit conditions Equations (2.9) and (2.10), and
the fact that r(ϕ̂z)
r(ϕz)
= ( ϕ̂z
ϕz
)σ−1, we find r(ϕ̂z) = (fz( ϕ̂zϕz )
σ−1 + χzfzx( ϕ̂zxϕzx )
σ−1)σrzw1−z.
Combined with the free entry condition, it can be shown that the average productivity
between home and foreign country is ϕ̂
∗
z
ϕ̂z
= (1+fχ
∗
z
1+fχz
)
1
awhile f ≡ fzxfz . Using the Pareto
37We will show how to determine the specialization pattern in proposition 2.
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distribution assumption, we find that ϕ̂z
ϕz
= ϕ̂zx
ϕzx
= ( aa+1−σ )
1
σ−1 , and χz =
1−G(ϕzx)
1−G(ϕz) = Λ
−a
z ,
while Λz is the productivity cut-off ratio defined in Equation (2.11). Combining these
results, it can be shown that:
r(ϕ̂z)
r(ϕ̂∗z)
= εp˜z(
1 + fχz
1 + fχ∗z
)
a+1
a , (E.2.2)
Using the definition of p˜z and combining Equation (E.2.1) and (E.2.2), we have:
χz =
τ˜−af − εah(z)
εafh(z)− τ˜a , (E.2.3)
where h(z) = ( ww∗ (
r/w
r∗/w∗ )
z)
aσ
1−σ and τ˜ = τf
1
σ−1 . From Equation (E.2.3), we find that
χz is a function of the factor prices. From Equation (2.11) we have Λz = χ
−1/a
z =
τP (z)
P (z)∗ (
fR
R∗ )
1/(σ−1), then P (z)P (z)∗ =
χ
−1/a
z
τ (
R∗
fR)
1/(σ−1). which is also function of the factor prices.
Combined with Equations (2.17) and (2.18), the revenue for those industries that both
countries produce are :
Rz = b(z)[
R
1− τ˜−aεafh(z) −
fR∗
τ˜aεah(z)− f ], (E.2.4)
R∗z = b(z)ε
ah(z)[
R∗
εah(z)− f τ˜−a −
fR
τ˜a − εafh(z) ]. (E.2.5)
Both equations above are functions of factor prices. Using l(z) = (1− z)b(z)Rz/w and
k(z) = zb(z)Rz/r, the factor market clearing conditions for home country are given by:∫
I(s)
(1− z)b(z)(R+R
∗)
w
dz +
∫
I(b)
(1− z)Rz
w
= L,
∫
I(s)
z
b(z)(R+R∗)
r
dz +
∫
I(b)
z
Rz
r
= K.
Another two symmetric equations can be written for the foreign country. I(s) is set of
the industries that home country specializes and while I(b) is the set of industries that both
countries produce. They are determined by cut-off industries where either the domestic or
foreign firm mass is zero using the result MzM∗z
= p˜σ−1z
(
P (z)
P (z)∗ )
1−σ−χ−
a+1−σ
a
z τ˜
−2(a+1−σ)τ1−σ
1−χ
a+1−σ
a
z τ1−σ(
P (z)
P (z)∗ )
1−σ
38,
which is also determined by factor prices. These four factor demand equations together
determine the four factor prices {w, r, w∗, r∗}.
Once the factor prices are known, χz is pinned down for all industries which in turn
determines the productivity cut-offs ϕz, and ϕzx. Once the cut-offs are known, average
revenue for each industry is given by r(ϕ̂z) = (fz(
ϕ̂z
ϕz
)σ−1 +χzfzx( ϕ̂zxϕzx )
σ−1)σrzw1−z. Then
38This is derived from Equation (2.18) defining price index
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we use the goods market clearing condition Equation (2.17) to determine the firm mass
for each industry. The price index for each industry is also pinned down using Equation
(2.18).
2.A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Suppose M∗z 6= 0, the relative firm mass between home and foreign can be extracted from
Equation (2.18) as:
Mz
M∗z
= p˜σ−1z
( P (z)P (z)∗ )
1−σ − χ−
a+1−σ
a
z τ˜−2(a+1−σ)τ1−σ
1− χ
a+1−σ
a
z τ1−σ( P (z)P (z)∗ )
1−σ
,
where we have used a result that χzχ
∗
z = τ˜
−2a to replace χ∗z by χ−1z τ˜−2a. Since
P (z)
P (z)∗ =
χ
−1/a
z
τ (
R∗
fR)
1/(σ−1) and p˜z =
ϕ̂∗zw
ε(z)ϕ̂zw∗ (
r/w
r∗/w∗ )
z, we have:
Mz
M∗z
= ε1−σ(
1 + fχ∗z
1 + fχz
)
σ−1
a [
w
w∗
(
r/w
r∗/w∗
)z]σ−1
fR
R∗ − χ−1z τ˜−2af2
1− χz fRR∗
τσ−1χ
σ−1
a .
If χz =
R∗
fR(
f
τ˜a )
2, we have MzM∗z
= 0. Since M∗z > 0, it must be that Mz = 0. If χz decreases
such that χz <
R∗
fR(
f
τ˜a )
2, we have MzM∗z
< 0. Since Mz cannot be negative, we should have
Mz = 0 and foreign will specialize in these industries. On the other hand, if χz increases
such that χz approaches
R∗
fR and
Mz
M∗z
→ +∞, or say M∗zMz → 0, which implies M∗z = 0. If χz
further increases such that χz >
R∗
fR , we again have
M∗z
Mz
< 0. Since M∗z cannot be negative,
M∗z stays at zero and home will specialize in these industries. In summary, to maintain
positive firm mass for both countries in each industry, we must have:
R∗
fR
(
f
τ˜a
)2 < χz <
R∗
fR
,
where fτ˜a =
f
τaf
a
σ−1
< f
f
a
σ−1
< 1. If χz falls out of this range, one country’s firm mass is
zero and the other is positive. This is when specialization happens. For industries that
both produce, we have
χz =
τ˜−af − εah(z)
εafh(z)− τ˜a , (E.2.6)
which is a continuous and monotonic between [z, z].39 For the boundary industries z and
z, since we have
χz =
R∗
fR
and χz =
R∗
fR
(
f
τ˜a
)2,
39This is proved in proposition 4.
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evaluating Equation (E.2.6) at z and z, we have:
z =
ln(
χz τ˜a+fτ˜−a
1+fχz
)− aσ1−σ ln( ww∗ )− a ln(λ)
aσ
1−σ ln(
r/w
r∗/w∗ ) + a ln(A)
,
z =
ln(χz τ˜
a+fτ˜−a
1+fχz
)− aσ1−σ ln( ww∗ )− a ln(λ)
aσ
1−σ ln(
r/w
r∗/w∗ ) + a ln(A)
,
which are also determined given the factor prices. If we have free trade such that τ = f = 1,
we have χz = χz =
R∗
R , and z = z. The two countries completely specialize.
2.A.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3
Let’s focus on the home country. For any two industries z and z′, suppose z < z′, using
the definition of Λz Equation (2.11), and the assumption that variable trade costs and
fixed costs are the same for all industries, we have:
Λz
Λz′
=
P (z)/P (z′)
P (z)∗/P (z′)∗
.
If P (z)P (z′) <
P (z)∗
P (z′)∗ , that is labour intensive products are relatively cheaper in home country,
then Λz < Λz′ . This is exactly what we will prove next. The idea is that if
P (z)
P (z′) <
P (z)∗
P (z′)∗
under autarky and P (z)P (z′) =
P (z)∗
P (z′)∗ under free trade, then the costly trade case will fall
between.
Under free trade, all firms export. The price of each variety and number of varieties
are the same for both countries. Thus the pricing index P (z) = P (z)∗ for all industries
and we have P (z)P (z′) =
P (z)∗
P (z′)∗ .
At the other extreme of closed economy, no firms export and from Equation (2.18) we
have P (z) = M
1
1−σ
z pzd(ϕ̂z). Firm mass for each industry is Mz =
b(z)R
r(ϕ̂z)
= b(z)R
r(ϕz)
(ϕzϕ̂z )
σ−1. So
P (z)
P (z′) = (
w
r )
(z′−z)/ρ( b(z)b(z′))
1
1−σ A(z
′)ϕz′
A(z)ϕz
. Using Equation (2.16) we have homogeneous cut-offs
for all industries under autarky: ϕz′ = ϕz. Then it can be verified that
P (z)/P (z′)
P (z)∗/P (z′)∗
= (
w/r
w∗/r∗
)
z′−z
ρ Az
′−z.
Since z′ > z and A < 1, then wr <
w∗
r∗ ⇐⇒ P (z)P (z′) < P (z)
∗
P (z′)∗ . We just need to show that
w
r <
w∗
r∗ under autarky. Using the factor market clearing condition, given the Cobb-
Douglas forms for production function, entry costs, and payments of fixed costs, we find
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that:
K
L
=
w
r
1∫
0
zb(z)dz
1∫
0
(1− z)b(z)dz
,
K∗
L∗
=
w∗
r∗
1∫
0
zb(z)dz
1∫
0
(1− z)b(z)dz
.
Thus KL <
K∗
L∗ ⇐⇒ wr < w
∗
r∗ and we establish that Λz < Λz′ , or say Λz increases with z in
home country.
For industries that both countries produce, Equation (2.16) determines the cut-offs.
It is easy to see that the first term in the left hand side of the equation is a decreasing
function of ϕz, and the second term is a decreasing function of ϕzx, given that g(ϕ) > 0,
ϕz ≤ ϕ and ϕzx ≤ ϕ . Since Λz increases with z, it can be shown that either ∂ϕz∂z > 0
or ∂ϕz∂z = 0 cannot maintain the equality of the equation.
40 So it must be the case that
∂ϕz
∂z < 0. Then the first term of Equation (2.16) increases with z. To maintain the equation
the second term must decrease with z. Thus ϕzx should be an increasing function of z.
Similar logic applies for the foreign country: ∂ϕ
∗
z
∂z > 0 and
∂ϕ∗zx
∂z < 0 .
For industries that home country specializes: M∗z = 0 and Mz > 0. Thus the price
indexes at home and foreign are: P (z) = M
1
1−σ
z pzd(ϕ̂z) and P (z)
∗ = χ
1
1−σ
z M
1
1−σ
z pzx(ϕ̂zx).
So we have Λz =
τP (z)
P (z)∗ (
fR
R∗ )
1
σ−1 = χ
1
σ−1
z
ϕ̂zx
ϕ̂z
(fRR∗ )
1
σ−1 . Using the definition of ϕ̂z and ϕ̂zx , we
have Λz = (χz
1
1−G(ϕzx)
∞∫
ϕzx
ϕσ−1g(ϕ)dϕ
1
1−G(ϕz)
∞∫
ϕz
ϕσ−1g(ϕ)dϕ
)
1
σ−1 (fRR∗ )
1
σ−1 = (
∞∫
Λzϕz
ϕσ−1g(ϕ)dϕ
∞∫
ϕz
ϕσ−1g(ϕ)dϕ
)
1
σ−1 (fRR∗ )
1
σ−1 which is
an implicit function of Λz and ϕz. Moreover, the free entry condition
fz
δ
∞∫
ϕz
[
( ϕ
ϕz
)σ−1 − 1
]
g(ϕ)dϕ+
fzx
δ
∞∫
Λzϕz
[
( ϕ
ϕzx
)σ−1 − 1
]
g(ϕ)dϕ = fez is also an implicit function of Λz and ϕz. Solving
these two equations together we would have Λz and ϕz. Since these two functions hold
for all the industries that home specializes, the solution would be the same for all these
industries within [0, z] under our assumption that fz, fzx and fez do not vary with z.
2.A.4 Proof of Proposition 2.4
The conditional probability of export is given by χz =
1−G(ϕzx)
1−G(ϕz) . From Proposition 3, we
know that ∂ϕz∂z < 0 and
∂ϕzx
∂z > 0 for z ∈ (z, z). Thus we have ∂G(ϕz)∂z < 0 and ∂G(ϕzx)∂z > 0
as long as the cumulative distribution function G(ϕ) is continuous and G(ϕ)′ > 0 . Then
it is easy to see that ∂χz∂z < 0 for z ∈ (z, z). For z ∈ [0, z], we know that ∂ϕz∂z = 0 and
∂ϕzx
∂z = 0 from Proposition 3, so
∂χz
∂z = 0.
Under the assumption that G(ϕ) is Pareto distributed, we have χz = Λ
−a
z and the
40This is a proof by contradiction. Suppose ∂ϕz
∂z
> 0, so will ϕzx given
∂Λz
∂z
> 0. Then the left hand
side of Equation (2.16) will decrease with z. But the right hand side is a constant. Contradiction. Similar
argument applies if ∂ϕz
∂z
= 0.
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Λz =
ϕzx
ϕz
= ϕ̂zxϕ̂z . Thus using the result that Λz = χ
1
σ−1
z
ϕ̂zx
ϕ̂z
(fRR∗ )
1
σ−1 from the proof of
Proposition 3, we have χz =
R∗
fR for industries that home specializes. For industries that
both countries produce, we know that χz =
τ˜−af−εah(z)
εafh(z)−τ˜a from the proof of Proposition
1. Using the chain rule, we have ∂χz∂z =
(1−τ˜−2af2)εah(z)a
(εafh(z)−τ˜a)2 (ln(A) − σσ−1 ln( r/wr∗/w∗ )). Let
B(z) = (1−τ˜
−2af2)εah(z)a
(εafh(z)−τ˜a)2 which is positive, immediately, we have
∂χz
∂z
= B(z)(ln(A)− σ
σ − 1 ln(
r/w
r∗/w∗
)),
whose sign depends only on ln(A) and σσ−1 ln(
r/w
r∗/w∗ ).
41 For average export intensity for
each sector is γz ≡ χzr(ϕ̂zx)r(ϕ̂z)+χzr(ϕ̂zx) =
χzfzx(
ϕ̂zx
ϕzx
)σ−1σrzw1−z
(fz(
ϕ̂z
ϕz
)σ−1+χzfzx( ϕ̂zxϕzx
)σ−1)σrzw1−z
= fzxχzfz+fzxχz =
fχz
1+fχz
,
thus ∂γz∂χz =
f
(1+fχz)2
> 0. So γz is a monotonic increasing function of χz and should follow
the same pattern as χz.
2.A.5 Proof of Proposition 2.5
From Equation (2.16) for free entry equation, we can calculate that the average of idiosyn-
cratic firm productivity as
ϕ̂z = (
a
a+ 1− σ )
1
σ−1ϕz = (
a
a+ 1− σ )
1
σ−1 [
(σ − 1)θa
(a+ 1− σ)δf˜
(1 + fχz)]
1
a ,
where f˜ = fezfz . Let C = (
a
a+1−σ )
1
σ−1 [ (σ−1)θ
a
(a+1−σ)δf˜ ]
1
a , we immediately have
ϕ̂z = C(1 + fχz)
1/a.
From the equation above, ϕ̂z is monotonic increasing function of χz. As we have proved
in Proposition 4, χz is higher in industries with larger comparative advantage, so is ϕ̂z.
Then measured average productivity for each industry is
Â(z) = Eϕ{A(z)ϕ|ϕ > ϕz} = A(z)ϕ˜z.
Thus the measured Ricardian comparative advantage is given by Â(z)
Â∗(z)
= A(z)A∗(z)
ϕ˜z
ϕ˜∗z
. Under
our assumption that A(z)A∗(z) = λA
z and using the expression for ϕ̂z above, we have
Â(z)
Â∗(z)
= λAz(
1 + fχz
1 + fχ∗z
)1/a,
which is the second result of the proposition.
41B(z) is positive as τ˜−af < 1.
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2.A.6 Welfare
Given the CES aggregation within each sector, the real consumption for each sector is
Q(z) = R(z)P (z) , where R(z)=b(z)R is the sectoral revenue and P(z) is the price index of
sector z. Hence the welfare of the representative household is given by
U =
1∫
0
b(z) ln b(z)dz + lnR−
1∫
0
b(z) lnP (z)dz,
where the first term is a constant intrinsic to the Cobb-Douglas preferences. The sectoral
price index P (z) is given by Equation (2.18). Plugging in the average price of domestic
varieties and average F.O.B price of foreign varieties respectively: Pz(ϕ̂z) =
σ
σ−1
rzw1−z
A(z)ϕ̂z
and Pz(ϕ̂
∗
zx) =
σ
σ−1
r∗zw∗1−z
A(z)∗ϕ̂∗zx
, we have
P (z) =
σ
σ − 1
1
A(z)
[Mz(
rzw1−z
ϕ̂z
)1−σ + χ∗zM
∗
z (τ
r∗zw∗1−z
A(z)∗
A(z) ϕ̂
∗
zx
)1−σ]
1
1−σ .
where A(z)
∗
A(z) is estimated as the Ricardian Comparative Advantage λA
z. If we only care
about relative welfare, then for the case of no specialization (which is the case for our
estimated results):
U∗ − U = ln R
∗
R
+
1∫
0
b(z) ln
P (z)
P (z)∗
dz
= ln
R∗
R
+
1∫
0
b(z)[ln
A(z)∗
A(z)
+
1
1− σ ln
Mz(
rzw1−z
ϕ̂z
)1−σ + χ∗zM∗z (τ
r∗zw∗1−z
A(z)∗
A(z)
ϕ̂∗zx
)1−σ
M∗z (
r∗zw∗1−z
A(z)
A∗(z) ϕ̂
∗
z
)1−σ + χzMz(τ
rzw1−z
ϕ̂zx
)1−σ
]dz.
This can be computed with our baseline estimation result. However, if we want to know
the welfare change at home and foreign over time, we need to know A(z) and A(z)∗, the
exogenous sectoral level productivities which are not directly observed. However, we can
first estimate the average sectoral TFP: E(A(z)ϕ|ϕ ≥ ϕz) = A(z)ϕ̂z while ϕ̂z can be
computed from Proposition 5 as ϕ̂z = C(1 + fχz)
1/a.42 Then an estimator of A(z) is:
A(z) =
E(A(z)ϕ|ϕ ≥ ϕz)
ϕ̂z
.
42The limitation that we face here is that we cannot identify C. We have to assume that it is constant
over time. Thus we cannot capture the welfare effect due to change in δ, θ or f˜ .
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Then A(z)∗ is inferred as A(z)∗ = A(z)λAz . We note that
exp(U) = exp(
1∫
0
b(z) ln b(z)dz)
R
exp(
1∫
0
b(z) lnP (z)dz)
is the real consumption, and the welfare change as measured by real consumption is given
by:43
Û ≡ exp(U ′ − U) = exp(ln R
′
R
−
1∫
0
b(z) ln
P (z)′
P (z)
dz)
=
R′
R
exp(
1∫
0
b(z)[ln(
A(z)′
A(z)
)− 1
1− σ ln
M ′z(
r′zw′1−z
ϕ̂′z
)1−σ + χ∗′z M∗′z (τ ′
r∗′zw∗′1−z
A(z)∗′
A(z)′ ϕ̂
∗′
zx
)1−σ
Mz(
rzw1−z
ϕ̂z
)1−σ + χ∗zM∗z (τ
r∗zw∗1−z
A(z)∗
A(z)
ϕ̂∗zx
)1−σ
]dz).
2.A.7 CES Preference
Instead of assuming an aggregate Cobb-Douglas utility function, we assume that
U = (
∫ 1
0
Q(z)µdz)1/µ,
Q(z) = [
∫
$∈Ωz
qz($)
ρd$]1/ρ,
where U is the upper-tier utility function and Q(z) is the lower-tier utility function and
µ ∈ (0, 1], ρ ∈ (0, 1]. Then the elasticity of substitution between different industry and
within each industry η = 11−µ > 1 and σ =
1
1−ρ > 1. Then the demand for each industry
and each variety are given by
Q(z) = Q(
P (z)
P
)−η,
qz($) = Q(z)(
pz($)
P (z)
)−σ,
where P and P (z) are pricing indexes. The revenues from domestic and foreign market
are:
rzd(ϕ) = R(
P (z)
P
)1−η(
pz(ϕ)
P (z)
)1−σ = RP η−1P (z)σ−ηpz(ϕ)1−σ,
rzx(ϕ) = R
∗P ∗η−1P ∗(z)σ−ηpzx(ϕ)1−σ.
43Since we normalize L = 1, R would be income per capita in China. We divide R∗ by L∗ to normalize
the income to be a per capita measure as well whenever we compute the welfare for the RoW.
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The profits from domestic and foreign sales are
pizd(ϕ) =
rzd(ϕ)
σ
− fzrzw1−z,
pizx(ϕ) =
rzx(ϕ)
σ
− fzxrzw1−z.
Using the zero-profit condition, we find Λz ≡ ϕzxϕz , the ratio between the cut-off produc-
tivity of export and survival is
Λz = τ(
fzxR
fzR∗
)
1
σ−1 (
P ∗
P
)
1−η
σ−1 (
P (z)
P (z)∗
)
σ−η
σ−1 ,
where P = [
∫ 1
0 P (z)
1−ηdz]
1
1−η is the aggregate pricing index (P* for foreign). If η = 1,
we are back to the Cobb-Douglas world. Using the equation above, we can prove that
our propositions still hold. Especially, under the assumption of Pareto Distribution, the
conditional probability of exporting is given by
χz =

[
τη−1 fRR∗ (
P
P ∗ )
η−1
] a(σ−1)
(1−η)(σ−1)−a(σ−η)
z ∈ [0, z],
τ˜−af−εag(z)
εafg(z)−τ˜a z ∈ (z, z).
2.A.8 Estimation Algorithm
For a given set of the exogenous parameters {K∗K , L
∗
L ,
K
L , A, λ, a, f, τ, σ, b(z)}, we follow
the idea of the proof for Proposition 1 to solve the endogenous factor prices {w, w∗, r, r∗}
using the factor market clearing conditions. First, the aggregate revenue for home and
foreign are: R = wL + rK and R∗ = w∗L∗ + r∗K∗. The factor intensity cut-offs are:
z =
ln(
χzτ˜
a+fτ˜−a
1+fχz
)− aσ
1−σ ln(
w
w∗ )−a ln(λ)
aσ
1−σ ln(
r/w
r∗/w∗ )+a ln(A)
and z =
ln(
χzτ˜
a+fτ˜−a
1+fχz
)− aσ
1−σ ln(
w
w∗ )−a ln(λ)
aσ
1−σ ln(
r/w
r∗/w∗ )+a ln(A)
, where χz =
R∗
fR
and χz =
R∗
fR(
f
τ˜a )
2. The factor market clearing conditions for home country are
z∫
0
(1− z)b(z)(R+R
∗)
w
dz +
z∫
z
(1− z)Rz
w
= L,
z∫
0
z
b(z)(R+R∗)
r
dz +
z∫
z
z
Rz
r
= K.
where Rz is given by Equation (E.2.4). There are two similar equations for the foreign.
So we have four equations to solve for the four unknown factor prices {w, w∗, r, r∗}.
Once {w, w∗, r, r∗} are known, we compute domestic and foreign aggregate revenues
R and R∗, the probability of export for each industry χz and the share of firms for
each industry. This is done without the need to know other parameters of the model:
fz, fzx, fez, δ and θ, which is shown in Appendix 2.A.9.
Then we compute our target moments R
∗
R , exporter share for z ≥ 0.5 and z ≤ 0.5,
capital intensity of all firms and capital intensity for all exporters. Our estimation takes
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{L∗L , f, a, σ, b(z)} as given and search for {K
∗
K ,
K
L , A, λ, τ } to match these moments. In
essence, there are basically two loops: an inter loop solving the factor prices and compute
the model the moments, and an outer loop to search for model parameters that match the
moments.
2.A.9 Identification
We first prove that given b(z), χz and
R∗
R only depend on {K
∗
K ,
L∗
L , A, λ, a, f, τ, σ}. Then we
prove that firm mass distribution mz depends on {K∗K , L
∗
L , A, λ, a, f, τ, σ} and KL . Starting
from factor market clearing condition, for sectors that are specialized by either country,
we have
Ls =
z∫
0
l(z)dz =
R+R∗
w
z∫
0
(1− z)b(z)dz = R+R
∗
w
N,
Ks =
z∫
0
k(z)dz =
R+R∗
r
z∫
0
zb(z)dz =
R+R∗
r
B,
L∗s =
1∫
z
l∗(z)dz =
R+R∗
w∗
1∫
z
(1− z)b(z)dz = R+R
∗
w∗
C,
K∗s =
1∫
z
k∗(z)dz =
R+R∗
r∗
1∫
z
zb(z)dz =
R+R∗
r∗
D,
where N ≡
z∫
0
(1− z)b(z)dz,B ≡
z∫
0
zb(z)dz, C ≡
1∫
z
(1− z)b(z)dz and D ≡
1∫
z
zb(z)dz.
For sectors that are produced by both countries, we have:
Lint =
1
w
z∫
z
b(z)(1− z)[ R
1− τ˜−aεafh(z) −
fR∗
τ˜aεah(z)− f ]dz =
R
w
E − R
∗
w
F,
Kint =
1
r
z∫
z
b(z)z[
R
1− τ˜−aεafh(z) −
fR∗
τ˜aεah(z)− f ]dz =
R
r
G− R
∗
r
H,
L∗int =
1
w∗
z∫
z
b(z)(1− z)εah(z)[ R
∗
εah(z)− f τ˜−a −
fR
τ˜a − εafh(z) ]dz =
R∗
w∗
I − R
w∗
J,
K∗int =
1
r∗
z∫
z
b(z)zεah(z)[
R∗
εah(z)− f τ˜−a −
fR
τ˜a − εafh(z) ]dz =
R∗
r∗
X − R
r∗
Y,
where E ≡
z∫
z
b(z)(1−z)
1−τ˜−aεafh(z)dz, F ≡
z∫
z
fb(z)(1−z)
τ˜aεah(z)−f dz,G ≡
z∫
z
b(z)z
1−τ˜−aεafh(z)dz,H ≡
z∫
z
fb(z)z
τ˜aεah(z)−f dz, I ≡
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z∫
z
b(z)(1−z)εah(z)
εah(z)−fτ˜−a dz, J ≡
z∫
z
fb(z)(1−z)εah(z)
τ˜a−εafh(z) dz,X ≡
z∫
z
b(z)zεah(z)
εah(z)−fτ˜−adz and Y ≡
z∫
z
fb(z)zεah(z)
τ˜a−εafh(z) dz.
Using factor market clearing condition,
Ls + Lint = L,Ks +Kint = K,
L∗s + L
∗
int = L
∗,K∗s +K
∗
int = K
∗,
we have
L =
R
w
(N + E) +
R∗
w
(N − F ),K = R
r
(B +G) +
R∗
r
(B −H),
L∗ =
R
w∗
(C − J) + R
∗
w∗
(C + I),K∗ =
R
r∗
(D − Y ) + R
∗
r∗
(D +X).
Moreover, given R = wL+ rK and R∗ = w∗L∗ + r∗K∗, we have
R∗
R
=
1−N − E −B −G
N − F +B −H =
C +D − J − Y
1− C −D −X − I .
Since N, B, C,..., I, J, X and Y only depend on { r∗r , w
∗
w , A, λ, a, f, τ, σ}44, according to the
equation above, R
∗
R also depends on { r
∗
r ,
w∗
w , A, λ, a, f, τ, σ} only.
Moreover,
L∗
L
=
w
w∗
C − J + (C + I)R∗R
N + E + (N − F )R∗R
,
K∗
K
=
r
r∗
(D − Y ) + (D +X)R∗R
B +G+ (B −H)R∗R
,
then given {A, λ, a, f, τ, σ}, there is an one to one mapping between {K∗K , L
∗
L } and { r
∗
r ,
w∗
w }.
So χz =
 R
∗
fR z ∈ [0, z]
τ˜−af−εah(z)
εafh(z)−τ˜a z ∈ (z, z)
depends on {K∗K , L
∗
L , A, λ, a, f, τ, σ} only.
Next, we prove that firm mass distribution mz depends on {K∗K , L
∗
L , A, λ, a, f, τ, σ} and
K
L . We define the firm mass distribution as
mz =
Mz∫ z
0 Mzdz
.
For industries that home country specializes
b(z)(R+R∗) = Mzr(ϕ˜z)
= Mz
aσfzr
zw1−z(1 + fχz)
a+ 1− σ ,
44Given b(z), N, B, C, ..., I, J, X and Y are integrals of function of εah(z) defined over a intersection
given by 0, z, z and 1. εah(z), z and z are functions of { r∗
r
,w
∗
w
Ψ,λ,a,f,τ ,σ} only.
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therefore,
Mz(
r
w
)z =
b(z)(R+R∗)
aσfzw
a+1−σ (1 + fχz)
= b(z)L
(1 + rKwL)(1 +
R∗
R )
aσfz
a+1−σ (1 + fχz)
.
Similarly, for industries that both countries produces:
Mz =
b(z)L(1 + rKwL)(1 +
R∗
R )
aσfz
a+1−σ (1 + fχz)(1 +
M∗z r(ϕ˜∗z)
Mzr(ϕ˜z)
)( rw )
z
.
Then, according to the definition of m(z), we have
mz =
Mz∫ z
0 Mzdz
=
b(z)L
(1+ rK
wL
)(1+R
∗
R
)
aσfz
a+1−σ (
r
w
)z(1+fχz)∫ z
0 b(z)L
(1+ rK
wL
)(1+R
∗
R
)
aσfz
a+1−σ (1+fχz)(
r
w
)z
dz +
∫ z
z
b(z)L(1+ rK
wL
)(1+R
∗
R
)
aσfz
a+1−σ (1+fχz)(1+
M∗z r(ϕ˜∗z)
Mzr(ϕ˜z)
)( r
w
)z
dz
= b(z)
( rw )
−z(1 + fχz)−1∫ z
0 b(z)(
r
w )
−z(1 + fχz)−1dz +
∫ z
z
b(z)( r
w
)−z
(1+
M∗z r(ϕ˜∗z)
Mzr(ϕ˜z)
)(1+fχz)
dz
for the industries that home specializes. As for industries that both countries produce:
mz =
Mz∫ z
0 Mzdz
= b(z)
( r
w
)−z
(1+
M∗z r(ϕ˜∗z)
Mzr(ϕ˜z)
)(1+fχz)∫ z
0 b(z)(
r
w )
−z(1 + fχz)−1dz +
∫ z
z
b(z)( r
w
)−z
(1+
M∗z r(ϕ˜∗z)
Mzr(ϕ˜z)
)(1+fχz)
dz
.
It is obvious that mz depends on
r
w which is determined by
r
w
=
L
K
R(B +G) +R∗(B −H)
R(N + E) +R∗(N − F )
=
L
K
(B +G) + R
∗
R (B −H)
(N + E) + R
∗
R (N − F )
.
Therefore, rw depends not only on {K
∗
K ,
L∗
L , A, λ, a, f, τ, σ} but also KL . So does mz.
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2.B Complementary Figures
2.B.1 Robustness of the Motivating Evidence
In this subsection, we examine the robustness of our motivating evidence that productivity
growth is faster in labour intensity industries, production becomes more capital intensive
and export propensity increases for labour intensive industries but falls for capital intensive
industries.
First, two alternative measures of productivity are used: labour productivity, and TFP
estimated by the Olley and Pakes (1996) method. The results are presented in Figure B1.
Again, productivity growth is relatively faster in labour intensive industries.
3
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8
0 20 40 60 80 100
Industry
1999 2007
value in log, weighted average of firm level value added per worker
Average Real Value Added per Worker by Industry
2
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Industry
1999 2007
value in log, weighted average of firm TFP estimated by OP
Average TFP by Industry
Notes: labour productivity is measured as real valued added per worker. TFP is estimated as in Olley-Pakes (1996).
Figure B1: Robustness of evidence on productivity growth
We then check whether our motivating evidence are driven by any institutional par-
ticular to China. We examine the role of Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA), State Owned
Enterprise (SOE) and processing trade. Each time, we exclude firms subject to these in-
stitutions respectively and regenerate our basic motivating graphs. The results are shown
in Figure B2. They are qualitatively consistent with the evidence in the main text. Next,
we check whether our findings are driven by definition for industries. Instead of using
the industry classification of “HO aggregates”, we use the four-digit Chinese Industry
Classification (CIC) to see whether our evidence still hold. The results are presented Fig-
ure B3. The results are consistent with our evidence using HO aggregates as industries
classification.
2.B.2 Additional Figures on Parametrization
The structural relationship γz =
fχz
1+fχz
is used to estimate the relative fixed costs of
export f ≡ fzxfz . Using the observe γz and χz, f is estimated by sector using f =
γz
χz(1−γz) .
The result is plotted in Figure B4 (a). The expenditure share b(z) is computed as the
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(c) SOE: firm mass
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(d) SOE: exporter share
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(e) Pure exporters: firm mass
.
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(f) Pure exporters: exporter share
Notes: (a) The industry classification used is “HO aggregates” as in the main text. (b) The charts on MFA are
produced by excluding the textile industries: 2-digit CIC industries of 17 and 18. (b) The charts on SOE are by
excluding state owned firms. (c) The charts on Pure exporters are by excluding pure exporters, i.e., firms which
export more than 70% of the outputs.
Figure B2: Robustness of motivating facts by sub-samples
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(a) firm mass
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Histogram: value added. Capital share is geometric mean (CIC industries, 5%−95% sample). Bin width=0.02.
(b) value added
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Histogram:  exporter number. Capital share is geometric mean (CIC industries, 5%−95% sample). Bin width=0.02.
(c) exporter distribution
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Histogram:  Export volume. Capital share is geometric mean (CIC industries, 5%−95% sample). Bin width=0.02.
(d) export volume
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(g) Sectoral TFP growth
Notes: (a) Industry classification is four-digit CIC manufacturing industries. (b)Capital intensity is measured as
the geometric mean across firms for each industry. (c) Non-parametric local polynomial is used to capture the trend
in the data. (d) For the chart of TFP growth, capital intensity is measured as the average of 1999 and 2007 for each
industry. Industry TFP is measured as the weighted average of firm level TFP, dropping the top and bottom 1%
within each industry.
Figure B3: Motivating evidence using CIC industry classfication
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average of consumption share during 2000-2006. A ratio of aggregate imports to exports
is estimated for the matched firms using the firm survey and the Customs Data. Imports
of each industry is estimated as aggregate exports of all the firms in the survey multiplied
by the ratio. Once imports are estimated, consumption is simply outputs plus imports
minus exports. To infer the expenditure function across the whole support [0,1] as a
continuous functions, we interpolate the expenditure function by linear projection. The
result is shown in Figure B4 (b).
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Figure B4: Relative fixed cost of exports and expenditure function
To infer export propensity for the RoW, we use the result that χ∗z = χ−1z
(
τf
1
σ−1
)−2a
,
where χz is directly observable from the data; a = 3.43 and σ = 3.66 are calibrated; f = 1
for year 1999 and f = 1.77 for year 2007 are estimated above; τ =2.38 for year 1999 and τ
=1.76 for year 2007 from the structural estimation. The results are plotted in Figure B5.
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Figure B5: Inferred export propensity for the RoW
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2.C Complementary Tables
2.C.1 Basic Summary Statistics of the Data
Table B1: Statistical summary of main variables
Variables mean in 1999 mean in 2007
revenue(U1,000 ) 50,932 117,888
value added(U1,000 ) 14,130 31,983
sales(U1,000 ) 49,306 115,413
export(U1,000 ) 8,932 24,052
employee 329 219
total profit(U1,000 ) 1,867 6,814
wage(U1,000 ) 3,383 5,429
Notes: We followed Brandt et al. (2012) to only include manufacturing firms with more than 8 employees,
positive output and fixed assets, and drop firms with capital intensities less than zero or greater than one.
We are left with 116,905 and 290,382 firms in 1999 and 2007 which represent about 80% and 93% of the
original sample, respectively.
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Table B2: Capital share of exporters and non-exporters in 2007
2-digit description
capital share of non-exporters capital share of exporters
industry code mean std mean std
13 Processing of Foods 0.83 0.18 0.76 0.21
14 Manufacturing of Foods 0.76 0.20 0.71 0.22
15 Manufacture of Beverages 0.80 0.18 0.78 0.17
16 Manufacture of Tobacco 0.74 0.19 0.90 0.11
17 Manufacture of Textile 0.72 0.20 0.63 0.22
18 Manufacture of Apparel, Footwear & Caps 0.60 0.24 0.51 0.24
19 Manufacture of Leather, Fur, & Feather 0.64 0.25 0.53 0.23
20 Processing of Timber, Manufacture of Wood, Bamboo, Rattan, Palm & Straw Products 0.74 0.20 0.69 0.21
21 Manufacture of Furniture 0.69 0.23 0.56 0.23
22 Manufacture of Paper & Paper Products 0.73 0.19 0.65 0.22
23 Printing, Reproduction of Recording Media 0.67 0.21 0.59 0.22
24 Manufacture of Articles For Culture, Education & Sport Activities 0.64 0.23 0.54 0.23
25 Processing of Petroleum, Coking, &Fuel 0.85 0.16 0.78 0.20
26 Manufacture of Raw Chemical Materials 0.79 0.19 0.75 0.19
27 Manufacture of Medicines 0.78 0.19 0.74 0.19
28 Manufacture of Chemical Fibers 0.80 0.17 0.77 0.20
29 Manufacture of Rubber 0.73 0.21 0.61 0.23
30 Manufacture of Plastics 0.72 0.21 0.60 0.23
31 Manufacture of Non-metallic Mineral goods 0.74 0.20 0.63 0.22
32 Smelting & Pressing of Ferrous Metals 0.82 0.17 0.82 0.15
33 Smelting & Pressing of Non-ferrous Metals 0.82 0.18 0.78 0.19
34 Manufacture of Metal Products 0.71 0.21 0.61 0.21
35 Manufacture of General Purpose Machinery 0.72 0.20 0.65 0.20
36 Manufacture of Special Purpose Machinery 0.72 0.21 0.63 0.21
37 Manufacture of Transport Equipment 0.70 0.21 0.65 0.21
39 Electrical Machinery & Equipment 0.73 0.21 0.61 0.23
40 Computers & Other Electronic Equipment 0.65 0.23 0.58 0.25
41 Manufacture of Measuring Instruments & Machinery for Cultural Activity & Office Work 0.69 0.22 0.56 0.23
42 Manufacture of Artwork 0.66 0.23 0.57 0.24
All Industries 0.74 0.21 0.62 0.23
Notes: This table is generated using the firm data for year 2007.
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Chapter 3
Comparative Advantage,
Competition, and Firm
Heterogeneity
3.1 Introduction
Comparative advantage which was first articulated by David Ricardo in 1817, has been
one of the corner stones of international trade theory in the last 200 years. In the past two
decades, firm heterogeneity has taken the centre stage in this research area. Despite the
growing interest on its macro implications on productivity and welfare (see, e.g. Melitz,
2003; Arkolakis et al., 2012; Melitz and Redding, 2015; Arkolakis et al., forthcoming),
we know relatively little about its impact on comparative advantage. Bernard, Redding,
and Schott (2007) famously demonstrate that firm heterogeneity amplifies comparative
advantage which increases the welfare gains from trade. In this paper, we show that in an
environment with variable mark-ups where the pro-competitive effect is essential, there
is another channel through which firm heterogeneity dampens comparative advantage.
We find this new mechanism to be quantitatively more important than the amplifying
mechanism in shaping comparative advantage in a calibrated Chinese economy.
We motivate our theory by four stylized facts about intra- and inter-firm realloca-
tions generated from matched customs and firm-level data from China. First, compared
with labour intensive firms, capital intensive Chinese firms are less likely to export. Sec-
ond, capital intensive exporters export fewer products on average than labour intensive
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exporters. Third, exports of capital intensive exporters are more skewed toward better
performing products than labour intensive exporters. Finally, the skewness of domestic
sales across labour intensive firms is higher than across capital intensive firms. The first
two facts, which concern the extensive margin of reallocation within and across firms, can
be rationalized by extending models such as Arkolakis and Muendler (2010), or Bernard,
Redding, and Schott (2011) to multiple industries. However, their assumptions of CES
demand and a continuum of firms impose an exogenously fixed mark-up across desti-
nations and industries. The different market conditions therefore have no effect on the
export product mix (the relative distribution of exports across products) or the variation
of skewness of domestic sales across firms. The third and fourth stylized facts, which
concern reallocations along the intensive margin, thus cannot be reconciled with models
of this type.
Our theory explains all these facts simultaneously. We extend the analysis of Mayer,
Melitz, and Ottaviano (2014) to a continuum of industries by embedding it in Dornbusch,
Fischer, and Samuelson (1977). The model features heterogeneous firms and variable
mark-ups as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). Each firm possesses a “core competency”
and has access to a multi-product technology. The marginal cost of producing a product
increases as it moves away from the firm’s core competency. There are two countries. In
industries of comparative advantage, firms are assumed to be more likely to have lower
marginal costs than firms from the other country. Exporters in comparative disadvantage
industries face tougher competition in the export market, which shifts the whole distri-
bution of mark-ups downwards. The tougher the competition is, the more exporters have
to cut the scope of their export product and skew exports toward the better performing
products. The relative ease of competition at home in comparative disadvantage indus-
tries also induces firms to sell more at home rather than export, thereby reducing their
propensity to export. However, competition is tougher in comparative advantage indus-
tries in the domestic market, which induces reallocations of domestic sales toward the
better performing firms.
Our theory generates new predictions about the effect of firm heterogeneity on com-
parative advantage. Melitz (2003) predicts that opening up to trade reallocates resources
toward more productive firms. In a Heckscher-Ohlin model with heterogeneous firms,
Bernard et al. (2007) find that the reallocation effect differs systematically across indus-
tries. Due to higher expected profits, an industry with comparative advantage has more
entry and stronger selection. This generates endogenous Ricardian comparative advan-
tage, which amplifies the ex ante comparative advantage. In our model, there is a new
mechanism working on the top of this. In industries of comparative disadvantage, tougher
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competition in the foreign market will induce more export sales toward the high produc-
tivity firms and the better performing products after the country has been opened up to
trade. The more competitive the foreign market is, the more exporters have to toughen
up. Such endogenous response reduces the relative productivity differences between the
two countries and dampens comparative advantage. We also use the model to theoretically
decompose Ricardian comparative advantage and find that the productivity measure mat-
ters for the decomposition. Industry productivity measures, which only capture selections
along the extensive margin, fail to capture the dampening component. Productivity mea-
sures which take into account selections along both the extensive and intensive margins
capture both the amplifying and the dampening components.
To test the mechanism of the model, we first extend the empirical analysis of Mayer et
al. (2014) to incorporate the competition due to comparative advantage. They examine
how French exporters vary their export product mix across markets with different sizes.
We construct new variables which measure the competition faced by firms in each market
due to comparative advantage. The idea is that capital intensive exporters face tougher
competition when exporting to capital abundant markets; labour intensive exporters face
tougher competition when exporting to labour abundant markets. Regressions using the
matched customs and firm-level data confirm the model’s predictions. Exporters export
fewer products and skew exports more toward better performing products in markets
where they face tougher competition due to comparative advantage, conditioning on the
effect of market size.
We then employ a sufficient statistic approach to quantify the different components of
comparative advantage. Comparative advantage is not directly observable. We show that,
given the trade elasticity, iceberg trade costs, and domestic export participation (export
intensities, and export propensities measured by the percent of firms that export), we can
infer the home country’s comparative advantage against the rest of the world (RoW). The
intuition is that, conditional on trade costs and trade elasticity, firms’ export participation
reveals their relative competitiveness. The higher the fraction of firms that export and
the more that exporters export, the stronger the country’s comparative advantage. This
echoes Balassa’s idea of “Revealed Comparative Advantage” (RCA).1 Our sufficient statis-
tics result also allows us to decompose comparative advantage and evaluate the importance
of individual components. Using this identification result, we estimate our two-country
model for the case of China vs. RoW. We find that the dampening component appears to
1While Balassa (1965) measured the underlying pattern of comparative advantage by relative exports
across industries, we use data on firms’ export participations together with estimated trade costs and trade
elasticity. As noted by Costinot et al. (2012) and French (2017), the RCA index would not necessarily
coincide with the underlying ranking of relative productivities. In contrast, our measure is theoretically
consistent.
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dominate the amplifying component. Ignoring the dampening component would lead to
overestimations of comparative advantage.
Finally, we parametrize our model and conduct simulations on the effect of trade lib-
eralization. We find that bilateral trade liberalization tends to strengthen the endogenous
comparative advantage. Taken together, however, whether trade liberalization strengthens
the overall comparative advantage or not depends on what kind of productivity measure is
used, and which of the endogenous components dominates. It tends to strengthen compar-
ative advantage if the productivity measure captures only the extensive margin. However,
if the productivity measure also incorporates the intensive margin and the dampening com-
ponent is more pronounced, bilateral trade liberalization weakens comparative advantage.
As regards welfare, our simulated model with variable mark-ups and firm heterogeneity
(Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008) generates higher welfare gains from trade than a simulated
model with variable mark-ups but without firm heterogeneity (e.g., Ottaviano, Tabuchi,
and Thisse, 2002).
Our paper contributes to the following strands in the literature. Our work is closely
related to that of recent authors who study the macro implication of firm heterogeneity.
We show that there is a new channel through which firm heterogeneity shapes comparative
advantage, namely that tougher competition in the export market induces reallocations
such that ex ante comparative advantage is dampened. This contrasts with the amplifying
mechanism found in Bernard et al. (2007).2 Arkolakis et al. (2012) find that for a group
of models which satisfy certain restrictions, the formula for the welfare gains from trade is
the same.3 Melitz and Redding (2015) show that the Melitz model with firm heterogeneity
implies higher welfare gains from trade than the Krugman model with homogeneous firms.
Compared with their results, our model features variable mark-ups. However, we also find
trade yields higher welfare gains in the simulated heterogeneous firm model than it does
in the homogeneous model.
We also contribute to the literature on the measurement of comparative advantage.
Comparative advantage is the basis of classic trade theory. However, it has remained chal-
lenging to measure. Balassa’s RCA index has in the last few decades been the key tool in
measuring comparative advantage. There has been a renaissance in quantifying Ricardian
comparative advantage since the seminal contribution by Eaton and Kortum (2002), which
2Recent contributions include Lu (2010), Huang et al. (2017), and Burstein and Vogel (2017). Gaubert
and Itskhoki (2016) also study a multi-sector Ricardian model with heterogeneous firms but their focus is
on the effect of the granularity force on comparative advantage. Ma et al. (2014) build on Bernard et al.
(2011) and study within-firm specialization across products with different factor proportions.
3The restrictions include CES preferences and a constant trade elasticity. Arkolakis et al. (forthcoming)
depart from these two restrictions and study welfare gains from trade in models with variable mark-ups.
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provides a tractable multi-country Ricardian model.4 We provide sufficient statistic re-
sults, which identify comparative advantage directly and decompose it into exogenous and
endogenous components. The sufficient statistic approach, as argued in Arkolakis et al.
(2012), saves us from solving all the endogenous variables but still provides estimates for
the object of interest. As far as we know, this paper is the first to provide sufficient statis-
tics for comparative advantage.5 We also show that, in measuring comparative advantage,
the exact productivity measures matter. Measures that capture only the extensive margin
miss an important determinant of comparative advantage and bias our estimations.
Finally, the literature both theoretical and empirical on multi-product firm has been
booming.6 Our analysis highlights how comparative advantage affects resource realloca-
tion along the intra-firm extensive and intensive margins for multi-product firms, and how
it feeds back to comparative advantage. The mechanism is similar to that in Mayer et al.
(2014). Their focus is on the competition due to market size while the present paper con-
centrates on comparative advantage. Our model therefore provides a finer characterization
of multi-product exports in a world with many industries.
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 presents four stylized
facts which motivate our theory. Section 3 presents the model and provides predictions
on comparative advantage. Section 4 contains two sets of empirical analyses. Section 5
conducts numerical simulations on the effect of trade liberalization. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Motivating Evidence
3.2.1 Data
In this section, we present a few stylized facts on the way in which export participation,
exporters’ product scope and product mix, and firm mix vary with capital intensity. These
facts are generated using matched customs and firm-level data from China for the period
2000-2006. The first dataset that we use is the Chinese Annual Industrial Survey (CAIS)
4Costinot et al. (2012) estimate the importance of Ricardian comparative advantage on trade patterns
and welfare using an extended Eaton-Kortum model. Relatedly, Levchenko and Zhang (2016) use the
gravity equation to infer comparative advantage from trade flows and its evolution over time. Costinot et
al. (2016) focus on the agriculture sector for which the parcel-level productivity of lands can be precisely
estimated for different crops. Gaubert and Itskhoki (2016), Huang et al. (2017) instead use the two-country
DFS framework to work out comparative advantage by structural estimation.
5The sufficient statistic approach has gained popularity in the field of public finance (Chetty, 2009).
Arkolakis et al. (2012) shows that within a set of trade models which satisfy certain conditions, trade
elasticity and the share of expenditure on domestic goods are sufficient statistics for welfare gains from
trade.
6Feenstra and Ma (2009), and Eckel and Neary (2010) examine the effect of competition on the distri-
bution of sales and the cannibalization effect for multi-product firms. Arkolakis and Muendler (2010), and
Bernard et al. (2011) emphasize selection along the extensive margin, while Mayer et al. (2014) focus on
selection along the intensive margin. Manova and Yu (2017) instead appraise quality differentiation and
study product selection along the quality margin. Bernard et al. (2010), Iacovone and Javorcik (2010), and
Mayer et al. (2016) investigate product churning over time in response to changes in market conditions.
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which covers all State Owned Firms (SOE) and non-SOEs with sales above 5 million
Chinese Yuan. These data provide rich information on firms’ financial statements, and
forms of identification, such as name, address, ownership, and numbers of employees. The
other dataset that we employ is Chinese Customs data, which cover all China’s import and
export transactions. For each transaction, we know the Chinese importer/exporter, the
product (at HS-8 level), value, origin, destination, etc. There is no common firm identifier
between the two datasets. We match the two datasets on the basis of firm’s name, address,
telephone number, and zip code.7 The sample of matched exports represents about 37%
of all Chinese exports reported in the customs data for 2000 and 52% for 2006.
We focus on the Chinese manufacturers and exclude firms from the mining and utility
sectors in CAIS, and wholesalers or intermediaries in the customs data. We use capital
intensity to capture comparative advantage: given the abundance of labour endowment
in China, we expect the country to have comparative advantage relative to the RoW in
labour intensive industries and comparative disadvantage in capital intensive industries.
We follow Schott (2004) and Huang et al. (2017) to define industries as “Heckscher-Ohlin
aggregates” and group Chinese firms into 100 bins according to their capital intensity.
Schott (2004) argues that traditional industry classification, which defines industries ac-
cording to the final use of goods, aggregates goods that are produced using different
factor proportions. Similarly, Huang et al. (2017) show that such industry classifica-
tion also aggregates firms which use different technologies. Capital intensity is defined as
1 − Labour CostsV alueAdded for each firm. For example, firms with capital intensity between 0 and
0.1 are defined as industry 1.8 Under this classification, which we use for the rest of the
paper, the following stylized facts are found using data for the year 2003.
3.2.2 Stylized Facts
Stylized fact 1: Export propensity and export intensity decline with capital intensity.
This is captured in Figure 3.1. The left panel plots the export propensity of each
industry, where export propensity is defined as the total number of exporters divided by
the total number firms. The right panel plots the export intensity, where export intensity is
defined as total exports divided by the total sales for each industry. As the figures indicate,
7Such matching method has been used by a few number of papers, including Ma et al. (2014), Yu
(2015), and Manova and Yu (2016).
8We follow the traditional two-factor Heckscher-Ohlin paradigm to consider labour vs. capital. Here
“capital” includes all non-labour factors, such as energies. Labour costs include payable wages, labour
and employment insurance fees, and the total of employee benefits payable. We exclude firms with capital
intensities which are negative or greater than 1. Their presence is very likely to be due to misreporting or
errors. We also exclude firms with negative value added, employment or assets. Firms with fewer than 8
employees are also excluded since they are under different legal regime. The results using data for other
years are qualitatively the same.
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both measures decline with capital intensity. This is consistent with our expectation that
China has comparative advantage in labour intensive industries and labour intensive firms
are more likely to export.
Stylized fact 2: Exporters’ export product scope declines with capital intensity.
A firm’s export product scope is defined as the number of products it exports. We
measure each exporter’s export product scope by counting the number of distinctive HS-8
products exported to all destinations in the customs data. The left panel of Figure 3.2
plots the export product scope averaged across exporters for each industry. As we can
see, it falls with capital intensity. The right panel of the figure plots the share of single-
product exporters, which are firms exporting one HS-8 product only. It is obvious that
single-product exporters are more prevalent in the capital intensive industries in China.
Stylized fact 3: The export product mix is more skewed in capital intensive industries.
This is captured by Figure 3.3. The left panel plots the average of the log-ratios
between the exports of the core product to the second best product. The core product is
defined as the product that makes up the greatest part of the total exports for each firm.
As we can see, this measure tends to be higher in capital intensive industries. Exports
are therefore more concentrated on the better performing products in capital intensive
industries. However, this measure captures only the skewness of exports across a few
products. To show the presence of such a relationship across all exported products, we
use a measure which captures the skewness of the whole distribution of exports. The right
panel plots the average Theil index of firm exports across products. Again, the skewness
of exports across products tends to increase with capital intensity.
Stylized fact 4: The skewness of domestic sales decreases with capital intensity.
In the left panel of Figure 3.4, we plot the log-ratios of domestic sales between the
75th-percentile firm and the 25th-percentile firm. We measure a firm’s domestic sales by
deducting exports from its total sales. As is obvious from the figure, the skewness tends
to be higher in labour intensive industries. We also use the Theil index to capture the
skewness of the whole distribution of domestic sales across firms. This is shown in the
right panel. Still, the skewness tends to decline with capital intensity.
3.2.3 Discussion
So far, our results are graphical evidence alone.9 In Appendix 3.A, we provide further
regression evidence on the robustness of the stylized facts. In Appendix Table C1, we
9In Appendix 3.C, we provide figures for the years 2000 and 2006, and other measures to capture the
skewness of distributions.
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Figure 3.1: Export propensity and export intensity
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confirm fact 1, that export propensity and export intensity decline strongly with capital
intensity, using data from 2000-2006. To deal with concerns that many Chinese exporters
were processing traders, and China went through a period of state-owned-enterprise (SOE)
reform which might have affected firms’ exports, we examine whether fact 1 is true or not
for non-processing traders and none-SOEs by excluding them from our sample. Still, fact
1 remains highly robust. Similarly, we examine the robustness of fact 2 on export product
scope in Appendix Table C2, and find that it holds for the full sample and sub-sample of
exporters. In Appendix Table C3-C5, we examine the robustness of fact 3 on the product
mix of exporters and use alternative measures of skewness such as the Herfindahl index.
Again, fact 3 is robust to alternative measures and data samples. Similarly, we examine
the robustness of fact 4 on the skewness of domestic sales in Appendix Table C6-C8. It is
still the case the skewness of domestic sales is higher in labour intensive industries.
Overall, these stylized facts reveal how comparative advantage shapes firm sales within
and across firms at home and abroad. The first two stylized facts focus on the extensive
margin, the third and fourth on the intensive margin. The first two facts can be easily
explained by existing models, such as that of Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007, 2011),
by introducing multiple industries and multi-product firms.10 However, the third and
fourth stylized facts are not consistent with these models which impose the CES demand
and a continuum of firms assumptions. These two assumptions imply a fixed mark-up
across markets and industries. There is therefore no variation in the intra-firm product
mix or relative sale across firms in different markets or industries.11 Mayer, Melitz, and
Ottaviano (2014) provide a multi-product model built on Melitz and Ottaviano (2008),
which features variable mark-ups. Their model explains how French exporters vary their
sales across markets of different sizes. They find firms which export to larger markets
skew their exports toward their better selling products. Such a mechanism should work at
the industry level as well, and in principle can explain the third and fourth stylized facts.
This motivates our theory in the following section.
3.3 Theory
We build a model which simultaneously explains the stylized facts discovered in the pre-
vious section. Our model extends Mayer, Melitz, and Ottaviano (2014) to a continuum
of industries by embedding it in Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977). The model
10For example, Huang et al. (2007) provide a multi-sector extension of Bernard et al. (2007). Bernard
et al. (2011) discuss an extension of their benchmark multi-product model to multiple industries in the
appendix.
11The relative sale of different products only depends on the relative firm or product productivity in
these type of models.
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makes novel predictions on the effect of firm heterogeneity on comparative advantage.
3.3.1 Closed Economy
We first consider the closed economy. Suppose there are two countries, Home and Foreign.
The consumers in each country have identical preference given by
U = qc0 +
∫ 1
0
[α
∫
i∈Ω(z)
qci (z)di−
γ
2
∫
i∈Ω(z)
(qci (z))
2di− η
2
(
∫
i∈Ω(z)
qci (z)di)
2]dz,
where qc0 denotes the consumption of the numeraire good and q
c
i (z) the consumption of
the differentiated variety i in industry z. z indexes the continuum of industries and has a
support of [0, 1]. Ω(z) is the set of differentiated varieties in industry z. The parameters
capturing the substitution pattern between the differentiated varieties and numeraire good
are α and η. As is obvious in the demand function below, a higher α or smaller η will lead
to a higher demand for the differentiated varieties relative to the numeraire good. The
parameter capturing the substitution pattern of the differentiated varieties within each
industry is given by γ. The degree of differentiation increases with γ. In the extreme case
that γ = 0, the differentiated varieties become perfect substitutes.
We normalized the price of the numeraire good to be 1. The budget constraint faced
by consumers is given by
qc0 +
∫ 1
0
∫
i∈Ω(z)
pci (z)q
c
i (z)didz = y
c
0 + I,
where yc0 is the endowment of the numeraire good and I the labour income. Assuming that
consumers have positive demand for the numeraire good, solving the consumers’ problem
delivers the following demand for the differentiated varieties
pi(z) = α− γqci (z)− ηQc(z).
Then the corresponding market demand is
qi(z) = Lq
c
i (z) =
L
γ
(pzmax − pi(z)),
where L is the number of consumers in the home country and pzmax is the choke price of
industry z. Then a firm with marginal cost c operating in industry z faces the following
problem
max
p(z)
(p(z, c)− c)q(z).
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Solving the firm’s problem, we have
p(z, c) =
1
2
(pzmax + c),
µ(z, c) =
1
2
(pzmax − c),
q(z, c) =
L
2γ
(pzmax − c),
pi(z, c) =
L
4γ
(pzmax − c)2,
where p(z, c), µ(z, c), q(z, c), and pi(z, c) are the price, mark-up, output, and profit, re-
spectively.
Each industry has a pool of potential entrants. Firms pay a fixed cost of fE , and
draw their marginal costs from a common distribution G(z, c) defined on the support of
[0, CM (z)] for industry z. Firms with marginal costs higher than the threshold CD(z) =
pzmax will exit from the market. Free entry implies that∫ CD(z)
0
pi(z, c)dG(z, c) = fE .
Under the Pareto distribution assumption that
G(z, c) = (
c
CM (z)
)k, c ∈ [0, CM (z)],
the cut-off marginal cost under autarky is given by
CD(z)
A = [
2(k + 1)(k + 2)γCM (z)
kfE
L
]1/(k+2). (3.1)
Similarly, for the foreign country, we have12
CD(z)
∗A = [
2(k + 1)(k + 2)γCM (z)
∗kfE
L∗
]1/(k+2). (3.2)
3.3.2 Open Economy with Single-product Firms
We now consider the open economy case without multi-product firms. The key purpose is
to study how competition varies across industries when countries start trading with each
other. To export to the foreign country, we assume that domestic firms need to pay an
iceberg trade cost of τ . Foreign firms face the iceberg trade cost of τ∗.
Free entry implies that the sum of expected profits from both markets equals the fixed
12Variables with asterisk are for the foreign country.
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entry cost. The free entry condition therefore becomes
∫ CD(z)
0
pid(z, c)dG(z, c) +
∫ CX(z)
0
pix(z, c)dG(z, c) = fE ,
where CX(z) = C
∗
D/τ is the marginal cost cut-off for exporters. Thanks to the Pareto
distribution assumption, this can be simplified as
LCD(z)
k+2 + ρL∗C∗D(z)
k+2 = βCM (z)
k, (3.3)
where ρ = τ−k ∈ [0, 1] is the freeness of trade and β = 2γ(k + 1)(k + 2)fE is a constant.
Similarly, for the foreign country, we have
L∗C∗D(z)
k+2 + ρ∗LCD(z)k+2 = βC∗M (z)
k, (3.4)
where ρ∗ = τ∗−k. Combining the two equations above, we have13
CD(z)
k+2 =
β[CM (z)
k − ρC∗M (z)k]
L(1− ρρ∗) , (3.5)
C∗D(z)
k+2 =
β[C∗M (z)
k − ρ∗CM (z)k]
L∗(1− ρρ∗) . (3.6)
Following Dornbusch et al. (1977), we rank the industries such that ∂CM (z)∂z > 0 and
∂C∗M (z)
∂z < 0. That is, domestic firms in industries with higher z draw their marginal costs
from a wider support, while the converse is true for the foreign firms. Under such as-
sumptions, the home country will have comparative advantage in industries with lower z.
There are different ways that these assumptions can be micro-founded. For example, they
can be generated by the Heckscher-Ohlin force. Suppose that firms use a Cobb-Douglas
production technology with z indexing the capital intensity, and CM (z) = w
1−zrz and
C∗M (z) = w
∗1−zr∗z. Then ∂CM (z)∂z = CM (z) ln
r
w and
∂C∗M (z)
∂z = C
∗
M (z) ln
r∗
w∗ . If the home
country is labour abundant relative to the foreign such that r
∗
w∗ < 1 <
r
w , then we have
∂CM (z)
∂z > 0 and
∂C∗M (z)
∂z < 0. Under this interpretation, the home country has compara-
tive advantage in labour intensive industries while the foreign country has comparative
advantages in capital intensive industries.
Given the assumption that ∂CM (z)∂z > 0 and
∂C∗M (z)
∂z < 0, it is easy to verify that
∂CD(z)
∂z
> 0, and
∂C∗D(z)
∂z
< 0.
So the cut-offs are lower in industries of comparative advantage. Exporters therefore face
13To ensure that the equations have real solutions, we assume that ρ ≤ CM (z)k
CM (z)
∗k ≤ 1ρ∗ for all z.
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tougher competition to sell in the foreign market in industries where the foreign country
has comparative advantage. Immediately, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. Export propensity χ(z) ≡ (CX(z)CD(z) )k and export intensity λ(z) ≡
Exports(z)
Total Sales(z)
increase with comparative advantage.
Proof. See Appendix 3.D.1.
This proposition implies that firms are more likely to export in industries of com-
parative advantage. This is consistent with Stylized fact 1 if we believe that China has
comparative advantage in labour intensive industries.
According to Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), the number of entrants in each industry is
given by
NE(z) =
2CM (z)
k(k + 1)γ
η(1− ρρ∗) (
α− CD(z)
CD(z)k+1
− ρ∗α− C
∗
D(z)
C∗D(z)k+1
),
N∗E(z) =
2C∗M (z)
k(k + 1)γ
η(1− ρρ∗) (
α− C∗D(z)
C∗D(z)k+1
− ρα− CD(z)
CD(z)k+1
).
If
α−C∗D(z)
C∗D(z)k+1
≤ ραz−CD(z)
CD(z)k+1
, we have N∗E(z) ≤ 0 so that there is no foreign firm in such
industries. In this case, the home country specializes in these industries. This is more likely
to happen if the freeness of trade ρ is sufficiently high, or C∗D(z) is greater than CD(z).
Intuitively, in such cases, foreign firms face tough competition and get eliminated from
the market. Similarly, the foreign country will specialize in industries where α−CD(z)
CD(z)k+1
≤
ρ∗ α−C
∗
D(z)
C∗D(z)k+1
is satisfied.14
3.3.3 Open Economy with Multi-product Firms
Now we extend the model to allow firms producing multiple products by following Mayer
et al. (2014). Each firm’s marginal cost of producing the core competency is given by
c. Varieties are ranked in increasing order of distance from the core competency and
indexed by m. The marginal cost of producing variety m is given by v(m, c) = $−mc, and
$ ∈ (0, 1). So the marginal cost increases as we move away from the core competency.15
Firms will keep adding products until the marginal cost is higher than the choke price.
Therefore, the number of varieties produced by each firm is given by
Md(z, c) =
 0, if c > CD(z),max{m|v(m, c) ≤ CD(z)}+ 1, if c ≤ CD(z).
14Given that China imports and exports in every industry, we assume for the rest of the paper that the
no-specialization conditions are always satisfied .
15Eckel and Neary (2010) provide an alternative way to model the asymmetries between products on
the cost side. Eckel et al. (2015) further allow firms to invest in quality.
Chapter 3 147
The number of varieties exported to the foreign country by domestic firms is given by
Mx(z, c) =
 0, if c > CX(z),max{m|v(m, c) ≤ CX(z) = C∗D(z)τ }+ 1, if c ≤ CX(z).
The free entry condition now becomes
∫ CD(z)
0
Πd(z, v(m, c))dG(z, c) +
∫ CX(z)
0
Πx(z, v(m, c))dG(z, c) = fE , (3.7)
where firm profits from Home Πd(z, c), and Foreign Πx(z, v(m, c)), are the sum of the
profits made from each product sold in the respective market:
Πd(z, c) =
∑Md(z,c)−1
m=0
pid(z, v(m, c)),
Πx(z, v(m, c)) =
∑Mx(z,c)−1
m=0
pix(z, v(m, c)).
According to Mayer et al. (2014), the free entry condition Equation (3.7) can be simplified
as
LCD(z)
k+2 + ρL∗C∗D(z)
k+2 =
βCM (z)
k
Ψ
, (3.8)
where Ψ = (1 − $k)−1 is an index of multi-product flexibility. Similarly, for the foreign
country, we have
L∗C∗D(z)
k+2 + ρ∗LCD(z)k+2 =
βC∗M (z)
k
Ψ
.
We can solve the two equations above for the choke prices:
CD(z)
k+2 =
β[CM (z)
k − ρC∗M (z)k]
ΨL(1− ρρ∗) , (3.9)
C∗D(z)
k+2 =
β[C∗M (z)
k − ρ∗CM (z)k]
ΨL∗(1− ρρ∗) . (3.10)
It is easy to see that we still have ∂CD(z)∂z > 0 and
∂C∗D(z)
∂z < 0 under the assumptions
that ∂CM (z)∂z > 0 and
∂C∗M (z)
∂z < 0. Therefore, Propositions 3.1 still holds in an environment
with multi-product firms. The following two propositions focus on the variations in the
product scope and product mix across industries, which the single-product model cannot
explain.
Proposition 3.2. The export product scope increases weakly with comparative advantage.
Proof. See Appendix 3.D.2.
Proposition 3.2 implies that the export product scope tends to be lower in the industries
of comparative disadvantage. For firms with the same marginal cost, those exporting in
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the industries of comparative disadvantage are more likely to be single-product exporters.
This is consistent with Stylized Fact 2.
Proposition 3.3. Exports are skewed toward better products in the industries of compar-
ative disadvantage.
Proof. See Appendix 3.D.3.
In industries of comparative disadvantage, the export market is more competitive.
The tougher competition induces exporters to reallocate more sales to the better selling
products. If we agree that capital intensive industries are the industries of comparative
disadvantage for China, we should expect capital intensive exporters to have a more skewed
export product mix. This is consistent with Stylized Fact 3.
Proposition 3.4. Domestic sales tend to skew toward more productive firms in compar-
ative advantage industries.
Proof. See Appendix 3.D.4.
In comparative advantage industries, the domestic market is more competitive. Such
tougher competition would induce reallocations of sales more toward products that are
produced with lower marginal costs. Since such products are more likely to be produced
by firms with higher core efficiencies, outputs are reallocated toward these firms. In the
end, domestic sales are skewed toward these firms and Stylized fact 4 is also rationalized.
3.3.4 Comparative Advantage
Our model has new implications for comparative advantage. Bernard et al. (2007) show
that the different degree of selection across industries generates endogenous Ricardian
comparative advantage which amplifies ex ante comparative advantage. In this subsec-
tion, we show that variable mark-ups allow for selections along the intensive margin, which
generate endogenous Ricardian comparative advantage that dampens ex ante comparative
advantage. We also find that the measure of sectoral productivity matters for the esti-
mate of comparative advantage. Comparative advantage is usually measured by relative
productivity (Costinot et al., 2012). If the productivity measure captures only selections
along the extensive margin, we miss the dampening effect of intensive margin selections
and overestimate comparative advantage.
Relative average marginal cost
Comparative advantage is defined as the relative productivity between home and foreign
for each industry. We can measure productivity as the inverse of the simple average
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marginal cost across firms within each industry. The average marginal cost of industry z
in the home country is given by
c(z) =
∫ CD(z)
0
cdG(z, c) =
k
k + 1
CD(z).
For the foreign country, it is c(z)∗ = kk+1CD(z)
∗. Then using Equations (3.1) and (3.2),
the relative average marginal cost under autarky is given by:
c(z)
c(z)∗
=
CD(z)
A
CD(z)∗A
= (
L∗
L
CM (z)
k
C∗M (z)k
)1/(k+2). (3.11)
If we denote the cost cut-offs in the open economy as CD(z)
T and CD(z)
∗T , according to
Equations (3.9) and (3.10) the relative marginal cost between home and foreign is16
c(z)
c(z)∗
=
CD(z)
T
CD(z)∗T
= (
L∗
L
CM (z)
k − ρC∗M (z)k
C∗M (z)k − ρ∗CM (z)k
)1/(k+2).
Proposition 3.5. Comparative advantage as measured by the relative simple average of
margin costs between home and foreign c(z)c(z)∗ is amplified after opening up to trade as
CD(z)
T
CD(z)∗T
=
CD(z)
A
CD(z)∗A︸ ︷︷ ︸
ex ante
 1− ρC
∗
M (z)
k
CM (z)
k
1− ρ∗CM (z)k
C∗M (z)
k

1
k+2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
amplifying
. (3.12)
Proof. See Appendix 3.D.5.
As noted above, the amplifying mechanism in Bernard et al. (2007) is also present in
our model. This proposition shows not only that it exists but also how to tease it out by
decomposition. However, the productivity measure varies only with the cost cut-off, or the
productivity of the marginal survival firm, which misses the details of allocations across
the inframarginal firms which form the majority in each industry. We next show that a
different result arises if the inframarginal firms also matter for the productivity measure.
Relative TFPQ
Now we consider a quantity-based TFP (TFPQ) from Mayer et al. (2014). It measures
industry output per worker and captures both the intensive and the extensive margins by
incorporating the fact that firms have different amounts of inputs and outputs, and only
16The single-product economy gives the same result. Equations (3.5) and (3.6) differ only by a constant
as compared with Equations (3.9) and (3.10).
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a subset of firms export. In the closed economy, the TFPQ of industry z is
Φ(z)A =
∫ CD(z)A
0 Q(z, c)dG(z, c)∫ CD(z)A
0 C(z, c)dG(z, c)
=
k + 2
k
1
CD(z)
,
where Q(z, c) =
∑Md(z,c)−1
m=0 q(z, v(m, c)) and C(z, c) =
∑Md(z,c)−1
m=0 v(m, c)q(z, v(m, c)) are
firm outputs and inputs, respectively. The relative TFPQ under autarky is given by
Φ(z)A
Φ(z)∗A
=
CD(z)
A∗
CD(z)A
= (
L
L∗
C∗M (z)
k
CM (z)k
)1/(k+2).
which is the ex ante comparative advantage before countries open to trade. It coincides
with Equation (3.11) which measures the relative average marginal cost under autarky. In
the open economy, we need to account for exports. The TFPQ is then given by
Φ(z)T =
∫ CD(z)
0 Qd(z, c)dG(z, c) +
∫ CX(z)
0 Qx(z, c)dG(z, c)∫ CD(z)
0 Cd(z, c)dG(z, c) +
∫ CX(z)
0 Cx(z, c)dG(z, c)
.
It can be shown that the total industry outputs and inputs for each market are
∫ CD(z)
0
Qd(z, c)dG(z, c) =
LCD(z)
k+1
2γCkM (k + 1)
1
1−$k ,∫ CX(z)
0
Qx(z, c)dG(z, c) =
ρL∗C∗D(z)
k+1
2γCkM (k + 1)
1
1−$k ,∫ CD(z)
0
Cd(z, c)dG(z, c) =
kLCD(z)
k+2
2γCkM (k + 1)(k + 2)
1
1−$k ,∫ CX(z)
0
Cx(z, c)dG(z, c) =
ρkL∗C∗D(z)
k+2
2γCkM (k + 1)(k + 2)
1
1−$k .
substituting these results into the definition of the TFPQ, we have
Φ(z)T =
k + 2
k
[ LCD(z)k+2
LCD(z)k+2 + ρL∗C∗D(z)k+2
1
CD(z)
+
ρL∗C∗D(z)
k+2
LCD(z)k+2 + ρL∗C∗D(z)k+2
1
C∗D(z)
]
,
which is a weighted average of the competitiveness of each market. The weights are given
by the total costs for the goods sold in each market. If ρ = 0, we go back to the closed
economy case. Using the free entry condition (3.8), it can be further simplified as
Φ(z)T =
(k + 2)Ψ
kβCM (z)k
(LCD(z)
k+1 + ρL∗C∗D(z)
k+1).
Chapter 3 151
There is a similar equation for the foreign country. The relative TFPQ between home and
foreign for each industry is therefore given by
Φ(z)T
Φ
∗
(z)T
=
C∗M (z)
k
CM (z)k
LCD(z)
k+1 + ρL∗C∗D(z)
k+1
L∗C∗D(z)k+1 + ρ∗LCD(z)k+1
.
Proposition 3.6. Comparative advantage as measured by the relative quantity-based TFP
between home and foreign Φ(z)
Φ
∗
(z)
after opening up to trade can be decomposed into three com-
ponents: an ex ante component, an amplifying component, and a dampening component
as:
Φ(z)T
Φ
∗
(z)T
=
Φ(z)A
Φ(z)∗A︸ ︷︷ ︸
ex ante
(
Φ(z)A
Φ(z)∗A
)k+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
amplifying
L∗
L
L
L∗ (
CD(z)
C∗D(z)
)k+1 + ρ
1 + ρ∗ LL∗ (
CD(z)
C∗D(z)
)k+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
dampening
. (3.13)
Proof. See Appendix 3.D.6.
As pointed out by Bernard et al. (2007), given the higher expected profits of exporting,
there will be more entrants and more intense selection in the comparative advantage
industries. This tends to enlarge the relative productivity differences across industries
and amplify comparative advantage. Such a channel is preserved in this measure and
given by the term ( Φ(z)
A
Φ(z)∗A )
k+1 which is positively correlated with the ex ante component
Φ(z)A
Φ(z)∗A .
17
However, their assumptions of CES demand and a continuum of firms impose a con-
stant exogenous mark-up. This implies that the relative revenue in each market between
firms depends only on relative productivity and has nothing to do with market condi-
tions. So selections along the intensive margin are constant across markets and industries.
Our model with variable mark-ups has different implications. Tougher competition would
induce reallocations of resources toward more productive firms and better performing
products, as evident from Propositions 3.3 and 3.4. In other words, in tougher markets or
industries, firms toughen up. This channel tends to dampen their comparative disadvan-
tage.
If we follow Mayer et al. (2014) to define revenue-based TFP (TFPR) as
P (z) =
∫ CD(z)
0 Rd(z, c)dG(z, c) +
∫ CX(z)
0 Rx(z, c)dG(z, c)∫ CD(z)
0 Qd(z, c)dG(z, c) +
∫ CX(z)
0 Qx(z, c)dG(z, c)
,
where Rd(z, c) and Rx(z, c) are firms’ domestic and foreign revenues, respectively, we get
17In Appendix 3.E.1 we extend the model by Bernard et al. (2007) to multiple industries. To simplify
the analysis, we use a quasi-CES preference and decompose comparative advantage in similar manners.
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the same result since
ΦR(z) =
(
∫ CD(z)
0 Rd(z, c)dG(z, c) +
∫ CX(z)
0 Rx(z, c)dG(z, c))/P (z)∫ CD(z)
0 Cd(z, c)dG(z, c) +
∫ CX(z)
0 Cx(z, c)dG(z, c)
= Φ(z).
3.4 Empirical Analysis
in this section, we provide two empirical tests on our theory. The first one is a reduced form
analysis, which shows that exporters skew more of their exports toward the better selling
products in markets where they face tougher competition due to comparative advantage.
This is followed by a more structural analysis, in which we calibrate our model to the
Chinese economy and quantify the different components of comparative advantage via a
sufficient statistic approach.
3.4.1 Comparative Advantage and Export Product Mix
Exporters face different levels of competition across different markets. For example, they
face tougher competition in larger markets (Mayer et al., 2014). Our theory emphasizes
competition induced by comparative advantage. Capital intensive firms face tougher com-
petition in capital abundant markets while labour intensive firms face tougher competition
in labour abundant markets. To capture this channel, we need to first measure the com-
petition faced by firms due to comparative advantage in each market. We propose the
following two measures. The first is given by
CA1ij = (zi − z)(Kj
Lj
− K
L
),
where zi is the capital intensity of firm i and z is the average capital intensity of all Chinese
manufacturing firms,
Kj
Lj
is the capital to labour ratio of market j and KL is the average
capital to labour ratio of all markets (other than China). The larger that CA1ij is, the
tougher the competition that exporter i will face in market j. The reason is that CA1ij
would be higher if zi is high above z and
Kj
Lj
is also high above KL , or if zi is far below
z and
Kj
Lj
is also far below KL . In both cases, firm i faces tough competition in market j
since the market is abundant in the factor that firm i uses intensively. Alternatively, we
can use firms’ capital to labour ratio instead of the capital intensity and have the following
measure
CA2ij = (
ki
li
− k
l
)(
Kj
Lj
− K
L
),
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where kili is the capital to labour ratio of firm i and
k
l is the average capital to labour ratio
of all Chinese firms.
To construct these measures, we need to estimate the capital to labour ratio for each
destination market. We use the Penn World Table 9.0, which provides estimates of capital
stock (at constant prices) and employment.18 The capital to labour ratio of each country
is then computed as the ratio of capital stock to employment. The world average capital to
labour ratio KL is computed as the average of the capital to labour ratio across all countries
except China.19 For the firm level measures, capital intensity is the same measure that we
used in constructing motivating evidence. To measure the capital to labour ratio of each
firm, following Brandt et al. (2012), we first estimate the capital stock for each firm using
the perpetual inventory method. Labour is measured as the total number of employees.
The average capital intensity z and capital to labour ratio kl are computed as the simple
average across all Chinese firms.
To compare our results with Mayer et al. (2014), we also use data for the year 2003.
Table 3.1 shows our first result, which extends their basic empirical analysis on the ex-
porters’ product mix by including our new competition measures. The dependent variable
is the logarithm of the ratio of exports between the core product and the second best
product in each market for each firm.20 We include the GDP of each market to capture
the competition due to the effect of market size. Following Mayer et al. (2014), we also
include the supply potential to capture the competition due to geography.21 As we can
see, the market size effect highlighted in their paper remains highly significant. The sup-
ply potential is positive but not precisely estimated. Our new competition measures are
positive and significant. That is to say, in markets where firms face tougher competition
due to comparative advantage, exports are more skewed toward the core product.
Table 3.2 looks at the skewness across all products that firms export to a market.
The skewness is measured by the Herfindhal or the Theil index. Here, we control for
the market fixed effect and firm fixed effect. The market fixed effect will capture the
size and geography of the destination market. As we can see, the skewness measures
tend to be higher in markets where firms have comparative disadvantage. That is to say,
exports are more skewed in foreign markets where exporters face tougher competition due
to comparative advantage.
Table 3.3 examines the effect on product scope, that is, the number of products ex-
18The data are available at http://www.rug.nl/ggdc/
19We exclude China from the sample to make the measure more exogenous, but in fact adding China
makes little difference.
20The product rank is the rank at the local market.
21Markets which are closer to other markets have more potential competitors. The supply potential
variable is constructed as the predicted aggregate exports to a market based on a gravity regression with
the usual gravity variables and fixed effects.
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Table 3.1: Comparative advantage and sales ratio between the core and second best product: 2003
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln GDP 0.0157∗∗∗ 0.0138∗∗∗ 0.0147∗∗∗ 0.0146∗∗∗
(0.00381) (0.00390) (0.00399) (0.00402)
ln supply potential 0.0127 0.0128 0.0136
(0.00823) (0.00863) (0.00871)
CA1 0.0695∗∗∗
(0.0244)
CA2 0.00744∗
(0.00383)
Constant -0.000603 -0.000367 0.000748 -0.000163
(0.00808) (0.00815) (0.00868) (0.00849)
Within R2 0.000113 0.000124 0.000229 0.000165
No. of observations 92904 92904 85293 92637
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the ratio of exports between the core product (m=0) and second
best product (m=1) in each market for each firm. CA1 and CA2 measure competition due to comparative advantage
(higher value is associated with tougher competition). CA1 is an interaction term between firms’ capital intensity
(relative to all other firms) and the destination market’s capital-labour ratio (relative to the world average). CA2 is
another measure, which is an interaction term between firms’ capital-labour ratio (relative to all other firms) and the
destination market’s capital to labour ratio (relative to the world average). We apply country-specific random effects
on firm-demeaned data. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The number of observations is significantly
less than the following two tables since the dependent variable can be constructed only if the firms export at least
two products at the destination. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, *** at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
Table 3.2: Comparative advantage and the skewness of export sales: 2003
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Herfindahl Herfindahl Theil Theil
CA1 0.0141∗∗∗ 0.0261∗∗∗
(0.00271) (0.00536)
CA2 0.00208∗∗∗ 0.00381∗∗∗
(0.000488) (0.00108)
country fixed effect Y Y Y Y
firm fixed effect Y Y Y Y
No. of observations 187693 202779 187693 202779
Notes: CA1 and CA2 measure competition due to comparative advantage (higher value is associated with tougher
competition). CA1 is an interaction term between firms’ capital intensity (relative to all other firms) and the
destination market’s capital-labour ratio (relative to the world average). CA2 is another measure, which is an
interaction term between firms’ capital-labour ratio (relative to all other firms) and the destination market’s capital
to labour ratio (relative to the world average). Standard errors are clustered at firm level. Significance levels are
indicated by *, **, *** at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
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Table 3.3: Comparative advantage and firms’ export product scope: 2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln product # ln product # product # product # product # product #
CA1 -0.0340∗∗∗ -0.146∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗
(0.00866) (0.0226) (0.00919)
CA2 -0.00358∗∗ -0.0340∗∗∗ -0.0277∗∗∗
(0.00167) (0.00674) (0.00151)
Constant 1.547∗∗∗ 1.543∗∗∗
(0.00763) (0.00734)
country fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
firm fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
R2 0.451 0.454
No. of observations 187693 202779 187694 202779 187694 202779
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) use OLS method and ln(product count) as the dependent variable. Columns (3) to (6)
use product count as the dependent variable. Columns (3) and (4) use Poisson method while columns (5) and (6)
use negative binomial method. CA1 and CA2 measure competition due to comparative advantage (higher value is
associated with tougher competition). CA1 is an interaction term between firms’ capital intensity (relative to all other
firms) and the destination market’s capital-labour ratio (relative to the world average). CA2 is another measure,
which is an interaction term between firms’ capital-labour ratio (relative to all other firms) and the destination
market’s capital to labour ratio (relative to the world average). Significance levels are indicated by *, **, *** at 0.1,
0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
ported by firms to each market. Again, we control for the market fixed effect and firm
fixed effect. We use ln(product count) as the dependent variable in columns (1) and (2),
and product count from column (3) to (6). In all cases, firms tend to export fewer products
in markets where they face tougher competition due to comparative advantage.
To sum up, the evidence is consistent with Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 that firms facing
tougher competition due to comparative advantage have narrower export product scope
and more skewed export product mix.
3.4.2 Quantification of Comparative Advantage
We have shown that different measures of comparative advantage capture different mar-
gins of reallocations in action. Measures capturing only the extensive margin miss the
dampening force. Does such a distinction quantitatively make a difference? How impor-
tant are the different components of comparative advantage? To answer these questions,
we need to quantify and decompose comparative advantage using these different mea-
sures. However, there are a few challenges in doing so. First, we do not observe the ex
ante comparative advantage, which depends on the relative productivity differences across
industries between the home country and the RoW under autarky. We observe only the
open economies.22 Second, even for the open economies which we can observe, measuring
the relative productivities between the home country and the RoW remains difficult. One
practical obstacle is that we do not have the firm-level data for the RoW. Even if we had
22Most modern economies are far from economic autarky. Historically, economic autarky is less unusual
but only a few cases have been studied by economists. Bernhofen and Brown (2004) investigate the sudden
opening-up of Japan in the 1860s to test the theory of comparative advantage. Irwin (2005) studies the
welfare cost of the Jeffersonian Trade Embargo from 1807 to 1809. Kung and Ma (2014) exploit the severe
trade suppression during 1550-1567 in Ming China to study the relationship between autarky and piracy.
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the data, selection into exports would posit a significant challenge in estimating the un-
derlying productivities (Costinot et al., 2012).23 Finally, it is challenging to measure the
endogenous components directly. They depend either on the relative cost upper-bound of
the Pareto distribution or on the relative cost cut-off between the two economies, which
do not have clear empirical counterparts.
Given these challenges, we provide an identification result which shows that only the
export propensity χ(z) and export intensity λ(z) for the home country, trade elasticity k,
and trade freeness ρ and ρ∗ are needed to measure and decompose comparative advantage.
In other words, χ(z), λ(z), k, ρ, and ρ∗ are sufficient statistics for comparative advantage
and its subcomponents.
Proposition 3.7. We can write comparative advantage (as defined in Propositions 3.5
or 3.6) and its different subcomponents as functions of the trade elasticity k, the trade
freeness ρ and ρ∗, the export propensity χ(z), and export intensity λ(z).
Proof. See Appendix 3.D.7.
To quantify comparative advantage using this result, we calibrate the model to the
Chinese economy. We set the Pareto shape parameter k = 3.43, which is the estimated
median trade elasticity by Broda et al. (2006) for China.24 ρ and ρ∗, the freeness of
trade, are estimated using the Head-Ries Index (Head and Ries, 2001) and the World
Input Output Database. The details of the estimation are in Appendix 3.B. The results
are presented in Appendix Table C10. As we can see, the freeness of trade between China
and the RoW has been increasing over time. The average freeness was 0.043 in 2000 and
rose to 0.058 in 2003 and 0.071 in 2006. Given the trade elasticity k = 3.43, the implied
average iceberg trade costs dropped from 2.50 in 2000 to 2.16 in 2006. Finally, we measure
the export propensity χ(z) by the percentage of firms that export, and the export intensity
λ(z) by the percent of sales exported, which are the data underlining Figure 3.1.
Validating the calibration
Before getting the result, we validate the estimation by evaluating the model prediction
on moments that have not been used in the estimation. Our sufficient statics rely only on
information about exports. We can evaluate the model prediction on imports. According
23Costinot et al. (2012) argue that relative producer prices are good measures of relative productivity.
However, we do not have the relative producer prices between China and the RoW.
24As proved by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and synthesized in Head and Mayer(2014), under our
current model, the Pareto shape parameter corresponds to the trade elasticity. For robustness, we have
also checked the results using the median trade elasticity of 5.03 from the literature (Head and Mayer,
2014) and experimented with relative low and high elasticities of 2.5 and 7.5. The results are qualitatively
the same.
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to the model, the volume of exports from China to the RoW in industry z is given by
EXP (z) = 1
2γ(k+2)CM (z)k
NE(z)C
∗
D(z)
k+2L∗ρ, and the volume of imports from the RoW
to China is IMP (z) = 1
2γ(k+2)C∗M (z)k
N∗E(z)CD(z)
k+2Lρ∗. Therefore, the ratio of imports
to exports is
IMP (z)
EXP (z)
=
L
L∗
ρ∗
ρ
N∗E(z)
NE(z)
CM (z)
k
C∗M (z)k
CD(z)
k+2
C∗D(z)k+2
,
which depends on the relative market size LL∗ , relative trade freeness
ρ∗
ρ , the relative
number of entrants
N∗E(z)
NE(z)
, and comparative advantage captured by CM (z)
k
C∗M (z)k
CD(z)
k+2
C∗D(z)k+2
. We
can estimate
CD(z)
k+2
C∗D(z)k+2
CM (z)
k
C∗M (z)k
directly using the sufficient statistics results from Proposition
3.7. How well does this explain the variation of IMP (z)EXP (z) in the data? Answering this
question helps to validate the calibrated model.
Our matched firm and customs data contain imports for importers. We assume that
the imports of industry z from the RoW are the total imports of importers from industry z
in China.25 Under this assumption, we find IMP (z)EXP (z) tends to increase with capital intensity
z, as shown in Figure 3.5. For the most capital intensive industries, China ran trade deficits
since IMP (z)EXP (z) > 1.
On Figure 3.6, we plot ln( IMP (z)EXP (z)) against ln(
CM (z)
k
C∗M (z)k
CD(z)
k+2
C∗D(z)k+2
). As can be seen, there is
a very strong positive correlation. China tends to run trade deficits in industries of com-
parative disadvantage. We confirm this by regressing ln( IMP (z)EXP (z)) on ln(
CM (z)
k
C∗M (z)k
CD(z)
k+2
C∗D(z)k+2
).26
The results are shown in Appendix Table C9. The coefficients for ln(CM (z)
k
C∗M (z)k
CD(z)
k+2
C∗D(z)k+2
)
are positive and highly significant. Comparative advantage explains around half of the
variation in ln( IMP (z)EXP (z)) and remains robust after controlling for capital intensity.
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Figure 3.5: Chinese imports relative to exports by industries
25Ideally, we would like the firm-level data for the RoW to get exports to China by capital intensity.
26Ideally, we would like to run this regression: ln( IMP (z)
EXP (z)
) = a0+a1 ln(
CM (z)
k
C∗
M
(z)k
CD(z)
k+2
C∗
D
(z)k+2
)+a2 ln
N∗E(z)
NE(z)
+εz.
Our theory predicts that a0 =
L
L∗
ρ∗
ρ
, a1 = a2 = 1. However,
N∗E(z)
NE(z)
is not observable.
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Notes: The horizontal axis is ln(
CM (z)
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M
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CD(z)
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(z)k+2
). Higher values indicate greater comparative disadvantage of
China relative to the RoW. The vertical axis plots the logarithm of Chinese imports from the RoW relative to exports
to the RoW.
Figure 3.6: Imports relative to exports and comparative disadvantage
Results
Armed with the calibrated parameters and the data, we quantify and decompose the com-
parative advantage of China relative to the RoW in 2000, 2003, and 2006, using Proposi-
tion 3.7. First, the ex ante component is the same for the two measures of comparative
advantage as shown in the proof of Proposition 3.7 (we invert relative cost so that it is
comparable with relative TFPQ). This is plotted in Figure 3.7. To filter out the noise
in the data, we use local polynomials to fit the data, with confidence intervals indicated.
According to the result, China had ex ante comparative advantage in the labour inten-
sive industries. Over time, the ex ante component appears to favour the labour intensive
industries.27
To single out the endogenous components of comparative advantage, we divide the
overall comparative advantage by the ex ante component and get
CD(z)
T
CD(z)∗T
/
CD(z)
A
CD(z)∗A
=
[
1− ρC∗M (z)k/CM (z)k
1− ρ∗CM (z)k/C∗M (z)k
] 1
k+2
, (3.14)
Φ(z)T
Φ
∗
(z)T
/
Φ(z)A
Φ(z)∗A
= (
Φ(z)A
Φ(z)∗A
)k+1
L∗
L
L
L∗ (
CD(z)
C∗D(z)
)k+1 + ρ
1 + ρ∗ LL∗ (
CD(z)
C∗D(z)
)k+1
. (3.15)
The right hand side of the equations above are left with the endogenous components.
They are plotted in Figures 3.8 and 3.9. As can be seen from Figure 3.8, the endogenous
component of relative cost cut-off tends to favour labour intensive industries (relative cost
is inverted to be comparable with relative TFPQ. Here, it is the RoW relative to China).
This is not surprising given that the theory predicts that it is positively correlated with
27Huang et al. (2017) also find that the exogenous Ricardian comparative advantage increasingly
favoured labour intensive industries in China during the period 1999-2007.
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the ex ante component which favours the labour intensive industries.
However, as is evident from Figure 3.9, the endogenous component of relative TFPQ
tends to favour capital intensive industries. Given that our theory predicts that the
dampening component is negatively correlated with the ex ante component, the dampening
component would favour the capital intensive industries. This implies that the dampening
component must have dominated the amplifying component such that it determines how
the endogenous component will vary with capital intensity.
To examine the effect of the endogenous components on comparative advantage, we
plot the inferred overall comparative advantage in Figures 3.10 and 3.11. Figure 3.10
plots the overall comparative advantage which captures only the extensive margin, i.e.,
CD(z)
∗T
CD(z)T
. Figure 3.11 plots the overall comparative advantage which captures both the
extensive and intensive margins, i.e., Φ(z)
T
Φ
∗
(z)T
. Both measures tend to favour the labour
intensive industries. Given that the endogenous component of the measure capturing only
the extensive margin amplifies the ex ante component as we saw in Figure 3.8, it is more
variant than the ex ante component since all the lines are steeper in Figure 3.10 than
in Figure 3.7. However, due to the dampening effect of the endogenous component, the
measure that captures both margins is less variant than the ex ante component since all
the lines in Figure 3.11 are flatter than in Figure 3.7.
Table 3.4 confirms a similar message. Column (1) reports the regression coefficients
of capital intensity out of an OLS regression which regresses the ex ante comparative
advantage on capital intensity. Indeed, given the negative coefficients, the home country
tends to be less productive in the capital intensive industries ex ante. These coefficients
become even more negative in Column (2) when we replace the dependent variable by the
measure of comparative advantage which captures only the extensive margin. This shows
the effect of the amplifying endogenous component. However, the coefficients become less
negative in Column (3) when we replace the dependent variable by relative TFPQ which
captures both margins. This again shows that the dampening component dominates the
amplifying component.
3.5 Numerical Simulations
In this section, we parametrize and simulate the single-product model.28 We are partic-
ularly interested in the way that trade liberalization (lower variable trade costs) affects
comparative advantage. We are also interested in comparing the associated welfare change
with the homogeneous firm model.
28The purpose of the simulations is to demonstrate the model channel and provide numerical comparative
statics. For future work, we will structurally estimate a multi-product model.
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Figure 3.8: The endogenous component of relative marginal cost cut-off
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Figure 3.9: The endogenous component of relative TFPQ
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Figure 3.10: Comparative advantage measured by relative marginal cost cut-off
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Figure 3.11: Comparative advantage measured by relative TFPQ
Table 3.4: Comparing different measures of comparative advantage
Regressor Dependent variables
capital intensity (1) (2) (3)
year ex ante comparative advantage relative cost cut-off relative TFPQ
2000 -0.223 -0.285 -0.135
2003 -0.292 -0.428 -0.142
2006 -0.267 -0.451 -0.106
Notes: The table reports the coefficients of capital intensity out of regressions which regress the different
measures of comparative advantage on capital intensity. The dependent variable of column (1) is the ex
ante comparative advantage implied by the sufficient statistics. For column (2), it is the relative cost cut-
off estimated using the sufficient statistics. For column (3), it is the relative TFPQ estimated from the
sufficient statistics. All coefficients are significant at the 0.1% level.
3.5.1 Parameters
We assume that CM (z) and CM (z)
∗, the cost upper bounds for the home country and the
RoW, which determine the ex ante comparative advantage, can be parametrized as
CM (z) = az + b,
CM (z)
∗ = a∗z + b∗.
We also assume that a > 0 and a∗ < 0. Therefore, the home country has comparative
advantage in low z industries and the RoW has comparative advantage in high z industries.
The key parameters of the model are given by Table 3.5. We assume that CM (z) =
1.3 + 0.3z, and CM (z)
∗ = 1.6− 0.3z. As can be seen in panel (a) of Figure 3.12, the cost
upper bounds are symmetric around z = 0.5 for the two economies.
Moreover, we set the size of the two economies to be the same L = L∗ = 10. This is to
neutralize the market size effect. Consumers’ endowments of the homogeneous good and
incomes are set to be yc0 = y
c∗
0 = 50 and I = I
∗ = 50, respectively. These values are high
enough to ensure that the demand for the homogeneous good is positive.
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Table 3.5: Model parameters
Parameter Definition Value
a the slope of CM (z) 0.3
b the intercept of CM (z) 1.3
a∗ the slope of CM (z)∗ -0.3
b∗ the intercept of CM (z)∗ 1.6
fE fixed cost of firm entry 0.5
k Pareto Shape 2.5
α consumer preference 5
γ consumer preference 1
η consumer preference 0.5
τ iceberg trade cost, home to foreign [1.3, 1.4]
τ∗ iceberg trade cost, foreign to home [1.3, 1.4]
L number of consumers in the home country 10
L∗ number of consumers in the foreign country 10
yc0 home country consumers’ endowments of homogeneous good 50
yc∗0 foreign country consumers’ endowments of homogeneous good 50
I home country consumers’ labour income 50
I∗ foreign country consumers’ labour income 50
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
CD(z)
A
CD(z)
∗ A
CM(z)
CM(z)
∗
Chom(z)
Chom(z)
∗
(a)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
CD(z), τ=1.3
CD
∗ (z), τ=1.3
CD(z), τ=1.4
CD
∗ (z), τ=1.4
(b)
Notes: The solid lines indicate the home country while the dashed or dotted lines indicate the
RoW. Chom(z) and Chom(z)
∗ are the marginal costs inferred for the homogeneous firm model such
that it has the same welfare level as the heterogeneous firm model under autarky (see Appendix
3.E.2 for more details).
Figure 3.12: Cost upper bounds and cut-off costs
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3.5.2 Simulation Results
Given that the two economies have the same size, we expect the cost cut-offs under autarky
CD(z)
A and CD(z)
A∗ to be symmetric around z = 0.5 as well. This is indeed the case
in Figure 3.12 (a).29 Since we are interested in comparing the welfare change with the
homogeneous firm model, we follow Melitz and Redding (2015) to find marginal cost
profiles Chom(z) and Chom(z)
∗ for the homogeneous firm model such that it has the same
welfare level as the heterogeneous firm model under autarky. The detailed procedure
in finding Chom(z) and Chom(z)
∗ are in Appendix 3.E.2. For the model that we have
parametrized, the associated Chom(z) and Chom(z)
∗ are plotted on Figure 3.12 (a) as well.
They turn out to follow a pattern similar to CM (z) and CM (z)
∗ as well and are symmetric
around z = 0.5.
Figure 3.12 (b) plots the equilibrium cost cut-offs in the open economy CD(z) and
CD(z)
∗ for two scenarios, one in which the iceberg trade costs are τ = τ∗ = 1.4, and
the other with bilateral trade liberalization such that the iceberg trade costs are reduced
to τ = τ∗ = 1.3. Two observations result from comparing these two scenarios. First,
bilateral trade liberalization appears to widen the gap between CD(z) and CD(z)
∗. Both
CD(z) and CD(z)
∗ become steeper in the case with lower trade costs. It suggests that if we
use industry productivity measures which capture only the extensive margin, we will find
comparative advantage strengthened by bilateral trade liberalization. Second, bilateral
trade liberalization can change the cut-offs of different industries in different directions. In
Figure 3.12 (b), when trade costs are reduced, the home country cost cut-offs of industries
closer to z = 1 rise, while those closer to z = 0 fall. This result can be explained as follows.
In industries where the home country has comparative advantage, trade liberalization
reduces the cut-offs by increasing the accessibility of the foreign market. Furthermore,
there will be more entrants in these industries, given the rising profits of exporting. This
drives the cut-offs further down. Trade liberalization also increases market accessibility
for the industries where the home country has comparative disadvantage. However, it
also makes the very efficient foreign competitors even more efficient in serving the home
country, which deters home entrants and lessens competition in the home country. If the
entry channel is more pronounced, the cut-offs will rise after trade liberalization.30
We now examine how bilateral trade liberalization affects comparative advantage. As
29Our choice of parameters guarantees that CD(z)
A < CM (z) and CD(z)
∗A < CM (z)∗ to ensure
that there is export selection. The conditions are CM (z) >
√
2(k + 1)(k + 2)γ/L and CM (z)
∗ >√
2(k + 1)(k + 2)γ/L∗.
30The mechanism is similar to the discussion of preferential trade liberalization in Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008). In our case, formally, we have ∂CD(z)
∗k+2
∂ρ
= β
L2
2ρCM (z)
k−(1+ρ2)C∗M (z)k
(1−ρ2)2 . Therefore, the effect of
bilateral trade liberalization on cost cut-offs is positive if 2ρCM (z)
k ≥ (1 + ρ2)C∗M (z)k is satisfied. This is
more likely to be the case for high z industries in the home country.
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Figure 3.13: Bilateral trade liberalization and comparative advantage
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Figure 3.14: Trade liberalization and welfare
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suggested above, if the industry productivity measure incorporates only the extensive
margin, we expect comparative advantage to be strengthened. This is indeed the case in
Figure 3.13 (a). As trade costs go down, the relative cost cut-off get steeper. In contrast, if
we use TFPQ to measure industry productivity, the relative TFPQ becomes flatter when
we reduce trade costs. Therefore, comparative advantage is weakened by bilateral trade
liberalization. This suggests that the endogenous dampening force becomes stronger and
dominates when trade costs fall.
Finally, we compare the welfare level of our heterogeneous firm model with a homoge-
neous model which has the same welfare level under autarky. The details on the welfare
formula are given in Appendix 3.E.2. Melitz and Redding (2015) show that the Melitz
model with heterogeneous firms predicts higher welfare gains from trade than the Krug-
man model with homogeneous firms. While the mark-up is constant in the models that
they consider, it is variable in the models that we examine. As Figure 3.14 indicates, at
least in the parameter space that we specify, the heterogeneous firm model still predicts
higher welfare gains from trade than the homogeneous firm model.
3.6 Conclusion
We uncover new stylized facts on the way in which comparative advantage shapes intra-
and inter-firm reallocations. Not all of the facts can be reconciled with existing models with
constant mark-ups. We construct a model which interacts firm heterogeneity with compar-
ative advantage, featuring variable mark-ups. The model simultaneously explains the facts
and generates novel insights on the way in which firm heterogeneity affects comparative
advantage. We find that exporters face tougher competition in comparative disadvantage
industries. Such an effect from competition induces exporters to cut their product scope
and skew their product mix in the comparative disadvantage industries. We also find that
export selections along the intensive margin generate endogenous Ricardian comparative
advantage, which is negatively correlated with the ex ante comparative advantage. This
contrasts with the amplifying mechanism found by Bernard et al. (2007). In both our
calibrated Chinese economy and the simulated model, we find that the dampening force
can dominate the amplifying force.
To conclude, while comparative advantage has important implications for the micro
behaviour of individual firms, the micro level responses from firms have profound macro
implications. Some of the macro implications, such as welfare gains from trade, appear ro-
bust to the model specification. Other macro implications, such as comparative advantage,
appear to depend on whether we allow for variable mark-ups or not.
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Appendix
3.A Complementary Tables
Table C1: Export propensity and intensity: 2000-2006
Regressand: Export Propensity Export Intensity
Sample: All Non-SOEs Non-Processing All Non-SOEs Non-Processing
Exporters Firms Exporters Firms
capital intensity -0.247∗∗∗ -0.314∗∗∗ -0.169∗∗∗ -0.247∗∗∗ -0.334∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗
(0.0140) (0.0126) (0.0146) (0.0103) (0.0121) (0.00905)
year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
R2 0.793 0.880 0.654 0.648 0.708 0.608
Observations 700 700 700 700 700 700
Notes: Export propensity is the percent of firms that are exporters. Export intensity is defined as the share of
goods exported. Each observation is a year-industry while industry is defined as “HO aggregates”. Year fixed effect
is included in each regression. OLS is used. Standard errors clustered at each industries are reported in parentheses.
Significance levels are indicated by *, **, *** at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
Table C2: Export product scope: all exporters 2000-2006
Regressand: Mean Product Scope Share of Single Product Firms
Sample: All Non-SOEs Non-Processing All Non-SOEs Non-Processing
Exporters Firms Exporters Firms
capital intensity -1.921∗∗∗ -1.989∗∗∗ -0.719∗∗∗ 0.0950∗∗∗ 0.0988∗∗∗ 0.0564∗∗∗
(0.174) (0.162) (0.166) (0.00594) (0.00608) (0.00912)
year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
R2 0.236 0.293 0.133 0.495 0.497 0.292
Observations 700 700 700 700 700 700
Notes: Mean product scope is the average number of products exported within each industry. Industry is defined
as “HO aggregates”. Year fixed effect is included in each regression. OLS is used. Standard errors clustered at each
industries are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, *** at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
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Table C3: Export product mix: all exporters 2000-2006
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
core product share m0/m1 m0/m2 mean Herfindhal mean Theil
capital intensity 0.0742∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.0920∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗
(0.00373) (0.0271) (0.0318) (0.00432) (0.00987)
year FE Y Y Y Y Y
R2 0.553 0.260 0.307 0.581 0.613
Observations 700 700 700 700 700
Notes: The table contains results using the full sample of exporters. Industry is defined as “HO aggregates”.
The regressand of column (1) is the average sales share of the core product across firms within each industry,
and the log sales ratio of the core product to the second best product in column (2), and the log sales ratio of
the core product to the third best product in column (3). Column (4) and (5) regress the average Herfindhal
index and Theil Index of exports on capital intensity. Standard errors clustered at each industries are reported
in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, *** at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
Table C4: Export product mix: all non-SOE exporters 2000-2006
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
core product share m0/m1 m0/m2 mean Herfindhal mean Theil
capital intensity 0.0760∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗ 0.456∗∗∗ 0.0944∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗
(0.00369) (0.0264) (0.0303) (0.00433) (0.00976)
year FE Y Y Y Y Y
R2 0.558 0.262 0.312 0.586 0.619
Observations 700 700 700 700 700
Notes: The table contains results using the sample of none-state-owned-enterprises (SOE) exporters. Indus-
try is defined as “HO aggregates”. The regressand of column (1) is the average sales share of the core product
across firms within each industry, and the log sales ratio of the core product to the second best product in
column (2), and the log sales ratio of the core product to the third best product in column (3). Column (4)
and (5) regress the average Herfindhal index and Theil Index of exports on capital intensity. Standard errors
clustered at each industries are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, *** at 0.1,
0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
Table C5: Export product mix: all non-processing exporters 2000-2006
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
core product share m0/m1 m0/m2 mean Herfindhal mean Theil
capital intensity 0.0314∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.114∗ 0.0401∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.00494) (0.0414) (0.0684) (0.00559) (0.0120)
year FE Y Y Y Y Y
R2 0.178 0.0283 0.0146 0.210 0.225
Observations 700 700 700 700 700
Notes: The table contains results using the sample of non-processing exporters. Industry is defined as “HO
aggregates”. The regressand of column (1) is the average sales share of the core product across firms within
each industry, and the log sales ratio of the core product to the second best product in column (2), and the
log sales ratio of the core product to the third best product in column (3). Column (4) and (5) regress the
average Herfindhal index and Theil Index of exports on capital intensity. Standard errors clustered at each
industries are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, *** at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01
respectively.
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Table C6: Skewness of domestic sales within industry 2000-2006: all firms
(1) (2) (3)
Herfindahl index Theil Index Inter quartile range of log sales
capital intensity -0.0358∗∗∗ -2.270∗∗∗ -1.633∗∗∗
(0.00621) (0.0958) (0.0997)
year FE Y Y Y
R2 0.0905 0.712 0.601
Observations 700 700 700
Notes: The skewness of sales is measured across all firms within each industry, while industry is defined
as “HO aggregates”. Robust standard errors clustered at industry level are reported in parentheses. The
constants are absorbed by the year fixed effects. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, *** at 0.1, 0.05
and 0.01 respectively.
Table C7: Skewness of domestic sales within industry 2000-2006: all non-SOEs
(1) (2) (3)
Herfindahl index Theil Index Inter quartile range of log sales
capital intensity -0.0413∗∗∗ -2.529∗∗∗ -2.357∗∗∗
(0.00684) (0.128) (0.174)
year FE Y Y Y
R2 0.0943 0.734 0.504
Observations 700 700 695
Notes: The skewness of sales is measured across all none-state-owned-firms within each industry, while
industry is defined as “HO aggregates”. Column (3) has less observations because the 25th percentile of
non-SOE firm has zero domestic sales in certain industries. Robust standard errors clustered at industry
level are reported in parentheses. The constants are absorbed by the year fixed effects. Significance levels
are indicated by *, **, *** at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
Table C8: Skewness of domestic sales within industry 2000-2006: all non-processing firms
(1) (2) (3)
Herfindahl index Theil Index Inter quartile range of log sales
capital intensity -0.0269∗∗∗ -2.269∗∗∗ -0.468∗∗∗
(0.00414) (0.0826) (0.0506)
year FE Y Y Y
R2 0.0680 0.716 0.388
Observations 700 700 700
Notes: The skewness of sales is measured across all none-processing firms (firms not engaged in processing
exports) within each industry, while industry is defined as “HO aggregates”. Robust standard errors clustered
at industry level are reported in parentheses. The constants are absorbed by the year fixed effects. Significance
levels are indicated by *, **, *** at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
Table C9: Imports relative to exports and comparative advantage
dependent variable: imports year 2000 year 2003 year 2006
relative to exports ln( IMP (z)EXP (z)) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(CM (z)
k
C∗M (z)k
CD(z)
k+2
C∗D(z)k+2
) 0.461∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ .247∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗
(.0460) (.071) (.0322) (.032) (.037) (.087)
capital intensity z 0.143 .214 -.228
(.115) (.168) (.245)
constant 1.86∗∗∗ 1.51∗∗∗ 0.968∗∗∗ .540 .432∗∗∗ 0.837∗
(.227) (.396) (.141) (.372) (.156) (.485)
Adjusted R2 0.635 0.641 0.589 0.596 0.413 0.420
N 100 100 100 100 100 100
Notes: The dependent variable is log total Chinese imports relative to exports within each industry. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, *** at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
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3.B The Head-Ries Index
We estimate the trade freeness between China and the Rest of World using the Head-Reis
Index (Head and Ries, 2001). If we assume symmetric trade costs ρij = ρji and zero
domestic trade costs, then
ρij =
√
XijXji
XiiXjj
,
where Xij is the aggregate exports from region i to region j which follows the gravity equa-
tion.31 So if let i = China and j = RoW , we can infer the trade freeness between China
and the RoW. However, to implement this equation, we need data on local absorption
Xii and Xjj . These are not available from our firm survey or customs data but available
from the World Input Output Database (WIOD).32 Local absorption is computed as the
total outputs minus total exports. We estimate trade freeness using the formula above for
each sector. The summary statistics for the manufacturing sectors are displayed in Table
C10.33 The estimated average trade freeness between China and the RoW increased from
0.043 in 2000 to 0.071 in 2006. If the trade elasticity is k = 3.43, which is the median
trade elasticity estimated for China by Broda et al. (2006), then the implied iceberg trade
costs τ = ρ−
1
k dropped from around 2.50 in 2000 to 2.16 in 2006. If we use the median
trade elasticity 5.03 from the literature (Head and Mayer, 2014), the implied iceberg trade
costs are lower.
Table C10: Trade costs between China and the RoW: the Head-Ries index
year
trade freeness ρ implied iceberg trade costs τ
average min max k=3.43 k=5.03
2000 0.043 0.012 0.116 2.50 1.87
2001 0.045 0.012 0.129 2.47 1.85
2002 0.051 0.012 0.165 2.38 1.81
2003 0.058 0.013 0.218 2.29 1.76
2004 0.070 0.015 0.282 2.17 1.70
2005 0.073 0.015 0.323 2.15 1.68
2006 0.071 0.015 0.313 2.16 1.69
Notes: Trade freeness ρ is estimated using the Head and Ries (2001) method and the World Input Output
Data for manufacturing industries. The columns titled “average”, “min”, and “max” are the average, mini-
mum and maximum of the Head-Ries Index across 13 manufacturing sectors. The iceberg trade costs τ are
inferred using the average trade freeness according to ρ = τ−k where k is the trade elasticity.
31Our model generates gravity equation for the sectoral trade flow which satisfies the general gravity
equations classified by Head and Mayer (2014) even if firms produce multiple products.
32We use the 2013 release at http://www.wiod.org/database/wiots13. The details of the data can be
found in Timmer, Dietzenbacher, Los and Vries (2015).
33There are 15 sectors of goods and 20 sectors of services. Manufacturing sectors include all the 15
goods sector except the sector of “Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing” and the sector of “ Mining
and quarrying”. For brevity, we do not report the trade freeness for the service sectors. The trade freeness
for services between China and the RoW is lower but increases over time.
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3.C Complementary Figures
Our benchmark results only use data from year 2003. Now we include results using data
for 2000 and 2006. Our stylized fact 3 states that export product mix is more skewed
in capital intensive industries. Other than the measures of skewness used in the main
text, we present results using other measures. Figure C5 plots the average sales share
of the core product. The core product is defined as the product that makes up most of
the total exports. As evident from the figures, the average share of sales from the core
product is higher for the capital intensive industries. Figure C7 plots the average of the
log-ratios between the sales of the core product to the third best product. Figure C8 plots
the average Herfindhal Index of exporters for each industry. Similarly, we also include
additional evidence for stylized fact 4 using alternative measures, including Figure C10
which plots the Herfindahl Index of domestic sales across firms.
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Figure C1: Export propensity by industry
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Figure C2: Export intensity by industry
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Figure C3: Number of products exported
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Figure C4: Share of single product exporters
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Figure C5: Average value share of the core product for exporters
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Figure C6: Exports of the core product relative to the second best product
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Figure C7: Exports of the core product relative to the third best product
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Figure C8: Average Herfindhal index of exports across products
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Figure C9: Average Theil index of exports across products
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Figure C10: Herfidhal index of domestic sales across firms
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3.D Proofs
3.D.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
The export propensity from the home country to the foreign in industry z is
χ(z) = (
CX(z)
CD(z)
)k,
where CX(z) is the cut-off cost of export which satisfies τCX(z) = C
∗
D(z). So we have
χ(z) = ρ(
C∗D(z)
CD(z)
)k.
Given that ∂CD(z)∂z > 0 and
∂C∗D(z)
∂z < 0 , it is easy to see that
∂χ(z)
∂z < 0. Similarly, we can
prove that ∂χ
∗(z)
∂z > 0.
The model predicts that exports from the home country to the foreign in industry z is
EXP (z) =
1
2γ(k + 2)CM (z)k
NE(z)C
∗
D(z)
k+2L∗ρ.
On the other hand, the sales of industry z at home is
S(z) =
1
2γ(k + 2)CM (z)k
NE(z)CD(z)
k+2L.
The export intensity of industry z is thus given by
λ(z) ≡ EXP (z)
EXP (z) + S(z)
=
L∗ρ
L∗ρ+ L(CD(z)C∗D(z))
k+2
=
L∗ρ
L∗ρ+ Lρ
k+2
k χ(z)−
k+2
k
.
Since we have ∂χ(z)∂z < 0, it is easy to see that
∂λ(z)
∂χ(z) > 0, thus
∂λ(z)
∂z < 0. Similar results
hold for the foreign.
3.D.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2
The export product scope is given by Mx(z, c) for a firm with core competency c in
industry z. For firms that do export, i.e., the marginal cost of their core competency
satisfies c ≤ CX(z). Then Mx(z, c) = max{m|v(m, c) ≤ C
∗
D(z)
τ }+ 1. Since v(m, c) = $−mc
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and $ ∈ (0, 1), we have
Mx(z, c) = max{m| ln τ + ln c+m ln( 1
$
) ≤ lnC∗D(z)}+ 1.
Since
∂C∗D(z)
∂z < 0, for two industries z′ > z, we have C∗D(z′) < C∗D(z), we should have
Mx(z
′, c) ≤Mx(z, c).
That is the export product scope is non-increasing with comparative disadvantage.
3.D.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3
The sales ratio of product m and m’ for an exporter to the foreign country in industry z
can be written as
r(z, v(m, c))
r(z, v(m′, c))
=
C∗D(z)
2 − (τ$−mc)2
C∗D(z)2 − (τ$−m′c)2
.
Suppose m’> m, so product m is closer to core: τ$−mc < τ$−m′c. Since ∂C
∗
D(z)
∂z < 0,
it can be shown that
∂ r(z,v(m,c))r(z,v(m′,c))
∂z
> 0.
Export sales from the home country to the foreign country therefore become more skewed
in the more comparative disadvantage industries.
3.D.4 Proof of Proposition 3.4
Consider two single-product firms in industry z such that c1 < c2, the ratio of their sales
in the domestic market is given by
rd(z, c1)
rd(z, c2)
=
C2D(z)− c21
C2D(z)− c22
.
Taking partial derivatives of the sales ratio with respect to CD(z), we have
∂ rd(z,c1)rd(z,c2)
∂CD(z)
= 2CD(z)
c21 − c22
(C2D(z)− c22)2
< 0.
Tougher competition therefore skews more sales toward the better performing firm.
The multi-product firm case is less straightforward. Consider two firms with c1 < c2,
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their sales ratio in the domestic market is given by
Rd(z, c1)
Rd(z, c2)
=
M1−1∑
m=0
rd(z, v(m, c1))
M2−1∑
m=0
rd(z, v(m, c2))
=
C2D(z)M1 − c21 w
2
w2M1
1−w2M1
1−w2
C2D(z)M2 − c22 w
2
w2M2
1−w2M2
1−w2
,
where M1 and M2 are the product scope of the two firms, respectively. Since c1 < c2, we
have M2 ≤ M1. If M1 = M2, we have
∂
Rd(z,c1)
Rd(z,c2)
∂CD(z)
= 2CD(z)M1w
2
w2M1
1−w2M1
1−w2
c21−c22
(C2D(z)−c22)2
< 0. If
M1 > M2, we cannot sign the partial derivative. However, we claim that if the intra-firm
reallocation is dominated by inter-firm reallocation, our result is still true. To see that,
we first note that
Rd(z, c1)
Rd(z, c2)
=
r0 + r1 + r2 + ...+ rM1−1
Rd(z, c2)
,
where r0 = rd(z, v(0, c1)), r1 = rd(z, v(1, c1)), ..., rM1−1 = rd(z, v(M1 − 1, c1)). It can be
further rearranged as
Rd(z, c1)
Rd(z, c2)
=
M2−1∑
i=0
ri
Rd(z, c2)
+
Rd(z, c1)−
M2−1∑
i=0
ri
Rd(z, c1)
Rd(z, c1)
Rd(z, c2)
.
If we move the second term of the right hand side to the left, we have
(1−
Rd(z, c1)−
M2−1∑
i=0
ri
Rd(z, c1)
)
Rd(z, c1)
Rd(z, c2)
=
M2−1∑
i=0
ri
Rd(z, c2)
,
or
Rd(z, c1)
Rd(z, c2)
M2−1∑
i=0
ri
Rd(z, c1)
=
M2−1∑
i=0
ri
Rd(z, c2)
. (E.3.1)
Now we make two claims. First, the term on the right hand side of Equation (E.3.1),
which captures inter-firm reallocations, decreases with CD(z). This term looks at the ratio
of total sales for the first M2 products between the two firms, which is
M2−1∑
i=0
ri
Rd(z, c2)
=
C2D(z)M2 − c21 w
2
w2M2
1−w2M2
1−w2
C2D(z)M2 − c22 w
2
w2M2
1−w2M2
1−w2
.
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Therefore, we have
∂
M2−1∑
i=0
ri
Rd(z,c2)
∂CD(z)
= 2CD(z)M2
w2
w2M2
1− w2M2
1− w2
c21 − c22
(C2D(z)M2 − c22 w
2
w2M2
1−w2M2
1−w2 )
2
< 0.
Second, the intra-firm reallocation component
M2−1∑
i=0
ri
Rd(z,c1)
decreases with CD(z). To show
that is the case, first we note that for any product i, 0 ≤ i ≤M1−1, its share in the firms’
total sales in the home market is
ri
Rd(z, c1)
=
C2D(z)− (c1w−i)2
C2D(z)M1 − c21 w
2
w2M1
1−w2M1
1−w2
.
Therefore, we have
∂ riRd(z,c2)
∂CD(z)
=
2CDc
2
1(M1w
−2i − w2
w2M1
1−w2M1
1−w2 )
(C2D(z)M1 − c21 w
2
w2M1
1−w2M1
1−w2 )
2
. (E.3.2)
For i = 0, we have M1w
−2i = M1 < w
2
w2M1
1−w2M1
1−w2 =
∑M1−1
i=0 w
−2i given that 0 < w < 1.
Therefore,
∂
r0
Rd(z,c1)
∂CD(z)
< 0, which means the share of the core product must always in-
crease when competition intensifies. For i = M1 − 1, we have M1w−2i = M1w−2(M1−1) >
w2
w2M1
1−w2M1
1−w2 since it is equivalent to M1 >
1−w2M1
1−w2 =
∑M1−1
i=0 w
2i. Thus we have
∂
rM1−1
Rd(z,c1)
∂CD(z)
>
0, which means that the share of the worst product must always decline when competition
intensifies. Since M1w
−2i is decreasing with i, there exists a product m∗ such that for
i ≤ m∗ , we have ∂
ri
Rd(z,c1)
∂CD(z)
≤ 0, and for i ≥ m∗, we have ∂
ri
Rd(z,c1)
∂CD(z)
≥ 0. Consequently, when
CD(z) increases, the market becomes less competitive and the share of the total sales of
the firm’s first M2 products declines.
Given these two claims, going back to Equation (E.3.1), if we let f(CD(z)) =
Rd(z,c1)
Rd(z,c2)
,
h(CD(z)) =
M2−1∑
i=0
ri
Rd(z,c1)
, and g(CD(z)) =
M2−1∑
i=0
ri
Rd(z,c2)
, we have
f(CD(z))h(CD(z)) = g(CD(z)).
If we take the partial derivatives with respect to CD(z) for the equation above, we have
f ′
f
=
g′
g
− h
′
h
,
where f ′ = ∂f(CD)/∂CD, h′ = ∂h(CD)/∂CD, and g′ = ∂g(CD)/∂CD. Given the two
claims that we have made above, we have g′ < 0 and h′ < 0. The sign of f ′ is therefore
undetermined. It is negative if g
′
g <
h′
h , which means that inter-firm reallocations (captured
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by g
′
g ) dominates intra-firm reallocations (captured by
h′
h ). In the case of single-product
firms, there is no intra-firm reallocation, therefore, this condition holds naturally.
3.D.5 Proof of Proposition 3.5
Comparing the relative average marginal costs between the home country and the foreign
country under autarky and open economy, we have:
CD(z)
T
CD(z)∗T
=
CD(z)
A
CD(z)∗A︸ ︷︷ ︸
ex ante
 1− ρC
∗
M (z)
k
CM (z)
k
1− ρ∗CM (z)k
C∗M (z)
k

1
k+2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
amplifying
. (E.3.3)
where the first term is the ex ante comparative advantage and the second term is only
present when countries open to trade. It is easy to verify that the second term increases
with capital intensity z.
Depending on the relative size of CM (z) and CM (z)
∗ and the trade freeness, the re-
lationship between CD(z)
T
CD(z)∗T
and CD(z)
A
CD(z)∗A
is illustrated by Figure C11. Panel (a) is when
ρ∗CM (z)2k is always larger than ρC∗M (z)
2k so that
1−ρC
∗
M (z)
k
CM (z)
k
1−ρ∗ CM (z)k
C∗
M
(z)k
> 1, vice versa for panel
(c). Panel (b) is when there exists an industry such that ρ∗CM (z)2k = ρC∗M (z)
2k. In
all 3 cases, the differences in the relative average marginal costs across industries enlarge
under the trade equilibrium. Hence comparative advantage is amplified by the second
component.
Figure C11: Relative average marginal costs: autarky vs. trade
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3.D.6 Proof of Proposition 3.6
The relative quantity-based TFP between the home country and the foreign country under
open economy can be rewritten as
Φ(z)T
Φ
∗
(z)T
= (
L
L∗
C∗M (z)
k
CM (z)k
)
1
k+2 (
L
L∗
C∗M (z)
k
CM (z)k
)
k+1
k+2
L∗
L
L
L∗ (
CD(z)
C∗D(z)
)k+1 + ρ
1 + ρ∗ LL∗ (
CD(z)
C∗D(z)
)k+1
=
Φ(z)A
Φ(z)∗A︸ ︷︷ ︸
ex ante
(
Φ(z)A
Φ(z)∗A
)k+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
amplifying
L∗
L
L
L∗ (
CD(z)
C∗D(z)
)k+1 + ρ
1 + ρ∗ LL∗ (
CD(z)
C∗D(z)
)k+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
dampening
.
(E.3.4)
Given that k > 0, it is obvious that the second component is amplifying the effect of the
first component, the ex ante comparative advantage measured by relative TFPQ under
autarky. For the third component, if we define as f(z) ≡ L∗L
L
L∗ (
CD(z)
C∗
D
(z)
)k+1+ρ
1+ρ∗ L
L∗ (
CD(z)
C∗
D
(z)
)k+1
, we have
∂f(z)
∂z
=
(1− ρρ∗)(k + 1)(CD(z)C∗D(z))
k
(1 + ρ∗ LL∗ (
CD(z)
C∗D(z)
)k+1)2
∂(CD(z)C∗D(z)
)
∂z
> 0.
Given our assumptions that ∂CM (z)∂z > 0 and
∂C∗M (z)
∂z < 0, we have
∂(
Φ(z)A
Φ(z)∗A )
∂z < 0. That is
to say the third component is negatively correlated with the first two components. Hence,
it is dampening the ex ante comparative advantage.
3.D.7 Proof of Proposition 3.7
According to Proposition 1, the export intensity is
λ(z) =
L∗ρ
L∗ρ+ Lρ
k+2
k χ(z)−
k+2
k
=
1
1 + LL∗ ρ
2
kχ(z)−
k+2
k .
As a result, we can infer the relative market size LL∗ as
L
L∗
=
1− λ(z)
λ(z)
χ(z)
k+2
k
ρ
2
k
. (E.3.5)
Again, according to Proposition 1, the export propensity in each industry is given by
χ(z) = ρ(
C∗D(z)
CD(z)
)k
= ρ(
L
L∗
C∗M (z)
k − ρ∗CM (z)k
CM (z)
k − ρC∗M (z)k
)
k
k+2 .
(E.3.6)
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Immediately, ratio of average costs between the home country and the foreign is given
by
C∗D(z)
CD(z)
= (
χ(z)
ρ
)1/k, (E.3.7)
which is the measure of comparative advantage. Moreover the relative cost upper bounds
can solved be solved out of Equation (E.3.6) as
C∗M (z)
k
CM (z)k
=
ρ∗ + L
∗
L (
χz
ρ )
k+2
k
1 + L
∗
L ρ
− 2
kχ(z)
k+2
k
, (E.3.8)
substituting the relative size of LL∗ using Equation (E.3.5), it can be written as a func-
tion of the observables. Then the endogenous component of the comparative advantage
given by
1−ρC
∗
M
k
CM
k
1−ρ∗ CMk
C∗
M
k
is also known. Finally, the ex ante comparative advantage CD(z)
∗A
CD(z)A
=
( LL∗
C∗M (z)
k
CM (z)k
)1/(k+2) can also be inferred.
The ex ante component of comparative advantage are the same for the two measures
of comparative advantage since
Φ(z)A
Φ(z)∗A
= (
L
L∗
C∗M (z)
k
CM (z)k
)1/(k+2)
=
CD(z)
∗A
CD(z)A
.
(E.3.9)
The way to quantify Φ(z)
A
Φ(z)∗A therefore is the same as quantifying
CD(z)
∗A
CD(z)A
. Then the
amplifying component ( Φ(z)
A
Φ(z)∗A )
k+1 is also known. On the other hand, the dampening
component is given by
L∗
L
L
L∗ (
CD(z)
C∗D(z)
)k+1 + ρ
1 + ρ∗ LL∗ (
CD(z)
C∗D(z)
)k+1
=
(χ(z)ρ )
− k+1
k + ρ1+
2
k
λ(z)
1−λ(z)χ(z)
− k+2
k
1 + ρ∗ 1−λ(z)λ(z)
χ(z)
k+2
k
ρ
2
k
(χ(z)ρ )
− k+1
k
= (
χ(z)
ρ
)−
k+1
k
1 + ρ
1
k
λ(z)
1−λ(z)χ(z)
− 1
k
1 + ρ∗ 1−λ(z)λ(z) χ(z)
1
k ρ
k−1
k
,
which can also be inferred as long as we know {ρ, ρ∗, k } and observe {χ(z), λ(z) }.
3.E Complementary Theoretical Results
3.E.1 A Model with Constant Mark-ups
This appendix section shows how to decompose comparative advantage in the constant
mark-up heterogeneous firm model a` la Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007). Suppose
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the demand is given by the following quasi-CES preference34
U = qc0 − γ
∫ 1
0
lnQ(z)dz.
Under such a preference, solving the consumer’s problem we have
qci = −γ
p−σi
P (z)1−σ
,
where P (z) = (
∫
i∈Ω(z) pi(z)
1−σdi)
1
1−σ is the price index, and P (z)Q(z) =
∫
pi(z)q
c
i (z)di =
−γ.
For the supply side, we follow the standard Melitz (2003) set up in the case of open
economy: the entry cost is fE and fixed cost of serving the domestic market and foreign
market is fd and fx, respectively. On top of that, we assume that firms draw their marginal
costs from the Pareto distribution G(z, c) = ( cCM (z))
k, where CM (z) is the upper bound of
the marginal cost at home. Given the market demand faced by firm at home and foreign
and the iceberg cost assumption, we have
qi(z) = −γL p
−σ
i
P (z)1−σ
,
q∗i (z) = −γL∗
p−σi
P ∗(z)1−σ
,
and the optimal pricing for each market is given by
pd(z, c) =
σ
σ − 1c,
px(z, c) =
σ
σ − 1τc.
Then firm’s profit functions for each market are given by
pid(z, c) =
rd(z, c)
σ
− fd = −γL
σ
(
pd(z, c)
P (z)
)1−σ − fd,
pix(z, c) =
rx(z, c)
σ
− fd = −γL
∗
σ
(
px(z, c)
P ∗(z)
)1−σ − fx.
The zero-profit conditions are
−γL
σ
(
σ
σ−1cD(z)
P (z)
)1−σ = fd,
−γL∗
σ
(
σ
σ−1τcX(z)
P ∗(z)
)1−σ = fx,
34We get rid of the income effect to simplify the algebra. Huang et al. (2017) include the income effect
and arrive at similar results.
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where cD(z) and cX(z) are the cost cut-offs. Dividing the two equations above, we have
cX(z)
cD(z)
=
P ∗(z)
τP (z)
(
fdL
∗
fxL
)
1
σ−1 . (E.3.10)
To determine how cX(z)cD(z) varies across industries, we need to know how
P ∗(z)
P (z) varies
with z. To do that, we follow Bernard et al. (2007) to consider two extreme cases: free
trade and autarky. Then the costly trade case would then fall between.
In the case of free trade, every surviving firm from every country exports. The number
of varieties and the price charged by each firm in each market is the same. As a result,
the price indexes satisfy P (z) = (
∫
i∈Ω(z) pi(z)
1−σdi)
1
1−σ=P (z)∗ = (
∫
i∈Ω∗(z) pi(z)
1−σdi)
1
1−σ
under free trade. Moreover, the relative price index P
∗(z)
P (z) is constant.
Under autarky, P (z) = (
∫
i∈Ω(z) pi(z)
1−σdi)
1
1−σ = M
1
1−σ
z pd(ĉd(z)) where Mz is the
domestic firm mass, and ĉd(z)
−1 = ( 1G(cD(z))
∫ cD(z)
0 c
1−σg(c)dc)
1
σ−1 is the average marginal
cost. Similarly, for the foreign country, we have P (z)∗ = M
∗ 1
1−σ
z p∗d(ĉ
∗
d(z)). For the firm
mass, using the market clearing condition, we have Mz =
P (z)Q(z)
r(ĉd(z))
= −γr(ĉd(z)) . Given the
CES demand, we have r(ĉd(z))r(cD(z)) = (
cD(z)
ĉd(z)
)σ−1. Combining this result with the zero profit
condition, we have r(ĉd(z)) = r(cD(z))(
cD(z)
ĉd(z)
)σ−1 = σfd(
cD(z)
ĉd(z)
)σ−1, which implies that the
firm mass is
Mz =
−γ
σfd
(
ĉd(z)
cD(z)
)σ−1.
So the autarky price index in home country is given by
P (z) = [
−γ
σfd
(
ĉd(z)
cD(z)
)σ−1]
1
1−σ
σ
σ − 1 ĉd(z).
If we impose the Pareto distribution assumption, we have ĉd(z)cD(z) = (
k−σ+1
k )
1
σ−1 . Then the
price index is
P (z) = [
−γ
σfd
k − σ + 1
k
]
1
1−σ
σ
σ − 1(
k − σ + 1
k
)
1
σ−1 cD(z),
which varies one-to-one with cD(z). To determine cD(z), we use the free entry condition
under autarky which says the probability of survival times the expected profit equals to
the fixed cost of entry:
G(cD(z))pi(ĉd(z)) = fe,
whereG(cD(z)) = (
cD(z)
CM (z)
)k. Since pi(ĉd(z)) =
r(ĉd(z))
σ =
r(cD(z))
σ (
cD(z)
ĉd(z)
)σ−1 = fd( kk−σ+1)
1
σ−1 ,
it is easy to find that
cD(z) = (
fe
fd
k − σ + 1
k
)1/kCM (z),
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which varies one-to-one with the cost upper bound. Therefore, under autarky, we have
P ∗(z)
P (z)
=
C∗M (z)
CM (z)
,
which declines with z given the assumption that ∂CM (z)∂z > 0 and
∂C∗M (z)
∂z < 0. That is to
say, if we have z′ > z, then we have
cX(z)
cD(z)
=
P ∗(z)
τP (z)
(
fdL
∗
fxL
)
1
σ−1
=
cX(z
′)
cD(z′)
,
under free trade, and
cX(z)
cD(z)
>
cX(z
′)
cD(z′)
,
under autarky. Given the continuity of trade costs, it must be the case that under costly
trade, we have
∂χ(z)
∂z
< 0,
where χ(z) = ( cX(z)cD(z) )
k is the probability of export. Similarly, we can prove that ∂χ(z)
∗
∂z > 0
holds for foreign.
Combining the zero profit condition and free entry condition under costly trade, we
have
fd
∫ CD(z)
0
(
pix(z, c)
pix(z, CD(z))
− 1)dG(z, c) + fx
∫ CX(z)
0
(
pix(z, c)
pix(z, CX(z))
− 1)dG(z, c) = fe,
for the home country. It can be simplified as
fdCD(z)
k + fxCX(z)
k =
k − σ + 1
σ − 1 feCM (z)
k.
Similarly, for the foreign country, we have
fdC
∗
D(z)
k + fxC
∗
X(z)
k =
k − σ + 1
σ − 1 fEC
∗
M (z)
k.
These two equations imply
fDC
∗
D(z)
k + fXC
∗
X(z)
k
fDCD(z)k + fXCX(z)k
=
C∗M (z)
k
CM (z)k
,
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or
(
C∗D(z)
CD(z)
)k =
C∗M (z)
k
CM (z)k︸ ︷︷ ︸
exogenous
1 + fXfDχ(z)
1 + fXfDχ(z)
∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
endogenous
,
where the exogenous and endogenous components are positively correlated.
3.E.2 Welfare in the Homogeneous and Hetergeneous Firm Models
Welfare in the Heterogeneous firm model
Substituting the demand function and consumers’ budget constraint into the utility func-
tion, we have
U = yc0 + I +
∫ 1
0
[
γ
2
∫
i∈Ω(z)
(qci (z))
2di+
η
2
Qc(z)2
]
dz. (E.3.11)
If we define average price of industry z as p(z) = 1N(z)
∫
i∈Ω(z) p
c
i (z)di, and the variance of
price within each industry σ2p(z) =
1
N(z)
∫
i∈Ω(z)(p
c
i (z)− p(z))di, we have
U = yc0 + I +
1
2
∫ 1
0
[
(η +
γ
N(z)
)−1(α− p(z))2 + N(z)
γ
σ2p(z)
]
dz.
If firm productivities are Pareto distributed, we have
Uhet = yc0 + I +
1
2η
∫ 1
0
[
(α− CD(z))(α− k + 1
k + 2
CD(z))
]
dz. (E.3.12)
Welfare in the homogeneous firm model
If firms are homogeneous, their profits are all given by
pii(z) =
L
4γ
(pmax(z)− c(z))2.
Due to free entry, firms earn zero profit, and we have
L
4γ
(pmax(z)− c(z))2 − fE = 0,
which implies that the choke price is given by
pmax(z) =
√
4γfE
L
+ c(z).
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Then immediately, we have
q(z) =
L
2γ
(pmax(z)− c(z))
=
√
fEL
γ
.
Therefore, the demand by each consumer is qc(z) = q(z)L =
√
fE
γL . Given the demand
function, the choke price can be rewritten as
pmax(z) = α− ηQc(z)
= α− ηqc(z)N(z),
which implies that the number of varieties is given by
N(z) =
α− pmax(z)
ηqc(z)
=
(α− c(z))
√
γL
fE
− 2γ
η
,
and the overall consumption of the differentiated varieties is
Qc(z) =
α− pmax(z)
η
=
α− c(z)−
√
4γfE
L
η
.
Then using Equation (E.3.11), we know that the welfare:
Uhom = yc0 + I +
∫ 1
0
[
γ
2
∫
i∈Ω(z)
(qci (z))
2di+
η
2
Qc(z)2
]
dz
= yc0 + I +
∫ 1
0
N(z)fE
2L
+
η
2
(
α− c(z)−
√
4γfE
L
η
)2
 dz
= yc0 + I +
1
2η
∫ 1
0
[
((α− c(z))
√
γfE
L
− 2γfE
L
) + (α− c(z)−
√
4γfE
L
)2
]
dz.
To ensure that the welfare are the same under autarky for the models of homogeneous
and heterogeneous firms, i.e., Uhom = Uhet, we can let
(α− CD(z)A)(α− k + 1
k + 2
CD(z)
A) = (α− c(z))
√
γfE
L
− 2γfE
L
+ (α− c(z)−
√
4γfE
L
)2.
(E.3.13)
This is a sufficient condition for Uhom = Uhet. Let U˜(z)A = (α− CD(z))(α− k+1k+2CD(z)),
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the equation above can be rewritten as
(α− c(z))2 − 3
√
γfE
L
(α− c(z)) + 3
(√
γfE
L
)2
− U˜(z)A = 0.
It is, however, difficult to identify which of the two roots of this quadratic equation in
(α− c(z)) is the sensible solution. Alternatively, we can write the welfare for the homo-
geneous firm case as the function of varieties N(z) :
Uhom = yc0 + I +
∫ 1
0
[
γ
2
∫
i∈Ω(z)
(qci (z))
2di+
η
2
Qc(z)2
]
dz
= yc0 + I +
∫ 1
0
[γ
2
N(z)qc(z)2 +
η
2
(N(z)qc(z))2
]
dz.
Again, let Uhom = Uhet, we have
γ
2
N(z)(qc(z))2 +
η
2
(N(z)qc(z))2 =
1
2η
U˜(z)A.
Since qc(z) =
√
fE
γL , the left hand side can be rewritten as
γ
2
N(z)(qc(z))2 +
η
2
(N(z)qc(z))2 =
fE
2L
N(z) +
η
2
fE
γL
N(z)2.
Then we have
fE
γL
η2N(z)2 +
ηfE
L
N(z)− U˜(z)A = 0, (E.3.14)
which is a simple quadratic equation of N(z). Given that N(z) ≥ 0, the permissible
solution is therefore given by
N(z)A =
√
η2f2E/L
2 + 4 fEγLη
2U˜(z)A − ηfEL
2 fEγLη
2
.
Then we also know the corresponding Chom(z) which satisfiesN(z)
A =
(α−Chom(z))
√
γL
fE
−2γ
η .
Substituting the expression for NA(z) then gives
Chom(z) = α−
2γ + η1
2
γ
η
√1 + 4 U˜(z)AL
γfE
− 1
√ fE
γL
(E.3.15)
= α− 1
2
√
γfE
L
3 +
√
1 + 4
U˜(z)AL
γfE

= α− 1
2
(
3
√
γfE
L
+
√
γfE
L
+ 4U˜(z)A
)
.
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It is easy to verify that this is a solution to Equation (E.3.13). On the other hand, the
other root of Equation (E.3.13) leads to N(z)A =
−
√
γfE
L
(U˜(z)A+4
γfE
L
)− γ
2
η < 0.
In the open economy, the free entry condition is given by
L
4γ
(pmax(z)− cA(z))2 + L
∗
4γ
(pmax(z)
∗ − τcA(z))2 = fE ,
L∗
4γ
(pmax(z)
∗ − cA(z)∗)2 + L
4γ
(pmax(z)− τ∗cA(z)∗)2 = fE .
There are two equations and two unknowns pmax(z) and pmax(z)
∗. In principle, we can
solve for pmax(z) and pmax(z)
∗ for given parameters. Once the choke prices are known, we
can solve for Qc(z) and Q(z)c∗ using:
pmax(z) = α− ηQc(z),
pmax(z)
∗ = α− ηQ(z)c∗.
Moreover, firm outputs are known given that
qHH(z) =
L
2
(pmax(z)− c(z)),
qHF (z) =
L∗
2
(pmax(z)
∗ − τc(z)),
qFF (z) =
L∗
2
(pmax(z)
∗ − c(z)∗),
qFH(z) =
L
2
(pmax(z)− τ∗c(z)∗).
Then we can solve for the number of varieties {nH(z), nF (z)} using
Qc(z)L = nH(z)qHH(z) + nF (z)qFH(z),
Q(z)c∗L∗ = nF (z)qFF (z) + nH(z)qHF (z).
The solution is
nH(z) =
Q(z)c∗L∗qFH(z)−Qc(z)LqFF (z)
qFH(z)qHF (z)− qFF (z)qHH(z) ,
nF (z) =
Qc(z)LqHF (z)−Q(z)c∗L∗qHH(z)
qFH(z)qHF (z)− qFF (z)qHH(z) .
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The welfare for the home country is then given by
U = yc0 + I +
∫ 1
0
[
γ
2
∫
i∈Ω(z)
(qci (z))
2di+
η
2
(
∫
i∈Ω(z)
qci (z)di)
2
]
dz,
= yc0 + I +
∫ 1
0
[
γ
2
(nH(z)(
qHH(z)
L
)2 + nF (z)(
qFH(z)
L
)2) +
η
2
Qc(z)2
]
dz.
For the foreign country, it is given by
U∗ = yc0 + I +
∫ 1
0
[
γ
2
(nF (z)(
qFF (z)
L∗
)2 + nH(z)(
qHF (z)
L∗
)2) +
η
2
Q(z)c∗2
]
dz.
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